

PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

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ABSTRACT

Psychoanalysis: A philosophy of mind

by

Annie Laurie Maddox

This study explores the theoretical intersection of philosophy and psychoanalysis with consideration of the hermeneutic-interpretive tradition and the phenomenology of consciousness as the theoretical and practical foundation for psychoanalysis. This paper places emphasis on the contemporary model of intersubjective systems theory (IST), an instance of the general category of relational psychoanalytic theory, and examines this theory in light of philosophical and Freudian contributions. A basic assumption of this study is that a genuine *science of human experience* implies a phenomenological approach to lived experience, which culminates in consciousness. Therefore, in its purest form, psychology as a human science is to have its basis in the phenomenology of consciousness—with its chief concern being how consciousness is altered in the process of therapeutic change. In addition, it is believed that a philosophical outlook is essential to any rigorous study of psychological life as it provides a requisite context and ideological frame for clinical practice. A close reading of John R. Searle's book *The Rediscovery of the Mind* is introduced to explore how phenomenological philosophy understands conscious and unconscious processes, in contrast to Freudian conceptions of the unconscious, and how it elucidates aspects of human nature and the nature of mind. A hermeneutic-deconstructive approach to theory calls for open questioning of our ideological beliefs and implicit values, rooted in the wisdom and scientific traditions that precede us, and lays a foundation for the synthesis of philosophy and psychoanalysis.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, phenomenology, intersubjective systems, relational theory, philosophy, intersubjectivity, hermeneutic, psychoanalytic, consciousness

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I dedicate this endeavor to my loving family — Jarrett, Matt, Mom, and Dad—and
Kristin, my fellow soul travelers. Whom I deeply cherish.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction1

 Purpose of the Study1

 Brief Overview of the Topic3

 Statement of the Research Focus14

 Personal Relevance16

 Relevance to Clinical Psychology18

Chapter 2. Literature Review26

 Literature Relevant to the Topic26

 Need for Research on the Topic.....39

 History of Psychoanalysis with Origins in Philosophy40

 The historicity of Freudian philosophy.....46

 The political Freudians48

 The psychological individual versus society49

 Unconscious mental processes.....50

 Fechner: The first experimental psychologist.....54

 Freud’s disavowal of philosophy56

 The unconscious and its relation to ethics61

 Drive theory63

 The world as representation68

 Fromm’s inquiry into the ethics of hermeneutic understanding69

 Temporal lacuna in Freudian theory72

 Temporal transactions of consciousness as hermeneutic in form.....73

Contemporary Intersubjective Systems Theory (IST)	75
Personality as the structure of one's subjective world.....	82
Primacy of affect.....	83
Complexity theory	85
Challenges to analyst neutrality.....	86
Interpretation as suggestion	88
Systems theory	90
A supraordinate principle of human motivation.....	92
Neurotic symptoms and the process of concretization	93
Symbolic objects and the process of concretization	93
Enactments and the process of concretization	94
Dreams and the process of concretization	95
The role of the unconscious.....	95
Phenomenology and the Birth of Subjectivity	99
Holism versus atomism.....	100
The psychological individual: The self.....	102
Brentano's theory and subjectivity	105
Fidelity to the experiencing subject.....	109
Intentionality and Intersubjectivity	111
Transference.....	117
Consciousness / The Nature of Mind.....	123
History of consciousness.....	123
Theories of consciousness.....	139

PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHY OF MIND	vii
Chalmers’s theory of consciousness	139
Lear’s theory of mind.....	143
Searle’s theory of mind.....	146
Mental causation and nonconscious processes	150
Science and the Study of Consciousness	155
Other Psychoanalytic Views	161
Chapter 3. Methods.....	165
Research Approach	165
Statement of Reflexivity	169
Implications for Future Research.....	171
Chapter 4. Discussion	172
Overview.....	172
Limitations of Current Study	173
Implications.....	174
Conclusion	180
References	185
1	

¹ The style used throughout this dissertation is in accordance with the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (6th Edition, 2009), and *Pacifica Graduate Institute’s Dissertation Handbook* (2014-2015).

Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose of the Study

This paper explores how select themes from philosophical thought have influenced psychoanalytic theory development, and how particular topics in philosophy impact the practice of psychoanalysis through a study of relevant literature across disciplines. Of primary concern is the suitability of hermeneutic-interpretive and phenomenological models to psychoanalytic theory and practice. Special emphasis is placed on philosophical ideas or concepts that are implied, promoted, or embedded either implicitly or explicitly in contemporary methodologies and practice. A thorough explication of George Atwood and Robert Stolorow's *phenomenological contextualism* is a primary focal point of this paper, using their book *Structures of Subjectivity* (2014) as a guide. Close readings of the phenomenological philosophy of John R. Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (1992) will be introduced to describe how current understandings of conscious and unconscious processes are explicated in relation to the classical Freudian conception of the unconscious. These inquiries aim to underscore what phenomenological philosophy has to offer in the way of understanding aspects of human nature and the nature of mind.

In the opening sections of the paper I wish to shed light on how psychoanalytic practice and philosophical reflection about such practice intersect. My goal is not to articulate a new theory or model, but rather to bring more clearly into focus a perspective that renders "what is right before our eyes visible to us" (Conant, 1990, p. 1xii). An additional goal of this paper is the stimulation of philosophical inquiry and reflection as it

relates to psychoanalysis. A philosophical perspective appears as an integral aspect of psychology as a human science, as part of grappling with epistemological questions and assumptions in the cultivation of meaning, redressing ethical considerations, and in theory building and exposition. This grappling is an ongoing recursive, dynamical tension rather than a fixed, static point to which one arrives. An inherent assumption in this project is the stance that ideological positions, beliefs, and cultural influences are intrinsically reflected in our theories, and ideally are to be in concert with the methods we employ, as well as the values we hold or seek to hold.

Literary and legal theorist Stanley Fish (1988) has argued that resolving epistemological questions about how we come to knowledge is not enough to effect practical performance and that good theoretical descriptions do not necessarily lead to good, or even better, practice. However, it is my view that reflection on theoretical assumptions can bolster our efforts to both understand and shape practice, and provide protection against the promulgation of destructive, ineffectual, or limiting assumptions. Fish's suggestion that performance and theoretical-philosophical description are not interconnected activities "takes the pragmatist notion of the heterogeneity of disciplines to an absurd extreme" (Clarke, 1997, p. 4). To argue the merits of a particular therapeutic model or technique without a thorough examination of its theoretical or metatheoretical constructs appears as an underestimation of necessary standards for professional rigor when the emotional lives of patients are at stake.

Let me say at the outset that my interests in this project are largely philosophical, as I believe that a focus on our theories of understanding can reveal and promote a needed dialectic between the philosophical and clinical commitments that we inherently

hold. The goal of this dialectic is an open, substantive discussion of psychoanalytic themes in relation to a broad range of contemporary philosophical issues. This project is not a critique of psychoanalytic theory, but rather an effort to shift the debate in a direction that speculatively and critically elaborates upon it. My hope is that through examination of our current knowledge foundations, and by expanding the conversation on how knowledge or meaning shape our conception of the person who is doing the understanding and interpreting—and of who is being understood or interpreted—that an openness to productive revision will result. In psychoanalysis, the assumptions about *how* we know directly affect how we conceptualize and interpret the psychoanalytically constituted person or subject (Clarke, 1997).

Brief Overview of the Topic

The psychodynamic theory of Freud, as well as contemporary psychoanalytic theories, retain elements of philosophical thought that derive from earlier philosophers and their contributions. The phenomenological contextualism of Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, Donna Orange, and Bernard Brandchaft is a contemporary psychoanalytic model that incorporates classical Freudian theory with the phenomenological ideas of several philosophers, drawing heavily from philosophical thought generally. In *Structures of Subjectivity*, Atwood and Stolorow (2014) describe the conceptual and methodological foundations of their “psychoanalytic phenomenology” (p. 3), drawing upon the intellectual heritage of the hermeneutic tradition, aspects of the phenomenological movement, concepts of modern structuralism, and trends in contemporary Freudian thought. They define their psychoanalytic theory as “a depth psychology of human subjectivity devoted to the illumination of meanings in personal

experience and conduct” (p. 3) founded on the belief that an effective theory of personality must be able to “illuminate the structure, origins, and therapeutic transformations of personal subjective worlds in all their richness and diversity” (p. 3). As such, they use the term *subjective world* when referring to the contents of experience and *structures of subjectivity* to denote invariant unconscious organizing principles that consistently structure and thematize experience (Stolorow & Atwood, 1979). Their unique approach is referred to as intersubjective systems theory (IST), and can be grouped with what the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1926/1961) termed *Geisteswissenschaften* or human sciences.

The historical domination of all the scientific disciplines by positivism, defined as the inclination toward the *positive*, is understood in terms of *facts*, with facts being understood in relation to a particular construction of *reality*. Facts are facts only if they can be weighed, measured and experimentally determined. In this way, positivism is interpreted as both a maxim of concrete research and, more generally, as a theory of knowledge and culture (Heidegger, 1985/1992). As a thought system, positivism grew concurrently in France and England through the writing of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Comte identified three phases in the history of human existence: (1) religion, (2) metaphysics, and (3) science—with the phase of science in its beginning stages (Heidegger, 1985/1992). The influence of John Stuart Mill’s (2011) ideas in *A System of Logic* and the rise of neo-Kantianism through the rediscovery of Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. 2007) express this positivistic line of questioning. Hermann Cohen of the Marburg School wrote *Kant’s Theory of Experience*, which interpreted Kantian philosophy along positivistic lines and revealed a profound bias

toward philosophy of science. Thus, these investigations of the structure of knowledge in experience are performed to work out “the constitutive moments of knowledge in the form of a *science of consciousness*” (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 16). This return to consciousness became and remained a tacit thematic field of consideration in philosophy of science, scientific psychology, and epistemology; however, it was taken up by Dilthey in a completely different way. Despite the weight of the traditional philosophy of his contemporaries, Dilthey sought to “philosophize out of the matters themselves” (p. 18), leading him to postulate a novel and independently devised study of structures of experience and eventually to conclude the necessity of a psychology that would be a *science of consciousness*.

From his early years, Dilthey (1926/1961) understood the impossibility of transposing the method of the natural sciences over into the human sciences. He believed that to comprehend the historical disciplines philosophically required reflection on the basic structures of reality that constitute the actual theme in these sciences, which he called *life* (Heidegger, 1985/1992). For Dilthey, the human sciences are to be contrasted with the sciences of nature because of a key distinction in attitude toward their objects of study. Essentially, the natural sciences investigate objects from the outside, whereas the human sciences rely on a perspective from the inside, with the ultimate category of the human sciences being one of *meaning*, something that exists within human subjectivity rather than on the plane of material nature. The primary emphasis in the natural sciences is causal explanation, in contrast to the goal of inquiry in the human sciences with its focus on interpretation and understanding. Understanding (*Verstehen*) refers to the act by which one passes from the sign to the thing signified, from the expression to the meaning

being expressed (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014) and is a primary aspect of interpretive understanding in psychoanalysis.

This emphasis on interpretation and understanding was part of the notion of the methodology of human sciences as fundamentally hermeneutic in character.

Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation that was used initially by religious scholars in an effort to understand religious texts and scriptures. Its scope was later broadened by Schleiermacher to apply to any literary text, and Dilthey further increased the application of hermeneutics as a tool for interpreting human history in general (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). This was achieved through a process of “re-experiencing” (Makkreel 1975, p. 252), whereby the historian reconstructs a world of meaning attached to an event and then must comprehend the world from the perspective of its own intrinsic structure. This process resembles the interpretive analysis of texts and adheres to a pattern termed the “hermeneutic circle” (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014, p. 4). The patterned process of the hermeneutic circle whereby meaning is reconstructed is very much analogous to and constitutive of the analytic process.

The ideas of Franz Brentano’s (1874/1973) *descriptive psychology* had a major impact on Wilhelm Dilthey, and in his Academy essay of 1894, *Ideas Toward a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*, he argued to make such a psychology the primary science among the human sciences. Husserl carried out the task first articulated and set in motion by Dilthey in Dilthey’s launch of a new *personalistic psychology* against the dominant *naturalistic psychology* of the time with the psychical reconceived not as an event of nature, but as a person:

Dilthey’s scientific work sought to secure that way of regarding man which,

contrary to scientific psychology, does not take him for its object as a thing of nature, explaining and construing him by means of other universal laws of 'events', but instead *understands* him as a *living person actively involved in history* and *describes* and *analyzes* him in this understanding. (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 117)

Brentano's formulation of the structure of lived experience was misunderstood by his contemporaries and taken as metaphysical dogma, rather than as the composition of this structure of lived experience, or consciousness. Husserl did not look to the dogma and assumptions, but to the phenomena itself in determining that "*perceiving is a directing-itself-toward*" (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 32). Heidegger expounded upon this idea when he wrote "The comportments of life are also called acts: perception, judgment, love, hate..." (p. 36), and stated that consciousness has a basic constitution:

We must learn to see the data as such and to see that relations between comportments, between lived experiences, are themselves not complexions of things but in turn are of an intentional character. We must this come to see that all the relations of life are intrinsically defined by this structure. (p. 36)

Heidegger reaffirmed the significance of the work of Brentano and Husserl by underscoring the importance of the first discovery of phenomenology—that intentionality, like temporality, is a structure of lived experiences. When epistemological presuppositions are put aside, it becomes evident that comportment itself, in its essential architecture, is a directing-itself-toward (Heidegger, 1985/1992).

A *genuine science of human experience* implies a phenomenological approach to lived experience, which culminates in consciousness. Therefore psychology should in its

purest form be a human science with its basis in the phenomenology of consciousness. “The study of the mind is the study of consciousness in much the same sense that biology is the study of life” (Searle, 1992, p. 227). It is on this basis that I focus on some of the current views of consciousness in exploring concepts common to psychoanalytic theory, most notably the distinctions between conscious and unconscious thought. These expositions into the methodological and conceptual foundations of a psychology of human experience are endeavored from the viewpoint that clinical psychologists and psychoanalysts are the ideal experts on the architecture, importance, origins, and therapeutic transformations of personal subjective worlds. This view that the nature of psychoanalytic investigation and knowledge should be reframed as pure psychology has been a topic in recent analytic literature and represents an effort to translate these concepts into a novel conceptual language, an effort which this paper attempts to echo and amplify.

The psychoanalytic phenomenology of intersubjective systems theory (IST) differs from philosophical phenomenology most centrally in that the sphere of subjectivity, or the experiencing subject, is the origin and basis for theoretical constructions for IST, and not assumptions that reduce experience to physical matter (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). Psychoanalytic phenomenology regards the material world as one domain of experience, and the concepts of natural science are understood as modes of organizing that domain of experience. This view is held in contrast to a theoretical position that ascribes ontological priority to physical matter and views human consciousness as a secondary expression of material events. Atwood and Stolorow (2014) noted that the accretion of knowledge in the sciences of nature ironically involves the

organizing and associating of human observations (i.e. experiences). Materialism is a viewpoint founded upon reifying the concepts of natural science, and considers consciousness as an epiphenomenon of those reifications. In this way, the idea that a genuine science of human experience requires its own concepts and methods, distinct from the natural science model, is a principle tenet of the phenomenological movement.

In their book *Faces in a Cloud*, Robert Stolorow and George Atwood (1979) first outlined their phenomenological approach, which emphasized a subjective approach to experience, avoiding concepts that objectify consciousness by “localizing it within a mind, psyche, or psychical apparatus of any kind” (p. 2). Their theory includes elements from philosophers Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Edmund Husserl. One of the initial concepts of their approach is the intersubjective field—understood as “a system of interacting, differently organized subjective worlds” (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002, p. 9) and the ongoing collaboration of these worlds among participants. Their dialogical approach, formulated on an experience-near level of discourse, is contrasted with the more remote, solitary reflection that gave rise to Descartes’ philosophical ideas.

Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, and Donna Orange (2002) asserted that the Cartesian doctrine of the isolated mind is essentially a myth of our culture, which functions as a protective shield against “the unbearable embeddedness of being” (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 22) and is related to excruciating feelings and anxieties about our own finiteness and existential dependency. Intersubjective systems theory has at its basis the central concept of *a priori*, systemically derived principles that serve to organize subjective experience. In the 2002 book, *Worlds of Experience: Interweaving*

Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis, Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange noted that traditional psychoanalysis continues to operate under the assumptions of the Cartesian isolated mind, bisecting the subjective world of the person into outer and inner regions, which “reifies and absolutizes the resulting separation between the two, and pictures the mind as an objective entity that takes its place among other objects” (2002, p. 1). This reifying tendency has clinical implications for how one works therapeutically with patients, and appears as a remnant of an earlier thought system still exerting an influence today.

Stolorow and Atwood first identified this reifying tendency in *Faces in a Cloud* (1979) in their critique and literature review of the psychoanalytic metapsychology of classical Freudian theory and its many metapsychological constructs. The concept *metapsychology* was used to refer to those tenets that attempted to explain clinical psychoanalytic observations in terms of energies, forces, or other structures that were thought to exist objectively (Gill, 1976; Klein, 1976). For example, Freudian drive theory (the *economic* point of view) and its energy discharge model have been broadly criticized for using metaphysical constructs like instinctual drives—pressing for release of accumulated energies—to explain pathological developments of the personality (Freud, 1915/1976b). Robert Holt (1976) noted that Freud and his adherents erroneously used motivational concepts (e.g. *instinctual drives* and *drive energy*), as though they were concrete causal agents or entities. This reification put the emphasis on *drives* rather than on *drivenness* as motivationally and causally efficacious. Holt also suggested that Freud’s theory of instinctual drive is “so riddled with philosophical and factual errors and fallacies that nothing less than discarding the concept of drive or instinct will do” (p.

159).

Additionally, epistemological and ontological reflection for how theories and concepts are derived and understood has merit and implications for intellectual rigor, ethical behavior, and social responsibility in the creation of psychological theories and their applied clinical use. Through this contemplative approach we engage our preconceived perspectives and reassess their relevance and applicability in light of emerging knowledge and changing worldviews: “Philosophy is the process of making both our unacknowledged presuppositions and the limitations of our perspectives explicit so that we can question each other and ourselves” (Stolorow et al., 2002, p. 109). Donna Orange (2010) has described this questioning approach as “psychotherapy in a Socratic spirit” (p. 1), and evokes Socrates’ assertion that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (p. 1). Orange wrote that psychoanalytic sources including Sigmund Freud, Ronald Fairburn, Heinz Kohut, Hans Loewald, D. W. Winnicott, Stephen Mitchell, and Robert Stolorow were well grounded in the history of Western philosophy, and to understand their theories, it is helpful for us to have an understanding of same. Orange noted that an acquaintance with major thinkers in each tradition is often part of training in psychoanalysis and other humanistic forms of psychotherapy, and prepares clinicians to consider therapeutic work as “situated historically, culturally, and politically” (p. 1).

According to Richard Williams (1990), there is a new awareness of language and its importance to the field of psychology. Attention to the study of language has come from numerous diverse groups, including (1) philosophers representing the new analytic tradition (e.g. Baynes, Bohman, & McCarthy, 1987), (2) the *ethogenic movement*, which takes its emphasis on the significance of language from the works of Ludwig

Wittgenstein and others in the tradition (e.g. Harré & Secord, 1972; Harré, 1984), and (3) scholars from the phenomenological/hermeneutic tradition who consider language and its study a worthy human behavior important to psychology.

Williams (1990) introduced three major points in relation to this call to attend to language. First, the importance of language as a human phenomenon has not been fully examined by the discipline: “It is argued that all things in the world, including human behavior, exist only in and through language. All that is known, or can be known, is known in discourse about it” (p. 140). This assertion was made by Gadamer (1975) throughout his many works. The second point is that the primary feature of being human is that we are born into and live within an ongoing conversation or discourse (Harré, 1979; Harré, Clarke, & DeCarlo, 1985): “We are what (who) we are only in and through our participation in the discourse” (p. 150). Thus in participating we both alter and add to the conversation. Lastly, the third argument follows from the basic significance of language and discourse as the grounding of the human world, and the precondition for all human understanding and meaning-making activity (Williams, 1990).

This emphasis on language is of particular importance to contemporary relational approaches as well as, the future of psychoanalysis in augmenting the clinical utility of its theoretical foundations, and how language is used within the analytic encounter. The focus on language is not to deny or negate the significance of affective experience, nonverbal, and prelinguistic experience to human life—which constitute the building blocks of human experience—but to highlight that when language captures experience most vividly through its metaphoric lens, it can enrich and deepen lived experience, connecting individuals through dialogue created in an effort to communicate meaning.

Juan Tubert-Oklander (2014) wrote about the metaphoric nature of language and how metaphors convey hyper-complex meanings, in what psychoanalyst Alfred Bion (1962) referred to as a “penumbra of associations” (Tubert-Oklander, 2014, p. 231), or in semiotic language, their *connotations*.

Here we are dealing with a most complex dynamic evolution of phenomena, for which it [is] not possible to define any part of it as a “cause” of all the rest that happens, since any one phenomenon can be seen either as a “cause” or an “effect” according to the way one decides to “punctuate” a sequence of events. (p. 231) (Bateson, 1972; Watzlawick, Jackson, & Beavin, 1967).

Tubert-Oklander (2014) argued that a nonlinear model of mind is needed to “include and highlight analogically complex interaction, simultaneity, reversibility and mutual determination” (p. 231). Intersubjective systems theory offers a nonlinear dynamic systems theory, and a strong foundation on which to build for mapping how associations, nuanced meanings, new linkages, and new configurations of self and other are established and maintained. The future is promising for adding to this rich heritage through refinement of these contemporary theories regarding (1) how understanding is conveyed in the implicit register of communication, (2) how various interventions produce subtle alterations in our understanding of self and other, and (3) how these impact organizing principles, future behavior, and broaden perspectival understanding.

Statement of the Research Focus

The goal of this research is to consider the applicability of select philosophical thought systems on aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice. This includes research drawing from the historical underpinnings of Western thought based primarily in

continental philosophy, and its impact on psychoanalytic theory development. A secondary goal of this project is to serve as another voice in the ongoing dialogue and growing body of literature interested in the practical influence of the philosophical origins of psychoanalytic theory. As such, this paper considers key interdisciplinary writings with relevance to select psychoanalytic concepts grounded in the contemporary psychoanalytic phenomenology of Robert Stolorow and George Atwood. This paper also introduces the notion that psychoanalytic phenomenology has an intrinsic leaning toward the exploration and aspects of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to intersubjectivity. References to current and historical scientific paradigms and *thought systems* serve as a contextualizing backdrop for consideration of the relevant zeitgeist of certain periods, and show how discoveries in other fields of study effect psychoanalytic theory development and its processes.

This project provides a reflection on key theoretical constructs that have relevance for psychoanalytic theory and the vital contexts within which they arise. I will argue that for analysts to study and ponder through self-reflection and research what constitutes mental life, and to become proficient as experts on the characteristics of consciousness is ideally suited for psychologists who identify as scholar-practitioners. The field of psychology is uniquely poised to teach and assimilate theories of consciousness and psychologists can use this epistemological background to inform everyday clinical practice.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul Ricoeur, and Jürgen Habermas are philosophers who have all made philosophical critiques of Freudian psychoanalysis. Excellent philosophical discussions of Freud by Jonathon Lear (1990) and other

nonprofessional philosophers like Peter Gay (2006) and Philip Rieff (1979) have also made significant contributions to the wide-ranging philosophical implications of Freud and psychoanalytic theory generally. However, the focus of this paper is not on a particular critique conducted by a historical philosopher, but on the inherent philosophical nature of the psychoanalytic endeavor and a recognition of this heritage and contribution for enlarging our understanding and broadening our knowledge fundament as practitioners who are also experts on the phenomenology of mind. There are several possible orientations to works that examine relations between philosophy and psychology: (1) philosophical principles can be used to criticize and cast doubt on psychoanalysis, (2) psychoanalytic findings may be used to illuminate traditional philosophical problems (e.g. freedom and determinism), or (3) psychoanalysis may be used to understand the psychological origins of philosophical ideas (Hanly, 1979). To these I would add a fourth orientation: the elaboration of psychoanalytic concepts through a philosophical lens.

For the purpose of clarification at the outset, I wish to point out that I have knowingly referred to unconscious processes invoking the outdated moniker *the unconscious* that is a certain reified remnant of Cartesian dualism. I use this term not ironically, but to more purely reflect the literature reviewed and because the term appears prominently in its original sources as a reified concept. It is my hope that this semantic convenience will not undermine one of the central purposes of the paper, which is to seek new understanding through the employment of a more precise clinical lexicon that more closely reflects the tenets and evolving paradigm, without continuing to cling to outmoded thought systems as represented in such metaphysical language games.

Furthermore, and for clarification, the terms *mind* and *consciousness* are used interchangeably throughout the paper and are understood as coextensive referents.

Personal Relevance

My personal interest in this topic was inspired by an introduction during graduate school to several key texts as sources relevant to the interrelation of psychoanalysis and philosophy in theory creation. The contemporary writings that first drew my attention to this topic include *Reconsidering Psychology: Perspectives from Continental Philosophy* by James Faulconer and Richard Williams (1990); *Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary Psychoanalysis and the Humanistic Psychotherapies* by Donna Orange (2010); and *Worlds of Experience: Interweaving Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis* by Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, and Donna Orange (2002). These books among others provided a preface to my consideration of the contributions of philosophical thought to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

Underlying this research project is my personal belief that ideas or ideological considerations serve as the basis for a therapeutic framework, which inform practice in the clinical setting. Awareness of the historical-philosophical framework underpinning contemporary psychological theories serves to animate buried or preconscious ideas and ideals in the discovery of a new understanding modeled on our relevant past. If we seek to discern errors or discrepancies in our current designs or theories, we may witness the rebirth of some ideas that were part of the philosophical origins of psychology at its inception, and the demise of others that are no longer useful or germane. A hermeneutic-deconstructive approach to theory calls for an open questioning of theory and such a rethinking reopens the theoretical conversation, allowing it to continue.

As contemporary psychologists, appearing in this socio-cultural context within a particular geographical place in history and time, we cultivate and use a frame reflective of the collective knowledge of our time that is rooted in the wisdom and scientific traditions that precede us. The addition of scientific and philosophical discoveries supports us in our ongoing grappling with existential, epistemological and ontological beliefs and tenets. Assuming that we see the merit of this ongoing dialogue, we may consider this kind of reflection as less a burden, and more a responsibility, or even a privilege.

It seems evident that a philosophical outlook is essential to any serious study of psychological life as it provides a requisite context. It offers a contextualizing framework that can usher in deeper or more nuanced affective and intellectual contemplation, and culminate in a more ethical approach to treatment. As scholar-practitioners we are a voice in the ongoing dialogues and critical analyses of the worldviews within which we find ourselves. And as such, we contribute to emerging worldviews, for good or ill, as we participate in the zeitgeist of the times. In addition, it seems imperative that the worldviews we espouse be reflected in the theories we create, adopt, or proffer, even as those worldviews and methods are being shaped and modified as an ongoing aspect of our theory building and *living-in* the world. In this vision, a reflexive, receptive stance in relation to theory and praxis, along with rigorous philosophical introspection are seminal ingredients of the modern psychologist.

Relevance to Clinical Psychology

The relevance to clinical psychology resides in a reconsideration of select ideas or concepts related to psychoanalytic theory and practice. The attempt to utilize

philosophical contributions as a background to understanding the structures of consciousness (conscious and nonconscious processes) that constitute the human experience is at the heart of this paper. Calvin O. Scrag (1990) discussed three issues in understanding the science of human behavior: (1) the nature of talk about human behavior and the domain of data for a science of human behavior, (2) the relation of theory to practice and concepts to facts, and (3) how one may integrate explanation and understanding (p. 3). Aspects of each of these issues is captured by the current research focus and brought into dialogue through the conclusions that follow in the synthesis of ideas from the texts and thinkers represented.

Merold Westphal (2003) described philosophy as “faith seeking understanding. Or vision seeking articulation” (p. 14). In this sense, *faith* is not religious faith, but rather the presuppositions with which philosophical reflection begins as reflected in the *prejudices* of Gadamer and the *preunderstandings* of Heidegger; in which human thought does not come from nothing but moves from somewhere to somewhere else. This kind of bracketing provides an important frame for a hermeneutics of understanding. According to Westphal:

We bring prephilosophical beliefs with us to philosophical reflection. These beliefs, which fall along the spectrum from tacit to fully explicit, are tightly wedded to forms of life or practices in two ways. On the one hand, they arise out of the language games in which we become competent players. We come to hold them primarily by being socialized in the life of a human community, on the other hand, these beliefs shape both our attitudes and our actions. In this way, they serve to reinforce and legitimize the life-worlds, which are their bearers. (2003, p.

15)

Such beliefs are part of our identity, and they can be considered “commitments” (p. 15), however shallow or fleeting, and signify the opinions, or traditions in which we are embedded and that appear in our most sophisticated reflection. According to Westphal, this is a reminder that human thought is always situated and reason is never pure. The goals of psychoanalysis have generally centered around a focus on emotional healing and inquiries into human nature and human existence. Philosophical assumptions necessarily form a part of psychoanalysis at every level of its theory and praxis, and are one of its principal constitutive contexts (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). There is a growing intimate connection between the traditionally distinct disciplines and tasks of philosophers and psychoanalysts, evidenced as the lines are starting to cross and blur through program studies of the *psychoanalysis of philosophy* and the reciprocal studies of the *philosophy of psychoanalysis*. Philosophical precepts, like psychoanalytic theories can be viewed as *ways of being*, articulated through the philosopher’s personal world and lens of experience and life history. Atwood and Stolorow (2014) asserted that under this premise, psychoanalysis itself might be viewed as its own distinct form of philosophy.

This radical view may initially create disequilibrium for some analysts, but may also instill a requisite prudence that is lacking without this contextualizing, broader frame for understanding the work we do and the way in which we do it. The expression of human nature and its multiplicity of manifestations (i.e. ways of being) have far-reaching implications for our patients and for ourselves in the therapeutic strivings to assist patients in navigating through changing worldviews in the cultivation of personal lifeworlds of subjective experience. As Atwood and Stolorow (2014) have stated:

As changes occur in our way of understanding worlds of personal experience, corresponding transformations in the field of clinical practice inevitably follow in their wake. Psychopathology, for example, will no longer be reducible to an array of discrete mental illnesses, conceived as located somehow within isolated individuals. Instead, the task of diagnosis shifts to the identification of recurrent patterns of disturbance or disequilibrium in complex intersubjective systems. (p. 142)

This idea suggests a shunning of the reified psychiatric diagnostic categories in favor of a focus on features of experience and behavior inseparable from the relational fields in which they cohere, formerly known as symptoms. This is yet another application for a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach to clinical intervention. To think about, to wonder, to analyze, and to question our socio-cultural worldviews for the purpose of greater understanding of self and others, are core values that define the psychoanalytic approach—and psychologists, in particular, are natural heralds for these questions and invocations.

James Faulconer and Richard Williams (1990) identified the problem of metaphysics as playing a key role in the manifestation of a more strictly psychological problem—psychologism. Faulconer and Williams denoted manifestations of psychologism as taking two forms: (1) the reification of mental or psychological states, which become the conditions, antecedents, and explanations for human action, and (2) the adoption of the models and methods of the natural sciences as appropriate for psychology. Psychologism is problematic because it always invokes what it should be explaining. An example of this would be the psychological tradition's borrowing of the

term *environment* from the natural sciences to represent “the totality of influences, entities or events outside the individual” (p. 9).

According to Faulconer and Williams (1990), all these answers formulated by psychology are laden with conceptual problems containing the seeds of their own insolubility, seeds that are fostered in the dominant *metaphysics of things*, from which psychological theorizing arises. In their critique, these assumptions harken to a long tradition and legacy in Western thought based in Cartesian dualism that creates a problem for psychology in the form that these assumptions have taken in terms of psychological theory and practice. In addition, they asserted that the model of mind and world given to us by 17th-century philosopher Rene Descartes assumes a distinction between mind and world, in which mind and world are distinct substances or modes of being whereby, inner and outer worlds are extricable and independent. The turn to privilege the inner world over the outer, or the outer over the inner, or to consider the inner subjective, and outer, the environment is to install the idea of variables in “lawful and impersonal interaction with one another” (Harré, 1977, p. 11).

Faulconer and Williams (1990) made the assertion that an affirmation of individualism is at the heart of all formal definitions of psychology, “Conceived variously as psyche, self, or organism, the individual is the focus and object of study for psychology, as well as the seat and origin of psychological function” (p. 9). Thus it follows that contemporary psychology emphasizes the study of behavior at the level of individual human being, setting psychology apart from related social science disciplines like anthropology or sociology. In spite of this focus on studying behavior at the level of the individual, it is clear that human beings are always encountered in complex groups

and do not act independently of the world in which they live (Faulconer & Williams, 1990). The integration of previously discrete thought systems ideally leads to intellectual hybridization, and can avoid the reductionism found in thought systems that adopt the language of another research field without retaining the conceptual, contextual, and historical relevance of same terms, thus losing essential meaning in the process.

Faulconer and Williams (1990) noted that all schools in mainstream psychology could be characterized by how they answer the question: “What is the nature of the relationship between human being and the nonhuman environment?” (p. 10). The normative ways in which this is explained can be divided into component parts: (1) behaviorists emphasize the pervasive and dominant impact of the environment, reducing the human being to the product of environmental contingencies and reinforcement schedules, (2) others move the environment inside to genetic, biochemical forces or to an “autonomous psychic entity” (p. 10) such as the traditional Freudian id, (3) the opposite move, a Kantian one makes the environment less important than its active conceptualization, and (4) the recent approach of cognitive psychology stresses the interaction of the person and environment, or between the “inner and outer worlds” (p. 10), reaching a middle ground.

In *Structures of Subjectivity* (2014), George Atwood and Robert Stolorow wrote that metaphysical illusion and metapsychology spring from the same impulse, and that their activities are in response to the same desire—to transcend the tragic finitude of human existence. Atwood and Stolorow locate the source of the metaphysical impulse in the experiential worlds of thinkers themselves, whether psychoanalytic or philosophical. They noted that the first Western philosopher to investigate systematically the relation

between the tragedy of human finitude and the universality of metaphysical illusion was Wilhelm Dilthey (1910/2002). In *The Tragedy of Finitude* (2004), Jos de Mul recast Dilthey's life as an effort to replace Kant's *a priori*—the timeless forms of perception and categories of cognition through which we come to know the world—with *life categories* that are historically situated and constituted over the course of life and time. De Mul (2004) intuited a tragic dimension within Dilthey's work stating that the historical consciousness of Dilthey brings out “the tragic contradiction between the philosophical desire for universal validity [the metaphysical impulse] and the realization of the fundamental finitude of every attempt to satisfy that desire” (p. 154).

Dilthey's historical examination of the development of metaphysics is an attempt at its undoing in an effort to unmask the illusion this ubiquitous desire stimulates, although Dilthey considered metaphysical aims to be intrinsic to human nature (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). According to Dilthey, metaphysical illusion transforms “historically contingent nexuses of intelligibility” (p. 130)—*worldviews*, as he calls them—into timeless forms of reality. Preceding Heidegger (1927/1962), Dilthey asserted that every *worldview* is grounded in a mood regarding the tragic realization of the finitude of life, and that “the metaphysicalization of worldviews transforms the unbearable fragility and transience of all things human into enduring, permanent, changeless reality, an illusory world of eternal truths” (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014, p. 130).

Succeeding Dilthey, Heidegger later offered his account of the history of metaphysics in which he illuminates the grand metaphysical systems of Western philosophy as “objectifications of epochs in the historical unfolding of Being (*Sein*)” (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014, p. 130). In this view, the foundationalist systems of Plato,

Aristotle, and Descartes reify the way entities showed up in that particular epoch; thus their respective thought systems are viewed as manifestations of the intelligibility of entities appearing in that time. According to Heidegger (1954), Nietzsche's metaphysical doctrine of the eternal return of the same captures the intelligibility of entities in our technological era, reflecting a worldview that considers entities useful only as resources to be "calculated, stored and optimized in the quest to conquer the earth" (p. 130). But later Heidegger appears to fall prey to this metaphysical impulse when he formulates Being as an inexhaustible and unknowable source of all intelligibility. This notion of an inexhaustible source suggests that this reifying and absolutizing tendency held sway in his theorizing in the face of his own human finitude (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014).

Atwood and Stolorow (2014) concluded that because metaphysics arises in response to the "tragic finitude of our existence" (p. 140) that it cannot be permanently transcended, and consequently there will "never be a psychoanalytic theory that is completely metapsychology-free" (p. 140). They pose in the way of a solution that a shared commitment to reflection on the vital contexts of all our theoretical constructs be undertaken, even including the idea of context itself. Transformations have already begun in which long-established psychoanalytic concepts are receding from usage, such as *psychical apparatus* and *internal psychodynamics*, and the psychological knowledge contained within them is being translated into more hermeneutic or phenomenological terms.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Literature Relevant to the Topic

Jonathan Lear (1998) described philosophy and psychoanalysis as “two activities which lie at the heart of humanity” (p. 3) and that resist professionalism in the sense that they resist fixed norms. In Lear’s view, the idea of a profession of psychoanalysis or a profession of philosophy is a contradiction in terms, as the very idea of a profession is that of a defensive structure—and philosophy and psychology attempt to undo such defenses. Likewise, philosophy and psychology are activities that share the same fundamental question posed by Socrates: *in what way should one live?* According to Lear (1998):

In psychoanalysis, the accent is on the first person singular—How shall I live? In philosophy, on the first person plural—How shall we go on? But as anyone who has engaged in either activity knows, you cannot investigate I without addressing We, and vice versa. (p. 4)

For Socrates, human living consists of living openly with this question, and any fixed set of norms attempts to foreclose the question of how to live by giving a prepackaged answer or set of standards (Lear, 1998). Thus for Socrates, the unexamined life is not worth living because it is not a form of living, but a form of deadness grounded in *knowingness*. Lear stated, “It is part of the logic of psychoanalysis and philosophy that they are forms of life committed to living openly—with truth, beauty, envy and hate, wonder, awe and dread” (p. 5). Lear invoked Freud’s definition of illusion—as a belief or worldview caused by a wish rather than by a perception of how the world is—to

account for the erotic engagement and striving to codify, preserve, and pass along the activities of philosophy and psychoanalysis expressed through such organizations as the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Philosophical Association. He identified these groups as tangible expressions emblematic of the *illusion* of psychoanalysis and philosophy as professions.

Lear also noted that the activity Plato described as “giving a logos of the psyche” (1998, p. 6), (i.e. working out the logic of the soul), has all but disappeared from psychology. Plato, in his project the *Republic*, is seen working out the idea of what it means to be minded as we are, in the reflection of Socrates’ example, in a life spent showing that “one of the most important truths about us is that we have the capacity to be open minded: the capacity to live nondefensively with the question of how to live” (p. 8). This capacity for open mindedness, and desire to live nondefensively is at the heart of the psychoanalytic movement.

That psychoanalysis is a continuation of the Platonic tradition is not a novel concept, as Plato in the *Republic* essentially invents *psyche-analysis*, dividing the psyche into three basic parts: the appetitive part (e.g. drives for sex and food), the narcissistic component, and the part concerned with thinking and finding out the truth about the world (Lear, 1998). Plato saw this desire to understand the world as an erotic engagement with and expression of love for the world. Lear noted that Freud came across this discovery later in his reconceptualization and expansion of the sex drive into eros. Freud (1921/1976) acknowledged Plato’s contribution in several of his works: “In its origin, function and relation to sexual love, the eros of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis” (p. 91) and “what

psychoanalysis calls sexuality was by no means identical with the impulsion towards a union of the two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to the all-inclusive and all-embracing love of Plato's *Symposium*" (Freud, 1925/1976d, p. 218).

Donna Orange (2010) noted that from the time of Freud, various psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic models have *theorized the emotional life*, its development and failure. Freud's theory emphasized sexual and aggressive drives, internal conflict, repression, repetition compulsion, and the use of defense mechanisms as basic assumptions of emotional life. For Kleinians original aggression is primary, and for the British middle group and Kohutian self-psychology, the success or failure of selfobject needs in self-development are fundamental. For relational psychoanalysis and intersubjective systems theory, the relational matrix and intersubjective field is key. The European theory of Daseinanalysis integrates Freud and Heidegger with the work of Medard Boss and Ludwig Binswanger as major contributors. Orange noted that these theories remain dependent on their philosophical foundations, although psychoanalysis has frequently abandoned the Socratic project, treating clinical work as independent of its philosophical context, thus insulating it from outside criticism. Orange observed that this legacy is consistent with Freud's tendency toward dogmatism and intolerance to engaging differences of opinion and disallowing dissenting voices (Orange, 2010).

Reading philosophy teaches us to read and listen differently, and to notice what we might miss if reading only theories within our own tradition (Orange, 2010). In addition, thinking and reading philosophy can relax the grip of automaticity on our clinical lives and foster an examination of our emotional convictions (Orange, 1995). The

expansion of interdisciplinary knowledge through study in other fields is a way to exercise our human responsibility to think and question, and to interpret the world, without reliance on a single thinker, authority or school of thought: “The great innovators in psychoanalysis and in the humanistic psychotherapies have been people who could notice, and even foreground, what their own theory had made invisible or had relegated to the background because it did not fit the theory” (Orange, 1995, p. 5). According to Orange (2010):

Thoughtful psychoanalysts and other humanistic clinicians are practicing philosophers. Doing philosophy every day, we always need to think more about what we are unconsciously doing. Engaging in dialogue with great philosophers can help us to keep thinking and questioning. If we clinicians do not engage, we remain captives in an unexamined life, in the grip of philosophical assumptions we notice neither in our theory nor in our practice. (p. 2)

Patricia Kitcher (1995) similarly emphasized the merits of interdisciplinary theory construction in her review of a historical case considering Sigmund Freud and his work in the mental sciences for its contemporary relevance. In contrast to Donna Orange’s (2010) view, Kitcher pronounced that Freud was the first interdisciplinary cognitive scientist and showed how interdisciplinary concerns informed the creation of his theories. Kitcher (1995) admitted that the pitfalls and difficulties of an interdisciplinary approach are many, as evidenced by Freud’s legacy, but argued that interdisciplinary methodologies require balance rather than abandonment in the effort going forward.

Kitcher (1995) additionally argued that progress in the cognitive sciences necessitates an interdisciplinary perspective due to the fact that psychologists,

philosophers of psychology, linguists, computer scientists, neurophysiologists, and anthropologists all significantly contribute to our understanding of mental processes. Because neural, developmental, computational, linguistic, psychological, and social factors are all involved in cognition, a complete cognitive science need include them. Kitcher stated, “these disciplines must learn from each other and coevolve” (p. 3), and further noted that many universities are establishing interdisciplinary departments of study in these related specialties.

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi in *The Phenomenological Mind* (2008) stated that the interdisciplinary nature of their book was necessary to do full justice to the complexity of the themes explored. Debates from cognitive and developmental psychology, psychopathology, brain science, artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind disciplines, as well as studies in cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging are incorporated in their discussions of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The emergence of these kinds of works denotes a pivotal turning point in philosophy of mind research going forward, and appears as an important attempt to address complex issues and philosophical problems through an interdisciplinary lens.

The philosophical principle that humans could be wrong about any extrapolation involving beliefs, expectations or their understanding of the world reflects the epistemological thesis of fallibilism, from the Latin *fallibilis*, meaning liable to err. *Fallibilism* is the term used to denote the thought and practice of a contextualist viewpoint (Orange, 1995) (e.g. intersubjective systems theory) and is employed when one recognizes that a given present understanding of anything or anyone is only a perspective within a horizon of experience, necessarily limited by one’s own organized and

organizing experience (Orange, 2009). Charles Sanders Peirce (2011) also discussed fallibilism in his writings in relation to the scientific attitude, and Orange evokes this use of the term to apply to theory construction and clinical practice with its necessary eye to the possibility of erroneous or limited perspectives or understanding.

As psychologists and clinicians, we attempt, through conversation, to make sense of divergent human experiences and perspectives, which can evoke thoughts and expressions we did not have previously. The historian Norman Melchert (2002) has described philosophy as the *great conversation*. Through reading and conversation with thinkers in the philosophical tradition, our own questioning participation becomes engaged as we bring these theories and ideas into dialogue with our own clinical concerns, traditions, and insights.

Donnel Stern (2002), in his mission statement for the journal of *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, wrote an elegant and important treatise on the role of psychologists in contemporary society. Stern asserted that our ideologies possess inherent values, which saturate our theoretical models, albeit largely outside of our awareness. Stern is particularly concerned with how we select the aims and theories we pursue and challenged the notion of psychoanalysis as a value-neutral profession. He reintroduced the idea that a moral position exists that exerts an influence whether or not it is acknowledged, disowned, unconscious, or disavowed. Stern asserted that “Psychoanalysis does not only investigate values, it promotes them” (p. 8). He also noted that the moral position that psychoanalysts all share is that “it is good to sense and question one’s inner life” (p. 10). Stern stated,

And so, because to be an analyst is to be involved in the struggle for inner

freedom, and because inner constraints are related to outer ones, analysts often find themselves critics of the societies within which they live. To be an analyst is to be an activist, even if the activism is not very noisy, and even if the activist him/herself is less than fully aware of participating that way. (p. 9)

Stern's scholarship underscored philosophical questions about what values are promoted in psychoanalytic theory and practice and emphasized the illumination of shared meanings intrinsic to the psychoanalytic endeavor. Stern (2002) noted, "The most cherished psychoanalytic value, though—that one value we all share, pursuing it in our in different ways—is the maintenance of curiosity and the tolerance of what we learn as a result" (p. 12).

Stern (1991) wrote about the relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics for psychoanalysis, and identified what he considers to be the source of resistance to hermeneutics within psychoanalysis proper, namely, Gadamer's refusal to endorse a practical method or approach to questions of truth which many psychoanalytic readers find unpalatable as they consider this too much like relativism: "It may seem that Gadamer's view encourages nihilism, or perhaps laziness, since there is no way to search out the truth" (Stern, 1991, p. 76). Confusion regarding relativism in the psychoanalytic literature has frequently led to the distortion of hermeneutics by analysts that have not had formal training in philosophy.

Some of this confusion may be attributed to the conflicting paradigmatic ways of viewing the psychoanalytic process, and the ongoing debate about the very nature of psychoanalysis. After more than one hundred years since its inception, the ontological status of psychoanalysis remains in question (Summers, 2013), and this confusion may be

attributed to Freud himself and his contrasting methods for approaching clinical material. In one formulation, Freud prescribes an analytic stance characterized by open-ended listening to all the patient's material and use of the technique of *evenly hovering* attention in an open-minded receptiveness to the clinical material (Summers, 2013). By way of analogy he described the analytic stance as that of a telephone receiver to a transmitting microphone. In his analytic work Freud employed a hermeneutic clinical technique to uncover and interpret the patient's unconscious experience by allowing the individual patient's associations and experience to lead in a specialized process of inquiry (Summers, 2013). However in his theoretical work, Freud asserted a biological view in which the laws of psyche are as discoverable as with any other natural science:

Science was equated with somatic processes, and because Freud was committed to including psychoanalysis among the sciences, he regarded biological phenomena, such as energy discharge and instinctual forces, as the essence of the psyche. This way of viewing the psyche eliminated the subject. In this theoretical work, we see a "biological Freud", as opposed to the "hermeneutic Freud" who engaged the individual patient's experience. (Summers, 2013)

The first publication of Freud's case studies, *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud, 1895), a hermeneutically inspired exposition, came out the same year he wrote *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (Freud, 1895/1975) in which he attempted to account for the psyche on the basis of neurological excitations and discharges (Summers, 2013). Ironically, Freud published these contradictory works based on very different ontologies for psychological pathology in the same year. In his later theoretical innovations Freud reaffirmed his contention of the somatic nature of the psyche, extended in space, in

Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (Freud, 1915/1976b), in which he described the psyche as established on drives of a biological origin but having a psychological manifestation, and again later when he defined the psychical apparatus in terms of organized energies (Freud, 1938/1976). Freud's central assumptions regarding the nature of the mental apparatus are essential to understanding other key concepts such as pathogenic symptoms of repression, primarily the notion of the constancy principle, which he postulated early in his psychoanalytic canon:

If a person experiences a psychical impression, something in his nervous system which we will for the moment call the sum of excitation is increased. Now in every individual there exists a tendency to diminish this sum of excitation once more in order to preserve his health. (Freud, 1893/1976, p. 36)

Although Freud attempted to share in the prestige of a positivist science by his continued commitment to the somatic, he focused ostensibly on clinical phenomena and offered general conjectures, some of which have since been refuted by neo-Freudian analysts, most notably, Karen Horney, as in the case of penis envy and the female character (Rieff, 1979). Freud (1894/1976) employed positivistic terms to define mental phenomena, like his definition of emotion as a

sum of excitation...having all the attributes of a quantity—although we possess no means of measuring it—a something which is capable of increase, decrease, displacement and discharge, and which extends itself over the memory-traces of an idea like an electric charge over the surface of the body. (p. 75)

Robert Holt (1976) suggested that Freud and his adherents used motivational concepts incorrectly (e.g. *instinctual drives* and *drive energy*), as though they were concrete causal

agents or entities. This reification placed emphasis on *drives* rather than on *drivenness* as motivationally and causally efficacious. The conceptual switch to *drivenness*, as a form of intentionality, turns the focus on consciousness as the ongoing-and-always-happening-interpretation occurring in the interface between body and mind.

Intentionality, or drivenness, brought the focus back to consciousness as an expression of all bodily drives and anything that is somatically registered—thus not severing the body from all things psychological and keeping the psychological conjoined with all things somatic. The malleable nature of drives suggests that intentionality is pliable and subject to events and socio-cultural interactions, or interaction with other subjectivities. The sexual instinct is pliable in terms of its object as well, and can be directed toward different and varying objects of desire—another demonstration of the highly variant nature of intentionality.

A heavily metaphoric cast to Freud's ideas and animistic imagery are fundamental characteristics of his canon of thought; however, to grasp his subject, Freud did not rely on quantification and measurement, but hermeneutic interpretation. In his explanation of hysteria, he described its cause as a *certain quantity of excitation* spilling over the psychic threshold (Güzeldere, 1997). This was not meant as a quantitative explanation but rather a qualitative description of psychic tension inscribing itself in physical symptoms. Freud frequently translated physical concepts into metaphors, as in the modification of Hermann Helmholtz's concept of *neurological energy* into Freud's notion of *psychic energy*, using the quantitative term *energy* (Güzeldere, 1997). Classical drive theory and the use of metaphysical constructs to explain its mechanisms took attention away from Freud's original hermeneutic-interpretive conceptualizations of

mental life and interfered with the integration of philosophical epistemology into the foundational tenets of psychoanalysis.

Jessica Benjamin (1991) stated that while many accuse Freud of positivism, it is only partly accurate to characterize classical Freudian psychoanalysis as positivist: “Freud’s self-understanding as a scientist included both German idealism and contemporary neo-Kantian scientific theory, which, strictly speaking, was not positivist since conceptualized causes could be seen in their effects, not in themselves” (p. 526). As Paul Ricoeur (1970) noted, Freud’s writings appear as a mixed or ambiguous discourse, which at times refers to conflicts of forces subject to an energetics and at times describes relations of meaning subject to a hermeneutics. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas (1968) has adduced that it was Freud’s scientific self-misunderstanding that gave rise to later misunderstandings of psychoanalysis as a positive science.

In spite of these theoretical caveats within the Freudian canon, one must extol Freud’s capstone achievements. Primary among these was his identification of two modes of thought—primary process and secondary process thinking—considered by some as among Freud’s most creative contributions to an understanding of the mind (Eagle, 2011). According to Freudian theory, unconscious mentation is ruled by primary process thinking. As noted by Lacan (1966/2002), unconscious mentation has its own language: “That language, most clearly seen in dream work, is characterized by wishful thinking and the formal properties of condensation, displacement, and, less centrally, symbolization” (Eagle, 2011, p. 28).

In addition, Freud’s reference to the analyst’s receptive frame of mind and his theory of unconscious communication were essential to the heart of his method (Bollas,

2001). Although according to Bollas, Freud's theory of unconscious communication did not follow his theory of the unconscious proposed in his topographic or structural models:

This unconscious is neither the repressed unconscious nor the id. It is the intelligence of the self's own ego that forms the dream, creates the symptom, selects the movement of defense—organizes the novelist's novel, the painter's painting, or communications with the other's unconscious. (p. 94)

Bollas contended that Freud's method "proposed a form of intersubjectivity that assumes unconscious perception, unconscious organization, unconscious creativity, and unconscious communication. This theory owes its origins to his concept of the dreamwork, to the intelligence of condensation, displacement, substitution" (p. 95). In Bollas's view, psychoanalysis is an *unconscious object relation*, in which both analyst and patient, as conscious participants, relate and attempt to use limited conscious understanding to "good effect" (p. 95) in responding to unconscious meaning. This perspective brings into view a conceptualization of intersubjectivity as both a conscious and an unconscious object relation.

Although many contemporary psychoanalytic theories object to the idea of a Freudian dynamic unconscious as a literal repository of repressed ideas and wishes pressing for expression in consciousness or motor action, what is most salient in Freud's formulation is the establishment of the relevance of unconscious mental states. This concept of the unconscious as a storehouse of impulses and energies is predicated on the idea of a *hidden reality* conception of unconscious mental contents (Fingarette, 1963), in which a mental content, like a desire or wish, persists as the same fully formed desire or

wish whether conscious or unconscious. As Morris Eagle (2011) explained:

Implied in the hidden reality view is not only the idea that the object (i.e., a wish) remains the same whether conscious or unconscious but also that when unconscious, it is fully formed and not just a fragment or a vague or unformulated state of the object. (p. 108)

According to Morris (2011), the positing of a dynamic unconscious by Freud is, in essence, a description of *inner conflict*, which remains a central concept of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Eagle additionally noted that unlike Freudian theory, contemporary psychoanalytic models focus on limited aspects of mind rather than offering a systematic exposition of the origin and nature of mind, as found in classical analysis. Selective inattention to the moral derivatives of inner conflict—in terms of its meaning and relationship to hermeneutic-interpretive understanding—is seen in both contemporary psychoanalytic theories and classical Freudian theory. Inattention to the inner conflicts and moral dilemmas with which patients consistently struggle has implications for how conscious and unconscious collusions are maintained or instantiated within treatment, and appears as an important area for future study.

Need for Research on the Topic

Focus on the philosophical predicates of psychoanalysis can serve as a way to sharpen and clarify the clinical application and utility of some concepts and theories under investigation. The clinical utility and application of a theory is contingent upon a thorough understanding of its basis or foundation, which can include relevant historical, political, socio-cultural, ideological, or therapeutic effects and influences. It seems evident that the basis for a particular clinical stance should be understood via its

ideological origins, which provide relevance and meaning. This understanding lays a more solid foundation for meaning-making activities, often referred to as insight or interpretation, found in narrative and cognitive therapy approaches, personal mythologies, spiritual and religious activities, and any thought system invoked for structuring and organizing schemas or supportive frames within the patient's life-world and in the therapeutic relationship. In addition, the recondite issues of ethics, ethical norms, values, and ethical sensibilities within analytic treatment appear as an implicit, if not unconscious, aspect of the work we do as scholar-practitioners.

The reevaluation of assumptions and ideals is considered a valuable contribution to contemporary clinical/theoretical discourse, case conceptualization discussions, and the evolution of language as new paradigms come into existence. The effort to see from within one's current thought system or ideological paradigm should alternate with an effort to consider the paradigm from an observer's point of view. This is the unique challenge of all philosophical contemplation. To discern one's current ideological paradigm is an effort to not only *see through* but also *beyond* the current horizons of meaning which define consciousness in preparation for new modes of being, sensing, and perceiving.

History of Psychology with Origins in Philosophy

Historically, all serious attempts to answer deep questions were made by philosophers. These thinkers believed that the best way to answer recondite questions was through rigorous thinking (appeals to reason), often combined with exacting readings of one or another religious texts (appeal to authority) (Charles, 2013). Philosophers thought the best answers were those that appeared ineluctable based on a pre-established

set of assumptions and rules for engaging ideas or those that seemed most compatible with particular texts and oral traditions. The early philosophers extensively avoided the facts of direct experience, which were distrusted (Charles, 2013). Over the course of time, the questions considered within the purview of philosophy diminished. Each modern science domain of inquiry began to take a set of questions they had been trying to answer for centuries, or even millennia, and test their questions empirically in the world through observation and experimentation, with the result of this process being the historic emergence of the specialized sciences (Charles, 2013).

Following Descartes, a great deal of effort was made to put the physical back together with the mental (Frith & Rees, 2007). Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) affirmed that the mental and the physical are different aspects of the same substance (*dual aspect theory*), whereas Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) advanced the theory that the mind and body were separate substances, but constructed from the inception to operate together in complete harmony (*psychophysical parallelism*). The radical *immaterialism* of Anglo-Irish philosopher George Berkeley (1685-1753) was founded on the proposition that things could only exist through being a mind or through being perceived by a mind, thus denying the feasibility of mindless material substances (Frith & Rees, 2007). In contradistinction, *materialism* maintains that matter is fundamental and is the cause of mental events. In his 1748 book *L'homme machine*, French physician and philosopher Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) purported such a belief and considered that conscious and voluntary processes result merely from more complex mechanisms than involuntary and instinctive processes (Frith & Rees, 2007). The hypothesis that many hold in support of the search for the neural correlates of consciousness has, at its basis,

the suppositions of materialism.

John Locke (1632-1704) and the British empiricist philosophers who succeed him were less interested in the mind-body distinction and more preoccupied with the problem of knowledge, or how the mind learns about the world. Locke differentiated *outer sense*, the mind's experience of things, with *inner sense*, the mind's reflective experience of its own experience of things (Frith & Rees, 2007). Locke also recognized the priority of the *association of ideas*, a theory taken further by David Hartley (1705-1757) and the direct predecessor of *associationism* in psychology, a precursor to Freud's related therapeutic technique of *free association*. Hartley also proposed that sensations were paralleled by vibration or elemental particles in the nerves and brain, thus proffering a hypothesis for physiological psychology (Frith & Rees, 2007).

While the British empiricists were paving the way for a science of psychology, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was refuting that such a science was attainable. In Kant's view, the scientific method requires the use of mathematics and experimentation, something that he believed could not be applied to descriptions of mental phenomena due to variance in one dimension—time. Because mental phenomena are private and inaccessible, they are not susceptible to experimental control. According to Kant's assessment, physiology (the study of the brain) is a scientific discipline, but psychology (the study of the mind) is not. This distinction significantly influenced the perception of psychology as not a proper subject for scientific inquiry, particularly when limited to the study of subjective experience—a notion that has left thought traces still evident today. The most recent major split from philosophy came with the inception of psychology in the mid-19th century. The divide occurred when individuals began to subject questions of

epistemology and phenomenology to empirical study. The founding of psychology as a distinct field was attempted to establish psychology as a specialized science under the assumption that properly gathered evidence could answer questions regarding the nature of knowledge and experience (Charles, 2013), and 150 years later this claim appears to be reasonable.

Eric Charles (2013) proposed a unifying vision of psychology grounded in this definition of psychology as *the empirical study of epistemology and phenomenology*. There are two basic questions in psychology: (1) What is the nature of knowledge? and (2) What is the nature of experience? Psychologists gather empirical evidence to answer their discrete questions in both epistemological and phenomenological inquiry. Charles argued that establishing just such a *comprehensive project* in psychology would fulfill the larger goals of understanding the nature of knowledge and experience, as well as rendering the work of fellow psychologists comprehensible to each other through an expanded understanding of how particular specialties contribute to the comprehensive project. Because the notion of what constitutes facts has been expanded to include direct experience rather than solely that which can be weighed and measured, the field of psychology as an empirical science has been expanded and broadened in its methods and subject matters for study.

Several researchers have noted that psychology is already a unified science because psychologists agree on the phenomena of interest (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001) and on a set of acceptable methods (Stam, 2004). Charles (2013) also noted that by and large psychologists agree about which situations involve psychological processes, and this agreement leads to a general consensus about the contexts in which

psychologists conduct research. However, there is essential disagreement as to which aspects of those situations fall within the psychologist's purview, and which research methods will illuminate relevant phenomena. Charles suggested that a solution to alleviating the increasing fragmentation in psychology is a reconstruction of psychology from its origins, back to its well-understood scope. He further asserted that mending current fissures within the field of psychology necessitates an understanding of the current divisions as attempts to answer different parts of its foundational questions. Charles's vision of a unified psychology is premised on his belief that an articulated mission would render the work of other psychologists more comprehensible to each other, and thus be understood and valued as part of a larger objective within such a comprehensive project of psychology.

In considering the philosophical origins of psychology, Donald Polkinghorne (1990) traced ideological epochs of thought systems beginning with the Greek period, into the Middle Ages and the later Enlightenment (positivism) era and up through the current Postmodern perspective. The Western tradition began with the classical discourse of the Greek period and moved to the dominant Christian revelatory discourse of the Middle Ages. The Enlightenment, historically situated after these periods, was a reaction against the revelatory discourse of the Middle Ages and was inspired by the rediscovery of classical scholastic discourse, thus it retains elements of both (Polkinghorne, 1990).

An emphasis on the potentialities of language was a primary concern of philosophy at its inception, with the goal of language, in the classical sense, being "to forge a synchrony, however tentative, by invoking common meanings and sensations between speakers" (Severson, 2012). Pre-Socratic philosophers had high hopes for a

logos, a binding concept that might explain the great diversity of phenomena in the world and “render the mysteries of the cosmos understandable” (p. 252). The hope for a *logos* prior to Plato was a wish to adopt and communicate principles without loss or contamination of meaning. The Sophist philosophers, contemporaries with Socrates and Plato, were the first to suggest the folly of this hope in language as the perfect conduit of anything (Mourelatos, 1987). Similarly, Plato recorded the relativism of Gorgias, a Sophist who asserted that even if objective truth were a thing that exists, it would be impossible to communicate (Gilbert, 2003). This open questioning about the inexact dynamics of language and communication continues today. As with the Greeks, we continue to wrestle with the question of language as an imperfect medium, with words as imperfect mirrors and gestures toward their referents (Severson, 2012). “We have come to see language as the shifting sea between the separated islands of individuals” (p. 253) or perhaps as Wittgenstein’s “language-games” (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 8) for which we only know some of the rules.

The Enlightenment conversation set the rules for the language game of science, which postmodern discourse attempts to reform, particularly in the approach to the study of human beings. Suppositions about the nature of reality were dramatically challenged by the Enlightenment doctrine. The old beliefs held that reality was a stage on which human salvation was determined via God’s purposes and interventions, which determined the events of the world and movements of the heavens (Polkinghorne, 1990). Through the lens of Enlightenment doctrine, reality was envisioned more like a machine with universal regularities that functioned as mathematical relations, which humans were capable of comprehending, proving that they had the capacity to understand the basic

functions of the universe. Thus the hypothesis arose that through careful, measured observations, inductive logic, and mathematics, consistent rules would be systematically discovered: “It was believed that humans, by gaining an understanding of the regularities, would gain the power to predict how reality would respond to their interventions and, thus, could secure control over the natural and human environments” (p. 95). Early and continuous success of formal science led to the idea that humans would eventually accumulate enough knowledge to build an earthly kingdom equivalent to the heavenly kingdom of the revelatory discourse, once considered possible “only through God’s grace at the end of time” (p. 95).

Antagonism between the formal science of the Enlightenment and the sacred knowledge of the revelatory discourse was present in the conflict between Galileo and religious authorities over the Copernican system and is still evident today in contemporary campaigns to teach creationism in secondary school textbooks (Eagleton, 1984). The new discoveries of science resulted in increased human control of natural processes, and reason became popularized as the ideas and concepts of the discourse spread throughout the European world via the writings of English periodicalists and the French philosophies (Eagleton, 1984). As knowledge of Western technological achievements spread to non-Western countries, the Enlightenment agenda and its discourse was adopted, with its emphasis on the accumulation of objective knowledge as the dominant international doctrine about reality.

Contemporary European philosophers characterize their work as occurring at the beginning of a new postmodern era, thus marking the end of philosophy—or the end of the Western effort to ground knowledge on a sure epistemological foundation. The prior

era was referred to using several terms, including modernism, metaphysics, and Enlightenment discourse (Polkinghorne, 1990). As mentioned above, at the core of modernism was the conviction that a method had been discovered that would reveal the laws of nature—this method was experimental science. The current discipline of psychology emerged from the modern commitment to experimental principles, and the same principles of its parent discourse are now being called into question by continental philosophers and as a result “present practices of the human sciences in general, and psychology in particular, are also in question” (p. 92).

The historicity of Freudian philosophy.

The first steps taken by the psychoanalytic method upon the stage of history were based on a scientific methodology. Freud’s psychoanalytic method was founded upon the scientific value of *truth*, grounded upon an empirical worldview that pictured the psyche as a mechanism responsible for regulating the drives (Pearl, 2011). Because the desire of classical psychoanalysis was to keep the dynamics of therapy within the domain of scientific values, this required the analyst to become a one-way mirror fulfilling two main roles: to reflect the patient’s world on one hand, and to conceal the world of the analyst on the other (Pearl, 2011). This categorical distinction between subject and object was very much prevalent in Freud’s time and part of the dominant Cartesian thought system owing to the endeavors of the Enlightenment movement in the West with its rational, universal and ahistorical basis for human society.

When Freud was 17, the German archeologist Heinrich Schliemann connected clues from literary and historical sources and discovered the ancient city of Troy, on the coast of what is now Turkey, an event that fired Freud’s imagination unlike any other

(Mitchell & Black, 1995). Years later Freud's private consulting room came to resemble an archeologist's office, filled with primitive artifacts and sculptures from ancient, remote cultures. Ironically, Freud has been called an archeologist of the mind, unearthing the underlying structure of the human mind through the use of psychoanalytic interpretations buried in time (Mitchell & Black, 1995).

When Freud graduated from medical school, he started his career as a researcher in neurophysiology when the study of the physical structure of the brain was in its thriving inception; it was a time when the neuron, or individual nerve cell, had been newly isolated. His studies with the renowned neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot on *glove anesthesia*, a symptom that presented as a lack of feeling in the hand had a significant impact on the young Freud. Through this mentorship, Freud studied the then common neurological disturbance of glove anesthesia, and discovered that the etiology of the illness was not caused by damaged nerves, but rather was associated with earlier experiences in the patient's memories that were found to be impacting the physical. The removal of these symptoms by Charcot through hypnotic trance sparked Freud's interest in unconscious ideas, thus shifting his focus "from brain to mind" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 2). In this turn, the role of psychoanalysis became a psychology of motivation, with motives being partly, but not generally considered in analogy with those being consciously experienced. Viewing a symptom as a symbol of an emotional disturbance manifesting in the body (Rieff, 1979) rather than as a physical disease permanently changed Freud's focus.

The political Freudians.

Russell Jacoby (1983) wrote that at its inception European psychoanalysis and its

founding analysts were devoted to the spirit of psychoanalytic culture, which was based in the radical, bohemian culture, society, and politics of the era, in turn-of-the-century Vienna and Berlin. Jacoby noted that Otto Fenichel, like so many analysts who immigrated to the United States from central Europe at that time fleeing Nazism, abandoned political psychoanalysis and its cultural and political commitments due to pressures related to personal survival as exiles in a new country. For Fenichel, the authentic task of psychoanalysis was the elaboration of a theory of human culture and society (Jacoby, 1983). In *Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, Fenichel wrote:

Neuroses do not occur out of biological necessity, like aging...Neuroses are social diseases...the outcome of unfavorable and socially determined educational measures, corresponding to a given and historically developed social milieu....They cannot be changed without corresponding change in the milieu. (p. 120)

According to Jacoby (1983), the public conformism of immigrating analysts to prevailing intellectual and societal trends accelerated the Americanization of psychoanalysis, with the loss of ideological and political ties to its European origins. Refugee analysts eased their prior commitments to nonconformist political, social, and cultural beliefs based in (noncommunitistic) socialism and Marxism in an effort to assimilate in America where Marxism and socialism remained culturally suspect, in order to minimize any risks to their immigration status as legal aliens (Jacoby, 1983).

The psychological individual versus society.

Jan Hendrik van den Berg, an existential phenomenologist and psychiatrist, likewise underscored a meaningful connection between the structure of society and the

structure of human personality. Drawing on William James's theory of the social self, van den Berg, in *The Changing Nature of Man* (1983), emphasized the impact of one's social and cultural context and the changing nature of community, society, and culture, as the primary reason for neurotic disorders, or anxiety. He suggested that the term *neurosis* be replaced with the concept of *sociosis* to reflect the impact of one's social context and interpersonal relationships, suggesting that the modern Western society at the time of his writing exerted a *neuroticizing* effect on a person. In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud (1930/2002) described the individual as in conflict with his or her society. Freud noted that culture and society can contribute to or even cause neurosis, and he later coined the term *social neurosis*. German psychoanalyst Karen Horney also observed that the formation of neurosis in her patients was affected by the social and economic conditions within the given culture and the society in which they operate.

Similarly, *culture-bound syndromes* are mental conditions whose manifestation is closely related to cultural factors, and can be best understood and managed from a cultural perspective, to explain or describe distress. The discovery that various, peculiar mental disorders exist within specific cultures spawned an interest in how cultural factors influence psychopathology and stimulated the development of *cultural psychiatry* as a new field of study (Tseng, 2006). This underscores the manner in which contextualism is implicated in the adaptation of a human being to one's environment and confirms the importance of a phenomenological understanding of social context as it affects human behavior and emotional development. The philosophical-ideological thrust of a culture is the basis of all social interactions constitutive of the intersubjective field within which social lives and lived meanings cohere.

Unconscious mental processes.

A critical feature in the study of consciousness is the essential distinction between conscious and unconscious aspects of mentality. According to Johnson-Laird (1983), “the division between conscious and unconscious processes is the best available clue to the structure of the mind” (p. 466). Before the era of Freud, there was no suitable theoretical framework in which to reject the Cartesian belief of equating the mind with whatever lay within consciousness. Consciousness (i.e. conscious processes) was accepted as the “point of division between mind and not mind” (Baldwin, 1901, p. 216), and was believed to delineate the boundaries of the mind from matter. Gottfried Leibniz (1951) in his *New Essays* presented ideas that contrasted Descartes and John Locke in their view of the transparency of the mind to one’s consciousness. Leibniz is thought to have anticipated important developments in psychology related to the features and role of the unconscious:

There are a thousand indications which lead us to think that there are at every moment numberless *perceptions* in us, but without apperception and without reflection... In a word, insensible [unconscious] *perceptions* are of great use in psychology as insensible corpuscles are in physics, and it is equally as unreasonable to reject the one as the other under the pretext that they are beyond the reach of our senses. (pp. 374-378)

However, the thought that consciousness marks the boundaries of the mind remained a dominant precept until the time of Freud, and its appearance in the 1901 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Psychology* was defined thus: “[Consciousness] is the distinctive character of whatever may be called mental life” (Baldwin, 1901, p. 216).

During this time, the introspectionists' vision of psychology as the *science of the mental*, prevented the inclusion of the unconscious as part of the mental, therefore deeming it an unacceptable subject matter for psychology. British psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener (1915) for example, was resistant to the idea of the unconscious and considered it a theoretically dangerous precept for psychology:

The subconscious may be defined as an extension of the conscious beyond the limits of observation...[T]he subconscious is not a part of the subject-matter of psychology...In the first place, the construction of a subconscious is unnecessary...Secondly, the introduction of a subconscious is dangerous. (pp. 326-327)

Although there were detractors, the idea of the unconscious as an aspect of the mental was not a foreign concept. According to Güven Güzeldere (1997),

Freud was not really the inventor (or discoverer) of the concept of the unconscious in any way. On the contrary, the general intellectual atmosphere of the times preceding Freud's appearance allowed talk about mental activity of various sorts that occurred without the subject's awareness. (p. 19)

The familiar topographical metaphor of mind as an iceberg with consciousness at the tip above the surface and a subsurface unconscious component affecting one's conscious mental life was widely recognized and utilized in the time period preceding Freud.

In Freudian theory, the unconscious proper is comprised of primitive urges, desires, and repressed processes, applying stress on the conscious element of the individual's mind and shaping everyday life in substantive ways. This is in contrast to the preconscious, which entails those processes that only contingently lie outside of

awareness in the moment. What is preconscious can easily become conscious without any unique effort or technique and, in contrast to what is unconscious, does not need to be brought to the surface through psychoanalytic technique or the aid of an analyst. The Freudian unconscious is quite dissimilar to the unconsciousness as articulated in cognitive psychology research, and although both are opaque to introspection, some key differences exist between the two.

Freud's unconscious eventuates and is constituted due to the repression of past events. The Freudian unconscious, in principle, is not inaccessible. The cognitive unconscious, in opposition, exists due to the manner in which our perceptual-cognitive system is constructed and resides in principle outside our access. For example, the mechanisms that constitute visual perception are understood to be hard-wired and can never be made conscious through any method. Studies of unconscious cognitive processes presaged the theory of Freud—as in the work of von Helmholtz's research on perceptual constancy (Güzeldere, 1997)—and span a long period of time even up to recent research by Irvin Rock (1983) on *unconscious perceptual inference*.

Near the end of the 19th century, the notion of the unconscious mind had become prominent among scientists, philosophers, and literati in a legacy linking back from Rousseau to Goethe, Fichte, and Nietzsche (Whyte, 1960). A specific school of thought, that of *Naturphilosophie* (philosophy of nature), was established as a product of German Romanticism by the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (Ellenberger, 1970). The basis for Schelling's philosophy was the assertion that nature and spirit are a binding unity and therefore nature cannot be understood based on mechanical and physical laws alone, but that a philosophy of nature must include spiritual laws that emerge from a

common invisible spiritual principle of world, or world soul (*Weltseele*). Other typically Romantic ideas included the fundamental bisexuality of human beings, an emphasis on dreams, concepts of the unconscious, mystical ecstasy, and poetic and artistic inspiration. Romantic concepts of man and nature represented in the philosophies of C. G. Carus and Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler as well as the poetic visions of nature of Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert found their way into dynamic psychiatry and the theories of Freud and Jung, both heavily embedded with dualistic ideas—a characteristically Romantic manner of thinking (Ellenberger, 1970).

Freud acknowledged this rich heritage in a comment made at his 70th birthday gathering, as recorded by British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones: “The poets and philosophers before me discovered the unconscious. What I discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied” (MacIntyre, 1958, p. 6). Despite this claim, German philosopher and pioneer in experimental psychology Gustav Fechner has been credited as the first researcher to attempt to disclose the constitution of the unconscious through experimental methods (Ellenberger, 1970). Fechner’s method of psychophysics (Fechner, 1860) was based on the demonstration that mental experiences (sensations) change in intensity and that a threshold exists for intensity, such that below a certain stimulus intensity there is *no* sensation (Frith & Rees, 2007).

Fechner: The first experimental psychologist.

Fechner also built on Ernst Heinrich Weber’s idea of *just noticeable difference* (*JND*) (Weber, 1834). JND represents the smallest increase in stimulus intensity needed to create an alteration in sensation. His use of JND showed that there was a systematic relation between subjective measures of sensation and the intensity of a physical

indicator, discovered to be a logarithmic relation, and termed the Weber-Fechner law (Frith & Rees, 2007). Fechner developed some of the basic methods of experimental psychology; however, there remained no well-formulated explanation for the structure, functional role, or operation of the unconscious—or to the manner of its relation to consciousness in the overall patterning of an individual's mental life (Güzeldere, 1997).

The philosopher Frederick Nietzsche has been described as a “philosopher of morality and critic of culture” (Vital-Brazil, 2001, p. 151). Nietzsche was a precursor to Freud and believed that although consciousness is an interpreter of dreams, there is a determinative unconscious (the dreaming mind) that has its own value determinations outside of conscious thought. Nietzsche wrote the epigraph, “Interpreting through dreams: what one ignores in a vigil state, what one is incapable of feeling—that is, if one has a good or a bad conscience toward another—the dreams reveal to us with no doubt” (p. 151). Throughout the tradition of philosophy, philosophers have placed the essence of mind in thought and consciousness. It was only later discovered that in relation to mind, that which lies within conscious awareness is “the mere surface of our minds, of which, as of the earth, we do not know the inside but only the crust” (Durant, 1961, p. 236). The juxtaposition to *know oneself* as Socrates advised and to denounce false values as a critic of culture, alongside a determinative unconscious with its ambivalent moral conscious, suggests a permanent conflict that remains unknowable, at the threshold of consciousness (Vital-Brazil, 2001). It is at just such a threshold, in the confluence of conscious and unconscious processes, that the psychoanalytic encounter and therapeutic action occurs.

Certain general themes engaged the German-speaking world of the 19th century, and none more so than conceptions of the will and the unconscious. These themes

reached their zenith, in terms of development, in Freud, but they did not commence with him or even with Nietzsche. Instead, their origins and first clear expressions are found in the writing of the German philosopher, Schopenhauer (Young, 1994). Thomas Mann (1947/1948) noted this connection and even termed Schopenhauer “psychologist of the will, the father of all modern psychology” (p. 408), citing that from him “the line runs, by way of the psychological radicalism of Nietzsche, straight to Freud and the men who built up his psychology of the unconscious as it applied to the mental sciences” (p. 408).

Mann credits Schopenhauer’s discovery of the primacy of the will as the origin of Nietzsche’s anti-Socraticism and hostility to mind in light of the insight of the secondary and subservient relation of the mind to the will. Mann (1947/1948) wrote that Schopenhauer’s discovery that “the intellect is there to do the pleasure of the will, to justify it, to provide it with motivations, which are often very shallow and self-deluding” (p. 408), prepared the way for a psychology of relentless penetration and unmasking of the relation between the instincts and reason in what later became psychoanalysis; indeed, that “it was already just that” (p. 408). According to Mann (1947/1948), “Schopenhauer’s sinister domain of the will is entirely identical with what Freud calls the unconscious, the ‘id’—as, on the other hand, Schopenhauer’s intellect entirely corresponds to the Freudian ego” (p. 408). In considering the historical development of Sigmund Freud’s classical analysis, the question presents: What did Freud inherit from philosophy and what impact has this inheritance had on the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis? Although many of Freud’s texts have references to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, of issue is that Freud disavowed the influence of the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in the face of criticism that these

formulations are notably similar to Freud's psycho-analytic canon (Grimwade, 2012).

Freud's disavowal of philosophy.

Parallels found between Freud's psychoanalytic theory and the characteristic doctrines of Arthur Schopenhauer's (1969) central work *The World as Will and Representation* have been noted. According to Christopher Young (1994), Schopenhauer's concept of the will contains the basis of what became in Freudian theory the concepts of the unconscious and the id. Schopenhauer's work delineated major parts of Freud's theory of sexuality and articulated aspects of what became Freud's theory of *free association*. In addition, Young (1994) noted. "Schopenhauer's writings on madness anticipate Freud's theory of repression and his first theory of the aetiology of neurosis" (p. 101).

Jacques Derrida (1980/1987), in "To Speculate—on Freud" in *The Post Card*, underscored the troubled relationship Freud had with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche:

No more than to Nietzsche, nothing is owed to Schopenhauer. As such psychoanalytic theory owes him nothing. It has no more inherited from him than one can inherit conceptual simulacra.... Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's words and notions resemble psychoanalytic discourse to the point of being mistaken for it. But they are lacking the equivalent of a content proper to psychoanalysis, which alone can guarantee value, usage, and exchange. (p. 266)

Freud (1925/1976a), in *An Autobiographical Study*, ultimately explained why he had been avoiding philosophy proper for so long, while concomitantly denying that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche had any impact on his ideas or the birth of psychoanalysis:

I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper. This avoidance has

been greatly facilitated by constitutional incapacity... The large extent to which psycho-analysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer—not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the mechanism of repression—is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life.

Nietzsche, another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psycho-analysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed. (pp. 59-60)

Despite Freud's assertion that he avoided philosophy due to a "constitutional incapacity" (p. 59), he appeared as much a philosopher as he was a psychologist, certainly in the view of many experimental psychologists. Michael Levine (2000) wrote that even if Freud was not first and foremost a philosopher, it could be momentous if it turns out that the philosophical implications of psychoanalytic theory are more compelling than merely the psychological. Levine (2000) noted that surprisingly, there has been proportionately little written by *analytic philosophers* on the philosophical implications of Freudian and post-Freudian theory, and that until recently, most of the philosophical work in connection with Freud has been focused on the scientific status of Freud's theories, specifically on whether his work is scientifically testable (verifiable or falsifiable) in accordance with scientific procedure.

According to Jacques Derrida (1980/1987), Freud repudiated the illegitimate economy of philosophy; however, these disavowed specters appear in his writings and infuse his entire corpus. Robert Grimwade (2012) agreed: "Philosophy is operating

behind the scenes in Freud's writings, framing the unfolding of psychoanalysis from its origin" (p. 361). In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud (1920/1961) refers indifferently to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In discussing the possibility of death drives, Freud stated:

There is something else that we cannot remain blind to. We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbor of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him death is the 'true result and to that extent the purpose of life', while sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live. (pp. 48-49)

Grimwade (2012) asserted that Freud's motives went beyond merely distancing himself from philosophy and justifying his supposedly nonphilosophical attempts to speculate.

Grimwade (2012) suggested that Freud attempted to hide the origins of his new *Wissenschaft*, through his disavowal of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by "inheriting their concepts and giving revisionist readings of their philosophies that seem to annihilate all trace of influence while simultaneously invoking the authority of their faded signatures" (p. 361).

In Arthur Schopenhauer's (1969) formulation in *The World as Will and Representation*, he identified the *will* as causality—a driving imperious desire, a persistent vital force or instinct—of which we are often unconscious. This *will* is fundamentally a will to live, and to maximum life; it is considered as the essence of man. In Schopenhauer's view will is the master, rather than the intellect: "The will is the permanent and unchanging element of mind" (Durant, 1961, p. 237). Thus, character lies in the will, not the intellect, which is there for service to the will. In relation to the intellect the will is characterized as "the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders

the lame man who can see” (p. 236). Donna Orange (2010) also wrote that Freud’s concept of the unconscious harkens to ideas from Schopenhauer’s concept of the will. Orange noted that Freud read both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer; however, he did not credit them in his writing as a source for his own similar theory of the id as the driving force of unconscious motivation.

Schopenhauer’s *will*, however was quite distinct from Freud’s unconscious in that the will for Schopenhauer was considered to be in all things animate and inanimate. Schopenhauer considered the physical world as expressed through the world of phenomena, to be a manifestation of the metaphysical will (Magee, 1997). According to Schopenhauer (1969), “We have therefore called the phenomenal world the mirror, the objectivity, of the will...what the will wills is always life” (p. 275). Schopenhauer further wrote:

The will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a blind, irresistible urge, as we see it appear in inorganic and vegetable nature and in their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life. (p. 275)

Although Schopenhauer’s description of the will as an *irresistible urge* may sound similar to the impulses of Freud’s id, Schopenhauer saw the will quite dissimilarly as the “thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world” (p. 275).

The unconscious and its relation to ethics.

John Riker (1997) raised the question of how the discovery of unconscious motivation affects our traditional ethical precepts and concepts of moral agency, responsibility, intentionality, self-determination, and what it means to live well as human beings. Riker considered the two primary languages that are used to interpret human

actions in the West—ethics and a psychology of the unconscious—and concluded that these two discourses are essentially incommensurate based on their ideological assumptions: “Ethics is founded on a psychology which assumes that humans can come to know and master all their sources of motivation, while the psychology of the unconscious denies this fundamental assumption” (p. ix). Riker noted that some philosophers have seen psychoanalytic theory as responsible for eliminating the possibility for ethics entirely and have used this basis as grounds for denying the discovery of unconscious motivation.

Riker (1997) wrote that the discovery of unconscious processes and revelation that conscious process is only one part of the human psyche is one of the most powerful recent conceptual revolutions. Although scientific and technological discoveries have changed our knowledge of the universe and transformed patterns of everyday life, the discovery of unconscious processes and psychic events presents new insight into the realm of human experiences and events. It lends a new awareness of the systematic, irrational, resistant, and repetitive nature of how the mind functions and the pervasive influence of these unconscious processes on everyone’s psyche in the ongoing efforts toward understanding inner motivations and behaviors.

Additionally, Riker (1997) noted that this discovery has not been adequately addressed by philosophy, whose traditional function has been elucidating human life, nor taken up by the branch of philosophy that most directly addresses inquiries about human agency, intentionality, and responsibility, namely ethics. Although contemporary ethicists debate the merits of virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, pragmatic ethics, and utilitarianism, all these comparable positions presume that humans are free to direct their own lives and

claim full responsibility for the values they hold and actions they conduct:

They assume that humans can become fully aware of the forces motivating them, determine which of these forces is ethically superior to the others, and act on the basis of this awareness. Yet, this is exactly the psychology that the discovery of the unconscious calls into question. (p. 3)

Riker (1997) noted that many psychoanalytic theorists have espoused the values and precepts of ethics without realizing that the discovery of unconscious processes calls these values into question. He noted that the widely held goal of psychotherapy is to promote the autonomy of patients, “to help them overcome impulses, obsessions, fixations, and other unconscious determinations of conscious life and action” (p. 4).

Freud’s focus on making the unconscious conscious is grounded in a belief in the notion of *mental health* as the capacity for rational, autonomous decision-making that is relatively free of psychic events that cause distress, disruption, or unpredictability like slips of the tongue, obsessive rituals, hysterical reactions, or other irrational, resistant, or unproductive behaviors that resist conscious attempts at modification. How we understand certain behaviors as being illegal, immoral, or antisocial, Riker believes, is affected by our interpretation of these behaviors understood as either freely chosen, thus requiring punishment, or motivated by pathological forces deriving from traumatic developmental histories, thus necessitating psychological treatment.

Drive theory.

As is well known, Freudian theory reduces the world, and human life in particular, to an interplay of forces acting either in cooperation or, more frequently, in antagonism to each other. Freud’s general philosophy reduces the mind, the intelligence

and the higher sentiments and the will to the action of instincts and impulses of “physical and animal origin” (Bischler, 1939, p. 88). The fundamental psychic phenomenon is the instinct, or the impulse (*Trieb*), termed the id. The conscious ego, with its various intellectual, rational, and moral functions, is thus only a product of the differentiation and sublimation of the primitive undifferentiated being—a differentiation that is formed as the result of and in response to contact with one’s physical and social world. In his formulation, Freud contrasted the sexual instincts with the ego instincts, and distinguished between the libido (sexual instinct) and Thanatos, or the instincts of death and destruction (Bischler, 1939).

Everywhere and always in the world, in the living organism, in its biopsychological activity, in its mental and social life, these two groups of forces manifest themselves and for the most part are set in violent opposition to each other. Man cannot act, cannot seek to realize his desires, cannot enter into contact with his fellow beings, without at the same time giving expression, directly or indirectly, to his erotic and aggressive impulses, and without feeling the repercussions, usually painfully, the prohibitions and the penalties, which the group inflicts upon him for the attempts he makes to break his bonds. With all his might the individual strives for happiness, for the satisfaction of his needs, for the avoidance of suffering (pleasure principle). But his moments of happiness are rare and transitory. Suffering threatens him from three directions at once: “from his own body, doomed to disintegration and dissolution, from the environment, whose physical forces of destruction lie ceaselessly in wait for him, and from society, which constantly impedes the freedom of his movements”. (pp. 88-89)

In this conception, mental illness is thought to consist of a “crystallization, a fixation” (p. 88) at a period of development prior to moral-social differentiation, or in some cases a regression, or a “dedifferentiation which may be deep, or superficial, transitory or permanent” (p. 88). Bischler’s conception is essentially dynamic in that it features life as a perpetual conflict between the forces of life and death; between forces of constructiveness (progress and love) and strife (destruction and disintegration).

Freud’s concept of biological determinism is built upon a naturalistic science account of how aggressive biological impulses, unconscious sexual instincts, defense mechanisms, and the repression of libidinal energy affect processes of consciousness, including unconscious thought and motivation. The Freudian concept of biological determinism takes the import of instinctual drives (e.g. sex and aggression) as the causal explanation for all human behavior and motivation.

Although Freud did not always view the mind in isolation (Stolorow, Orange, & Atwood, 2001a), classical psychoanalytic theory was undergirded by philosophical assumptions inherited from Descartes, termed, the Cartesian philosophy of the isolated mind. However, Freud’s discovery of the unconscious has been depicted as “a second Copernican revolution” (p. 1263), in that it profoundly eroded the epistemological status of the self-conscious subject that had been the centerpiece of Descartes’ philosophy and Enlightenment thought in general (Stolorow et al., 2001a). From a Freudian perspective, “Descartes’ self-conscious *cogito* was exposed as a grandiose illusion; consciousness was shown to be a mere pawn of vast unconscious forces of which the subject was completely unaware” (p. 1263).

Despite this, the Freudian unconscious remained mired in the very Cartesianism

to which it posed a challenge (Cavell, 1993). Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, and Donna Orange (2001b) have argued that the Freudian unconscious and its contents are but a “sealed-off, underground chamber within the Cartesian isolated mind” (p. 1263). Although Freud’s metapsychology was built on the abstract concepts of force and energy borrowed from natural science, his case studies were often hermeneutic endeavors to interpret the meaning of symptoms without predicates in physicalistic mechanisms (Summers, 2012). Here we see a clear discrepancy between theory and practice, between the theoretical and the applied. This divergence can be understood as an organic response to the subjective encounter, to the symptomatic hysteric lying on the couch that first entered Freud’s consulting room in *fin de siècle* Vienna.

In Freud’s psychodynamic formulation, the psyche is an objective entity that takes its place among other objects, a *thinking thing* that has an inside with contents and that looks out upon an external world from which it is essentially estranged. The Freudian mind is a Cartesian mind: a container of instinctual energies, wishes, and representations. The id, ego, and superego are considered to be psychic structures contained within the mind of the patient that have certain functions. Psychic energy can be repressed or contained by the repression barrier, and can lead to intrapsychic conflict that can manifest as psychological symptoms. According to Wallerstein and Nemetz (1979), “the therapist serves as a model for imitation and identification in regard to ego and superego functions” (p. 139). Through the transference relationship and interactions, the client is offered opportunities for enacting new modes of defense or adaptation and mastery within the safety of the therapeutic setting, thus increasing the client’s capacity for tolerance of previously unacceptable psychic material. The dualistic paradigm of

Descartes' inside/outside dichotomy is contained within this framework, as is the insinuation of a one-person psychology with symptoms isolated within the patient.

Grounded in a classical Freudian psychoanalytic framework, Paul A. Dewald presented "*The Increase in Psychic Continuity*" in 1969 at the International Psychoanalytic Association congress that concentrated on intrapsychic processes in therapy and made a distinction between *psychoanalytic* and *psychotherapy* approaches to treatment. Dewald identified discrete goals in regard to level of intrapsychic change being sought in relation to these two treatment modalities (Wallerstein & Nemetz, 1979), "Changes occurring at the level of deeply unconscious psychic structures and conflicts can be distinguished from changes occurring at levels of derivative psychic conflict and function" (p. 137). In Dewald's conceptualization, the client goes through "incremental steps of increasing awareness and direct experience of previously unacknowledged thought processes, fantasies, and drive derivatives, and their accompanying affects, explored at a derivative level" (Wallerstein & Nemetz, 1979, p. 138).

The presumption in this theory is that the depth and rate at which these processes emerge into a client's conscious awareness are controlled by the therapist. The therapist does this through the use of interventions based on the client's assessed capacity to contain emerging affects such as anxiety, guilt, shame, or depression. However, there is no elaboration provided on *how* the therapist controls the rate of these emerging affects or exactly *how* changes occur at "deeply unconscious" (Wallerstein & Nemetz, 1979, p. 137) levels of psychic structure, nor how such changes are verified in subjective experience. This offers an example of the aptly leveled criticism of the *psychologism*, which has followed psychology since the introduction of Freud's classical

metapsychological theory founded upon positivistic science concepts and Cartesian dualism.

In a thorough review of classical psychoanalytic history, the analytical psychology of Carl Jung also supports the notion of the reality of an *objective psyche*. Jung argued that all personal material and individual experience has a universal core that derives from the objective psyche or *collective unconscious* (Salman, 2008). In this way, subjective experience is understood as reflective of universal, archetypal dynamics that are common to all:

The understanding of both the objectivity of the psyche and the importance of one's subjective experience of it inform the Jungian view of the analytic process the discovery of one's personal history, unconscious dynamics and identification, one's limitations, the attendant suffering and healing of unresolved complexes, and the emerging unknown. (p. 62)

Jung postulated that archetypal symbols that emerge from the unconscious are part of the psyche's *objective* religious instinct, although these symbols are experienced *subjectively* within each individual.

The world as representation.

The modern philosophical/psychological subject is one that has representations, and these representations are its predicates (Faulconer & Williams, 1990). Because, as Descartes (trans. 1972) pointed out, the self is only a thinking thing, the having of these predicates is a knowing that one has them: "Having predicates defines the thinking thing as a thinking thing" (Faulconer & Williams, 1990, p. 32). Descartes' famous phrase *cogito ergo sum* does not mean that I am *because* I am thinking. It means that in thinking,

I am.

The subject is distinct from one's predicates; it is not its predicates, but its thinking of them. On the other hand, in having them and in being distinct from them, the subject has its representations, its predicates, as objects—mental objects that supposedly correspond to external objects. The relation of these objects of thought to the objects in the world becomes a major question for modern philosophy. Having set the self off from the world, how can one determine whether one's representations, the things one predicates of the world, correspond to that world? Where can one find the unity which makes it possible to bring together the self that is alienated from its world and that world? (Faulconer & Williams, 1990, p. 32)

Mental objects or representations are *experiential predicates* connecting us to the world, symbols of what is constituted in consciousness by social and external realms, since all experience is inevitably symbolic in nature. In early 20th-century Vienna, one found this unity in the psychoanalytic consulting room, which ushered in the era of the one-person psychology (the patient's), with the authoritarian psychoanalyst as the arbiter of accurate representations.

Fromm's inquiry into the ethics of hermeneutic understanding.

The psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (1947) wrote about humanistic ethical thinkers of the past, namely, philosophers and psychologists, who believed that the understanding of human nature and the understanding of values and norms were interdependent. Fromm cited Freud's relativistic position in regard to values as an impediment to the progress of ethical theory and to psychology generally. Fromm (1947) asserted that the

problem of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality, either theoretically or therapeutically: “The value judgments we make determine our actions, and upon their validity rests our mental health and happiness. . . . In many instances a neurotic symptom is the specific expression of moral conflict, and the success of the therapeutic effort depends on the understanding and solution of the person’s moral problem” (p. viii). Fromm’s position appears as a balance between the positivistic belief in an objective truth and his support for the search for “valid norms of conduct” (p. vii) with the relativism that he saw in Freudian theory. He held a unique vantage point from which he was able to highlight some of the philosophical problems of psychology, and to reaffirm the validity of humanistic ethics with its sources of norms for ethical conduct inherently found in the qualities of man’s nature itself.

Fromm (1947) wrote about the tradition of humanistic ethical thought—which laid the foundations for value systems founded upon human capacities of discernment and making value judgments—with its basis in Enlightenment notions of the autonomy of human beings and the total reliance on reason. These traditions were built on the premise that “in order to know what is good or bad for man one has to know the nature of man” (p. 6). These traditions searched for definitive answers to questions of human existence and the essential features of man, which were fundamentally psychological inquiries. Fromm contextualized this search within the ideological-historical systems of thought in which they occur. His critique criticizes psychoanalysis as having nullified its potency by not being a stimulus for the development of humanistic ethics. He attributes this shirking of opportunity as an attempt by psychoanalysis to establish psychology as a natural science, but in doing so psychoanalysis “made the mistake of divorcing psychology from

the problems of philosophy and ethics” (p. 6).

According to Fromm (1947), the spirit of optimism and hubris of the Enlightenment in the West was born of the pride of reason as man’s instrument of understanding and mastery of nature in the material world that solved problems of production and offered hope for the achievement of happiness for the greatest number. Although human beings grew in power over nature, they also became more enslaved within the machine of their creation and more interested in questions of what man is, how he should live, and how the powerful energies within man might be released and used productively. The Enlightenment motto of “dare to know” (p. 5), implying *trust your knowledge*, became the incentive for the achievement of modern man. These ideas taught human beings to trust in their own powers of reason to establish valid ethical norms rather than relying on revelation or the authority of the church to know good and evil.

As the belief in man’s ultimate power and significance of Enlightenment ideas began to recede, human beings began to doubt the certitude of human autonomy and reason, ushering in an era of moral confusion. In this emerging postmodern perspective, neither reason nor revelation remain as ultimate guiding forces, resulting in a relativistic position in which value judgments and ethical norms become a matter of taste or random preference. Instead of consenting to the alternative between relativism and religion, Fromm (1947) countered with a third option: “Valid ethical norms can be formed by man’s reason and by it alone. Man is capable of discerning and making value judgments as valid as all other judgments derived from reason” (p. 6). Fromm’s turn to reason as an innate foundation for ethical ideals is grounded in the contextualism of the ideological-historical life of the individual, and offers a theory of mind that accentuates the essential

merit of the activity of meaning-making to the psychological life of human beings. The additional relevance of Fromm's contribution is his emphasis on this exact operandi, which points to the central feature of psychoanalysis—its hermeneutic-interpretive nature. Fromm's argument disrupts the implausible perception of psychoanalysis as a value-neutral profession with relativistic goals and methodologies, which leads to several interesting questions: Whose values and ethical norms are being promulgated, promoted, or buttressed in the therapeutic encounter? How is this meaning-making activity negotiated in the co-creation of values, ideas, and preferences between two subjectivities and their unique worlds of experience? How do new norms and principles come into being or become established through this intersubjective interplay within the consulting room? These questions are beyond the scope of the current paper, but serve as a meaningful backdrop to the influence and importance of consciousness and philosophical manipulation of ideas and ideals.

Temporal lacuna in Freudian theory.

Joel Pearl (2011) unveiled what he calls the temporal lacuna in Freud's methodology and theorizing. This conception, which harkens to Aristotle's metaphysics and was carried forth by both Descartes and Kant, pictures time as a linear phenomenon unfolding upon an axis in a quantifiable sequence of intervals. Linear time is the conception of time that underlies the scientific method, because it locates the succession of nows in the external world where they can be counted and calculated and the intervals between them measured by a subject who stands outside the time being objectified and studied (Pearl, 2011). Pearl asserted that this notion of time—in which passage and change can be observed on a linear axis—actually obscures a more basic locus of time in

which “past, present and future are bound together into a single fabric” (p. 5), which reflects Martin Heidegger’s notion of temporality and his assertion that the concept and significance of time are linked to the basic questions of philosophy.

Heidegger considered the past, present, and future as inseparable aspects of the temporal fabric of human life and considered the center of consciousness to be a product of temporal structures. Heidegger described temporality as “the fundamental horizon of meaning in human life” (Pearl, 2011, p. 17) and held the view that the concept of temporality offers the most appropriate perspective for the study of human existence. In Heidegger’s worldview, the subject is a being already actively engaged within the world whose very existence is grounded in its ability to interpret and constitute itself in time. The starting point of Heidegger’s ontological inquiry is Dasein (being-there), which refers to the notion of temporality and the Heideggerian subject’s being in the world as the ontological given of all human existence.

Pearl (2011) demonstrated that the linear conception of time adopted by Freud conceals the temporal fabric of human existence itself, showing itself in the therapeutic encounter. Within the framework of time conceived as a linear succession of present moments, what Heidegger called a metaphysics of presence, transference, for example, could be interpreted only as a temporal disruption and the unconscious as a container of experiences diverted from the timeline by repression. Thus, Freud’s adoption of linear time was consistent with his wish for his psychoanalysis to attain the status of a natural or objective science. Within this view, the Freudian psychological subject “is posited a-priori as a being which transcends the world and is located outside time” (Pearl, 2011, p. 18) apart from his subjective context of existence.

Temporal transactions of consciousness as hermeneutic in form.

Heidegger noted that the primary transactions of consciousness are hermeneutic or interpretive in form due to their temporal composition (Polkinghorne, 1990).

The reason why hermeneutics is indispensable in a descriptive human science lies in the fact that all forms of human conduct are *essentially* temporal and historical, and thus cannot be understood adequately if they are not ‘understood’ within the context of a person’s past and the history and tradition of the society to which that person belongs. (Polkinghorne, 1990, p. 89)

Because the analysand is an individual whose motives, needs, problems and concerns cohere within the world in which he or she actually lives, the psychoanalyst has to rely on interpretive and critical methods in the application of psychological insights according to the tenets of hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger described the process of experiencing reality as meaningful, as a hermeneutic *knowing*, akin to the processes of thought in which the whole text is understood by successive heuristic interpretive guesses toward patterns of meaning associating the parts of the message:

The hermeneutic process advances by moving to and fro between the parts and a continuously more refined interpretive understanding until a point of most likely fit is developed and each part is seen as significant in relation to the assumed whole meaning. (Polkinghorne, 1990, p. 111)

A decade prior to Heidegger’s rediscovery of hermeneutics in *Being and Time*, Carl Jung offered hermeneutics as an approach for getting to know the individual uniqueness of the psychological subject and in the interpretation of symbolic material as an alternative to the scientific attitude of the time. Jung (1916/1920) defined the art of the hermeneutic

process as consisting in

adding more analogies to that already given by the symbol: in the first place, subjective analogies given by the patient as they occur to him; and in the second place, objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. The initial symbol is much enlarged and enriched by this procedure, the result being a highly complex and many-sided picture, which may now be reduced to *tertia comparationis*. Thence result certain psychological lines of development of an individual as well as collective nature. No science upon earth could prove the accuracy of these lines; on the contrary, rationalism could very easily prove that they are wrong. But these lines vindicate their validity by their value for life. The chief thing in practical treatment is that people should get a hold of their own life, not that the principle of their life should be provable or 'right'. (pp. 468-469)

Using Heidegger's analysis of human existence is to approach human actions as the expression of hermeneutic understandings. A psychology that approaches human actions in this manner would see outcomes as statements describing the importance of events in relation to their larger role in episodes, and an inventory of linguistic schemes like narratives and stories could provide clarity and depth to understanding human existence. Conclusions drawn from this kind of approach to a discipline of psychology would be as an aid to description rather than a means for prediction and control (Polkinghorne, 1990).

Contemporary Intersubjective Systems Theory (IST)

Although many contemporary psychoanalytic schools of thought could have been considered, *intersubjective systems* is a contemporary theory with well articulated roots and a rich grounding in philosophical thought. Intersubjective systems theory (IST),

founded by Robert Stolorow and George Atwood (1984), is a recent model of psychoanalysis that has been formulated on an experience-near level of discourse, closely anchored in the phenomena of clinical observation. Stolorow (2013) refers to this type of theorizing as proceeding from the *bottom up*, beginning with clinical phenomena and working in an effort to rethink the psychoanalytic process phenomenologically—with the later discovery of philosophical support for this endeavor found in philosophical thought (e.g. Heidegger’s existential analytic), with the task being to interpret and understand the meaning that exists within human subjectivity. According to German philosopher-historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1926/1961), understanding, or *Verstehen*, denotes the act by which one passes from the sign to the thing signified, from the expression to the meaning being expressed (Stolorow & Atwood, 1984). This focus on interpretation and understanding was part of the conceptual methodology of the human sciences as essentially hermeneutic in character and thus inherent within the psychoanalytic process.

Intersubjective systems theory emerged as its own theoretical branch from the relational psychoanalytic field founded by Stephen Mitchell and Jay Greenberg. The relational school blends contributions from object relations theory, self psychology, intersubjective psychoanalysis, interpersonal psychoanalysis, and some ideas from Jungian analytical psychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis (Aron, 1996). Philip Ringstrom (2010) offered a unique perspective on the emergence of the relational school, with intersubjective systems theory being its later outgrowth. Ringstrom articulated some important similarities as well as subtle differences between the relational school proper and intersubjective systems theory, using source material from the book *Worlds of Experience: Interweaving Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis*

(Stolorow, Orange, & Atwood, 2002). According to Ringstrom (2010), both perspectives share an epistemological basis in *perspectival realism*, as defined by Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood (2002),

each participant in the inquiry has a perspective that gives access to a part or an aspect of reality. An infinite—or at least an indefinite—number of such perspectives is possible...Since none of us can entirely escape the confines of our personal perspective, our view of truth is necessarily partial, but conversation can increase our access to the whole. (pp. 109-110)

In addition, both employ a clinical methodology drawing from the “empathic/introspective/interpretive tradition” (p. 198) in which the patient’s subjective experience is approached with a great deal of empathic inquiry, while the analyst also introspects about her own experiences “in her attempt to better understand the patient’s experience as well as to better understand her limitations in understanding” (p. 198). In addition, both schools adhere to systems theory principles in which social systems are considered to perpetually mutually influence each other in a nonlinear, circular causality rather than in a linear, cause-and-effect manner. The systems principle of *equipfinality*, which is often associated with the idea that there are “many roads to Rome” (p. 198), avers that there are numerous ways the clinical pair may move through a treatment, and that these may be influenced as much by the nature of the therapeutic relationship as by its theoretical bent.

Ringstrom (2010) noted that a key difference between the theories includes the very different emphasis on the use of language. In his view, the relationalists have retained more of the Cartesian language, which the intersubjectivists view as supportive

of the objectivist-tradition and its one-person psychology. Other dissimilarities between the theories include differing views regarding: (1) the use and formulation of the term *projective identification*, (2) the definition of intersubjectivity (i.e. relationalists consider intersubjectivity as reflective of a developmental achievement or capacity), (3) the use of the term *mutual recognition* as a valid clinical concept, and (4) the emphasis on *perspectival realism*—taken as either a foreground issue (relationalists) or a background issue (intersubjectivists) in terms of how it illuminates or constrains within the therapeutic setting (Ringstrom, 2010).

Philip Ringstrom (2010) has argued that differences in language use do matter, and points to the very precise, characteristic language style of IST used to present a contextualist explanatory theory of the phenomenology of psychoanalysis. Ringstrom noted that while IST's abstract, explanatory language can seem very experience-distant, "its intent is to encourage clinicians to resist the reductionism and foreclosures common to the traditional psychoanalytic canon and to undauntingly pursue the closest iterations of subjective experience as possible" (p. 200). In contrast, the language of the relational school is used more colloquially and with the result that the explanatory theory is often conflated with the phenomenology that it explains.

One such example is the process of mutual recognition, which is operationalized by Jessica Benjamin (1988) as a version of subjectivity. In Benjamin's formulation, mutual negation is a normative part of every relationship and a byproduct of the assertion of self—with the process of mutual recognition serving to repair those normative relational ruptures. The advantage for relationalists is the clinical utility made available to support a rich formulation of analytic ideas, but for the intersubjectivists the

commingling of Benjamin's phenomenological observations with her explanatory theory is problematic. Ringstrom (2010) wrote that each perspective "balances the weight of vulnerabilities of analyst and patient that each makes focal" (p. 216) in their theory, and therefore, when taken together, the two perspectives enhance and amplify one another in important ways that make them insufficient without the other, and thus both necessary.

Stolorow (2013) defined intersubjective systems theory (IST) as *phenomenological contextualism*: "It is phenomenological in that it investigates and illuminates worlds of emotional experience. It is contextual in that it holds that such organizations of emotional experience take form, both developmentally and in the psychoanalytic situation, in constitutive intersubjective contexts" (p. 383). A key concept within IST is that of *prereflective organizing principles*, which Stolorow denotes thusly:

Developmentally, recurring patterns of intersubjective transaction within the developmental system give rise to principles (thematic patterns, meaning-structures) that unconsciously organize subsequent emotional and relational experiences. Such organizing principles are unconscious, not in the sense of being repressed but in being prereflective; they ordinarily do not enter the domain of reflective self-awareness. These intersubjectively derived, prereflective organizing principles are the basic building blocks of personality development, and their totality constitutes one's character. (p. 383)

Two key concepts of intersubjective systems theory—intersubjectivity and contextualism—find referents in the existential and phenomenological philosophical work of Martin Heidegger. The *Being* of human life is reflected in Heidegger's term *Dasein*, and refers to primordiality embedded engagement in-the-world in some time and

place; whereas human Being is saturated with the world in which it resides just as the inhabited world is drenched in human meanings and purposes (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). In his work *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1962) made few explicit definitions of Dasein, but in one such instance depicted Dasein as “this entity which each of us is himself” (p. 277). In view of this fundamental contextualization, affectivity (e.g. moods, emotions) is a person’s mode of living. Because affectivity is contextualized, it includes both how one feels and the situation within which one is feeling or being oneself in the world (Stolorow et al., 2002). Of particular importance to contemporary psychoanalysis is Heidegger’s emphasis on the primacy of affectivity in disclosing our context-embeddedness. According to Stolorow (2011), Heidegger’s ontological contextualism, outlined in Division I of *Being and Time*, contributes a philosophical grounding for a psychoanalytic phenomenological contextualism, as existence is bound by temporality, culture, and our radical situatedness in the world.

Stolorow and Atwood (1984) wrote that intersubjectivity is based in psychoanalytic understanding, which entails a grasp of the meaning of something that has been expressed that belongs to an individual’s personal subjective world and becomes accessible to understanding in the medium of the analyst’s empathy. According to their early view, empathy arises in therapy because of the common bond of humanity shared by the observer and the observed. Cognitive science offers a conceptual model of social cognition that augments the idea of empathy, with two related theories on how we come to know others: *theory-theory of mind* and *simulation theory of mind* (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). Theory theory (TT) is so called because it claims that our understanding of others relies on exploring a theoretical stance—“it requires the appeal to a particular

theory, namely folk psychology, which offers us the commonsense explanation of why people do what they do” (p. 172). Simulation theory (ST) in contrast asserts that our understanding of the other is based on self-simulating their beliefs, desires, or emotions. In this view, one puts oneself, as observer, in the place of the observed, and using one’s own mind as a model to ask “what would I be thinking or feeling if I were in his/her place” and then projects the results onto the observed (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). These theories are related to cognitive science discussions about the nature of social cognition within the framework of the theory of mind debate. The expression *theory of mind* is used as shorthand for our capacity to attribute mental states to self and others, and to interpret behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). These theories, however, are not neat divisions, and several hybrid theories combine TT and ST because neither positions represent theoretical monoliths. In general, TT holds that understanding minded beings is theoretical, inferential, and quasi-scientific in nature. Simulation-theorists argue that not only are conscious imagination and deliberative inference implicated in discerning and differentiating mental states in others, but also that implicit (unconscious) simulation occurs (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). Here we begin to formulate the multicomponential architecture of empathy, which includes intentionality, and implicit relational knowing or unconscious communication, as aspects of relational experience.

Stolorow and Atwood (1984) noted that the development of psychoanalytic understanding may be conceptualized as an intersubjective process involving a dialogue between two personal universes with the goal of illuminating the inner pattern of one’s life, defined as “that distinctive structure of meanings that brings together the different

parts of an individual's world in an intelligent whole" (p. 88). This gives rise to an interpretive hypothesis regarding the experiential and life-historical context within which that behavior has meaning. This intersection or interplay of two subjectivities is the intersubjective field or analytic space. Because the boundaries of the field are intersubjective, Stolorow and Atwood explain, the interpretive conclusions must be understood as *relative to* the intersubjective context of their origin. Thus, in terms of meaning-making, what occurs within or between the dyad in the analytic situation cannot be generalized to situations beyond the clinical encounter itself. Stated simply, philosophical hermeneutics posits a situational or contextual theory of truth, because truth is historical; this appears in direct opposition to the prevailing Western theory of truth as universal and objective (Crusius, 1991). The creed of philosophical hermeneutics could well be "truth keeps happening" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 9), another way of saying that Being is an event of truth (Crusius, 1991).

Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange (2002) articulated three features of their view of a post-Cartesian psychoanalytic perspective: (1) It is *phenomenological*—its focus is subjective worlds of emotional experience, (2) It is *hermeneutic*—it seeks to interpretively illuminate "structures of meaning that organize worlds of experience" (Stolorow, 2006, p. 594), and (3) It is *contextual*—it considers experience and its horizons as constituted within "formative contextual systems" (p. 594).

Personality as the structure of one's subjective world.

From the perspective of psychoanalytic phenomenology (IST), personality structure is essentially the *structure of a person's experiencing*—defined by the distinctive configurations of self and other/object that shape and organize a person's

subjective world. These structures include systems of ordering, termed *organizing principles* and cognitive-affective schemata (Stolorow & Atwood, 1984) through which a person's sense of self and other assumes their characteristic forms and meanings. Self-organizing processes are considered *a priori* psychological structures that are modified from relations and due to complexities present in active, living systems. Crucial to psychoanalytic interpretive understanding is the concept of *character* as coextensive with the *structure* of a subjective world. Thus, the concept of character rests on the assumption of a close functional relationship between the ordering of human experience (in configurations of self and other) and the patterning of human conduct (Stolorow & Atwood, 1984).

Primacy of affect.

Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood (2002) noted that the shift in psychoanalytic thinking from the primacy of Freud's drives to the primacy of affectivity moves psychoanalysis toward a phenomenological contextualism and a primary focus on dynamic intersubjective systems. They asserted that unlike drives, which originate within the interior of the Cartesian isolated mind, affect (subjective emotional experience) is something that from birth onward is "regulated, or misregulated within ongoing relational matrices or systems" (p. 678). Locating affect at the center of subjective experience assumes a radical contextualization of human psychological life and its many expressions.

Stolorow and Atwood proposed an extension of Kohut's (1971) selfobject concept by suggesting that selfobject functions fundamentally pertain to the integration of affect into the organization of self-experience, and that the need for selfobject ties relates

centrally to the need for attuned responsiveness to affect states in all stages of the life cycle. In this formulation, emotional experience (affect) is inseparable from the intersubjective contexts of attunement and malattunement, in which it is felt. This shift to the primacy of affect marked a major turning point in the psychoanalytic theorizing of Stolorow and Atwood (1992):

It became a central tenet of our perspective that a shift in psychoanalytic thinking from the motivational primacy of drive to the motivational primacy of affectivity moves psychoanalysis toward a phenomenological contextualism and a central focus on dynamic intersubjective systems.... Comprehending the motivational primacy of affectivity enables us to contextualize a wide range of psychological phenomena that have traditionally been central in psychoanalytic theory, including psychological conflict, trauma, defense and resistance, and the dynamic unconscious itself. (p. 292)

From an intersubjective perspective, psychological conflict arises when important affect states of the child cannot be integrated because they evoke massive or consistent malattunement from caregivers (Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1987). Such unintegrated affect states can become the source of lifelong emotional conflict and susceptibility to traumatic states because they are experienced as threats to the individual's established psychological organization and the maintenance of vitally needed attachments (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). Stolorow and Atwood observed that the hallmark of developmental trauma is *unbearable affect*. However, the intolerability of an affect state cannot be accounted for solely, or even primarily, on the basis of the quantity or intensity of the painful feelings evoked by an injurious or traumatic event. Thus, the

consequence of a traumatic affect state can only be understood in terms of the relational system in which it occurs.

Developmental trauma originates within a formative intersubjective context whose central feature is malattunement to painful affect, leading to the child's loss of affect-integrating capacity and, thereby, to an unbearable, overwhelmed, disorganized state. Painful or frightening affect becomes traumatic when the attunement that the child needs to assist in its tolerance and integration is profoundly absent. (pp. 292-293)

Complexity theory.

William Coburn (2002) underscored and expanded on a contextualist complexity theory perspective in conceptualizing the organization of personal, subjective experience and the therapeutic process. He emphasized that one's personal, lived experience originates and continues to evolve from within a relational matrix, with affect as its primary currency. Additionally, he asserted that one could never extricate oneself from the world for even just a moment, in accounting for an individual's perceptions and experiences, because to do so would thrust one back into the theoretical quagmire where perceptions and experiences are conceptualized as *transference distortion*, which decontextualizes the person, removing him or her out of the subjective worlds or relational fields in which such psychological phenomena transpire and have meaning.

Coburn (2002) also noted that psychoanalytic theorists increasingly conceptualize both the organization of personal, subjective experience and the therapeutic process through a contextualist systems view—meaning that patients are never outside of their subjective worlds or relational fields in which psychological phenomena occur. Coburn considered several theorists including Stolorow (1997) and Sucharov (2002), who

attempted, through an investigative process, to particularize the nature of emergent experience, and to understand more specifically, from a contextualist perspective, how and where emotional experience originates, evolves, and is transformed in a nonlinear manner. In this conceptualization, organizing principles have been reconceived to denote modes of experience that are relationally, or more broadly, *systemically* derived. Theorists now speak less of organizing principles within the patient, and place more emphasis on the coalescence and evolution of organizing principles whose author or owner is the analytic dyad or system.

Additionally, Coburn (2002) focused on what, exactly, is being analyzed and potentially transformed in the clinical encounter. He considered two complementary themes: the concept of the interpenetration of multiple worlds of experience and the idea of *systemically derived* organizing principles. These themes are considered for the purpose of enhancing understanding about the concept of subjective experience, its relationship to intersubjectivity, and related perspectives about the process of therapeutic transformation or change in psychoanalysis.

Kuppens, Stouten, and Mesquita (2009) have described each person as having a unique emotional life that is a synthesis of one's idiographic history comprised of one's genetic constitution, learning histories, and experiences of threats, challenges, interpersonal relations and life events. Systematic individual differences are at the heart of their model, which assumes that divergent dynamics of emotions exist across individuals and are multicomponential, dynamic phenomena that evolve over time. Explicit attention on intra- and inter-individual differences in the componential architecture of emotions, in which components are continuously updated and regulated, is

necessary to their unfolding across time and contexts (Kuppens, Stouten, & Mesquita, 2009).

Challenges to analyst neutrality.

Stolorow and Atwood (1997) offered a critique of conceptions of the myth of the neutral analyst that appeared prominently in their survey of psychoanalytic literature. They proposed that the notion of analyst neutrality continues to function as a deeply embedded organizing principle “shaping analysts’ perceptions of the analytic encounter and obscuring the intersubjective nature of the analytic process” (p. 431). Although alternatives to the idea of neutrality exist in the psychoanalytic literature (Ehrenberg, 1992; Rahlhing, 1995; Renik, 1996; Singer, 1977), Stolorow and Atwood (1997) found that even relationally oriented analysts and therapists continue to preserve neutrality as an exalted, although unattainable ideal. They identified four main ideas that abide to exert a strong influence: (1) neutrality as abstinence, (2) neutrality as anonymity, (3) neutrality as equidistance, and (4) neutrality as empathy.

Neutrality as abstinence is often associated with Freud’s (1915/1976c) adage that “treatment must be carried out in abstinence” (p. 165), which is usually interpreted to mean that the analyst must not give patients any instinctual satisfactions—but instead is to decisively frustrate the patient’s needs and wishes. This technical prohibition follows from the theoretical perception that the primary constellations of which psychoanalysis is concerned are derivatives of repressed instinctual drives. Thus, and according to this model, gratification would interfere with the aim of bringing repressed instinctual wishes into consciousness, whereas abstinence would not (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997).

Neutrality as anonymity, closely linked to the rule of abstinence, extends from

Freud's (1912/1976) advisement that the analyst "should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him" (p. 118). The assumption that the analyst can stay anonymous denies the intersubjective nature of the analytic process (Gill, 1984). "Everything analysts do or say—especially the interpretations they offer—are products of their psychological organization, disclosing central aspects of their personality to their patients. These impressions, in turn, are decisive in codetermining the development of the transference" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997, p. 432). It is a myth of neutrality that an analyst can obscure his or her own personality while in the midst of analytic discourse with the patient.

Neutrality as equidistance is Anna Freud's (1936) assertion that the analyst "takes his stand at a point equidistant from the id, the ego and the superego" (p. 28), a stance that she represents as being "clear objectivity" and an "absence of bias" (pp. 28-29). This presents a metaphysical conundrum in trying to measure distances between oneself and hypothetical mental constructs, but additionally, this idea is based in the value-loaded theoretical belief system of the tripartite model of the mind, and therefore represents another myth of analyst neutrality (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997).

Neutrality as empathy has persisted in the self-psychology of Heinz Kohut (1977), who denoted analyst neutrality as "the responsiveness to be expected, on an average, from persons who have devoted their lives to helping others with the aid of insights obtained via the empathic immersion into their inner life" (p. 252). This idea is also rooted in a theoretical belief system and clearly does not articulate a neutral analytic stance. Kohut (1980) purported that empathy "is in essence neutral and objective" (p. 483), and Wolf (1983) has agreed that Kohut's definition "implies an attitude of

objectivity with regard to the patient's subjectivity" (p. 675). Stolorow and Atwood (1997) contended that it is impossible for an analyst to be objective and neutral, as that would require the analyst to be able to eliminate one's own psychological organization from the analytic dyad.

Interpretation as suggestion.

Freud (1919/1976) originally made a distinction between interpretation as "the pure gold of analysis" (p. 168) versus what he termed, "the copper of direct suggestion" (p. 168). This claim is the source of a distinguishing characteristic of psychoanalysis from other forms of psychotherapy, its reliance on interpretation, and this belief in the difference between interpretation and suggestion is closely aligned with the ideas of neutrality examined above, on which the neutral analyst is assumed to be able to offer "pure interpretation without suggestion" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997, p. 432). As Merton Gill (1984) noted, "every time the analyst intervenes he may be experienced as suggesting a direction for the patient to pursue" (p. 171). Stolorow and Atwood (1997) agreed with Gill's assertion regarding the lack of evidence for a sharp distinction between interpretation of transference and suggestion. They asserted that the idea that interpretation "simply lifts into awareness what lies hidden within the patient" (p. 433) is a residual of Freud's topographic theory and archaeological paradigm for the analytic process (Freud, 1913/1976), and that this paradigm neglects to consider the contribution of the analyst's psychological organization in the framing of interpretations. This observation underscores the fact that every transference interpretation, even the concept of transference itself, is grounded in the theoretical framework that directs the analyst's ordering of the clinical material (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997), and that an analyst's loyalty

to his or her guiding framework “has roots in deeply felt personal beliefs and values” (p. 434). According to Stolorow and Atwood,

Thus, each time the analyst offers an interpretation that goes beyond what the patient is consciously aware of, he/she invites the patient to see things, if ever so slightly, from the analyst’s own theory-rooted perspective. To that extent, interpretation are suggestions, and it is critical to the analysis to investigate whether the patient believes that he or she must adopt the analyst’s viewpoint in order to maintain the therapeutic bond. (p. 434)

Stolorow and Atwood explained that once the psychoanalytic situation is recognized as an intersubjective system of reciprocal mutual influence, the concept of neutrality is revealed to be a grandiose defensive illusion. As such, interpretations are always suggestions, transference is always contaminated, and analysts are never objective (Stolorow & Atwood, 1997). As an alternative to neutrality, the authors considered the investigatory stance taken from Kohut’s self-psychological theory.

Robert Stolorow, Bernard Brandchaft, and George Atwood (1987) described this alternative stance to analyst neutrality as one of empathic-introspective inquiry. This approach helps illuminate the principles unconsciously ordering the patient’s experience (via empathy), the principles unconsciously ordering the analyst’s experience (via introspection), and the interplay created between their two subjectivities within the analytic field (intersubjectivity). Unlike the position of neutrality, the stance of empathic-introspective inquiry does not aim to disavow the effect of the analyst’s psychological structure on the patient’s experience. In contrast, it considers this effect as inherent to the intersubjective nature of the analytic encounter and seeks consistently to

reflect on it as an ongoing part of the analysis.

Systems theory.

Stolorow (1997) stated that dynamic systems theory provides a source of powerful new metaphors for psychoanalysis in understanding the process of developmental change. Dynamic systems theory is centrally concerned with conceptualizing the process of developmental change in the generation of “emergent order and complexity: how structure and patterns arise from the cooperation of many individual parts” (p. 338). In accounting for the “messy, fluid, context-sensitive” (p. 338) nature of the developmental process, this framework is predisposed to serve as a source of guiding metaphors for psychoanalysis.

According to Stolorow (1997), within a general systems philosophy, any living system is part of a hierarchy. Two or more systems interacting cooperatively form a suprasystem. Some conceptualizations enter the living hierarchy at the level of the child-caregiver suprasystem and emphasize the ongoing processes of reciprocal mutual regulation within the dyad. Other formulations highlight the exquisitely context-dependent nature of the child’s self-regulatory processes, which are influenced by exchanges with caregivers. Psychoanalysis is concerned with the process of change within the patient-analyst relationship; thus, the level of hierarchy most relevant is the dyadic system. In addition, because the focus of psychoanalytic investigation is considered psychic, or subjective reality—the dyadic system is formed by the reciprocal interplay between two subjectivities (i.e. worlds of experience) and constitutes the unique domain of inquiry in psychoanalysis.

Stolorow (1997) asserted that phenomena such as conflict, transference,

resistance, fantasy, and the unconscious itself are grasped from a dynamic systems theory perspective as dynamically emergent properties of self-organizing, nonlinear, dyadic, intersubjective systems. This perspective is in direct contrast to the Freudian notion of the repression barrier as a fixed intrapsychic structure. Stolorow conceived of development as evolving and dissolving attractor states of intersubjective systems, which richly illuminate the processes of pattern formation and change in psychoanalysis. An attractor state is a quasi-stable or preferred configuration for which the self-organizing activity of a system has an affinity. Preferred attractor states continually stabilize and destabilize over time and vary greatly in terms of the degree of their stability. From a dynamic systems perspective, development is not viewed as teleological, but is the “outcome of the self-organizing processes of continuously active living systems” (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 44). Stolorow suggested that effective interpretations serve as perturbations of preferred, fixated attractor states in the therapeutic system, which allows new organizing principles to come into being.

A supraordinate principle of human motivation.

In the evolution of psychoanalytic phenomenology (IST), Atwood and Stolorow (2014) have proposed an ancillary, more general principle of human motivation: the “*need to maintain the organization of experience*” (p. 29) in the patterning of human conduct. This motivational principle sheds light on the key role played by concrete symbolization in human psychological life:

The basic psychological process that mediates this functional relationship between experience and action is *concretization*—the encapsulation of structures of experience by concrete, sensorimotor symbols. We have come to believe that

the concretization of experience is a ubiquitous and fundamental process in human psychological life and that it underlies a great variety of psychological activities and products. (p. 67)

Concretization can take different configurations and forms depending on its mode of expression, in order to actualize some aspect of psychological experience. Concretization appears in various expressions, including neurotic symptoms, symbolic objects, enactments, and dreams, to name a few.

Neurotic symptoms and the process of concretization.

The first profound demonstration of the role of concretization was the early psychoanalytic discoveries, in which psychopathological inhibitions and conversion symptoms could be terminated by unmasking their unconscious meanings (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1976). However, Freud's use of metapsychological notions and positivistic terms, such as energy transformation, clouded the significance of the initial discovery and insight that concrete, sensorimotor symbolism was central to the process of symptom formation.

Symbolic objects and the process of concretization.

A significant contribution to the understanding of the function of concretization in human psychological life was Winnicott's (1951) notion of the *transitional object*. Winnicott focused on a small child's use of a particular object to master anxiety or depressive emotional expression evinced by early experiences of caregiver separation. The transitional object stands in for the lost object and thus supplies a calming, soothing reparative function, in creating an "*illusion of reunion*" (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014, p. 69) or replacing the broken alliance with the missing maternal presence. "Transitional

objects are often used by patients to restore or maintain the bond with their therapist during separations” (p. 69).

Enactments and the process of concretization.

When motor activity predominates in the mode of concretization, expression takes the form of behavioral enactments. “The significance of enactment in concretizing and maintaining organizations of experience is implicit in our conceptualization of character as the structure of a subjective world” (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014, p. 71). This formulation presumes that recurrent sequences of conduct serve to actualize (Sandler & Sandler, 1978) “the nuclear configurations of self and other that constitute a person’s character” (p. 71). Patterns of human conduct that operate to sustain the organization of experience can be understood to apply in two ways: (1) to sustain a *particular* organization of experience, whereby specific configurations of self and other, originating from multiple origins and serving multiple purposes, are constellated, or (2) to sustain psychological organization itself—as when behavioral enactments supply the structural cohesion and continuity needed to prevent fragmentation of structures of experience, sense of self, or others (Atwood & Stolorow, 2014). When enactments are materialized to sustain a *particular* organization of experience, they may serve a defensive function, fulfill cherished wishes or desires, provide moral restraint or self-punishment, bolster adjustment to difficult realities, or restore damaged or lost self or images.

When severe developmental traumata interfere with the structuralization of the subjective world, vivid concrete enactments may be utilized to restore vulnerable, disintegration-prone structures of experience (Stolorow & Lachmann, 1980). Dramatic, bizarre, overtly destructive, aggressive, or erotic enactments often signal an endangered

subjective world. If one's structures of subjectivity are adequate for symbolization, then dreams, personal myths, fantasies, and social roles supply sufficient expression in the maintenance of the structural integrity of one's subjective world.

Dreams and the process of concretization.

Historically, the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious developed in concert with the interpretation of dreams (Freud, 1900/1994). Atwood and Stolorow (2014) refer to the form of unconsciousness in dreams as *prereflective*:

The prereflective structures of a person's subjective world are most readily discernable in his or her relatively unfettered, spontaneous productions, and there is probably no psychological product that is less fettered or more spontaneous than the dream. As human subjectivity in purest culture, the dream constitutes a "royal road" to the prereflective unconscious—to the organizing principles and dominant leitmotifs that unconsciously pattern and thematize a person's psychological life. (p. 76)

Concretization encompasses an extensive array of psychological phenomena involving unconscious symbolization. The wide scope of the concretization principle and use of concrete symbolization serves to "crystallize and preserve the organization of the subjective world" (p. 90) in the patterning of human action and conduct.

The role of the unconscious.

In the intersubjective systems model, unconscious influences are referred to as *unconscious organizing principles* and exist as *a priori* psychological structures that affect present-day events and regulate and organize new experience. Conscious and

unconscious intrapsychic organizing principles develop in mental life through interactions with one's environment and in the context of relational matrices.

Developmentally, recurring patterns of intersubjective transaction within the developmental system give rise to principles that unconsciously organize subsequent emotional and relational experiences. Such unconscious organizing principles are the basic building blocks of the personality. They show up in the therapeutic situation in the form of transference, which intersubjective systems theory conceptualizes as unconscious organizing activity. (Stolorow, 1998, p. 424).

IST emphasizes both the effect of early relational experience and object relations as well as relational interactions within every temporal intersubjective context.

Some may see a contradiction between the concept of developmentally preestablished principles that organize subsequent experiences and our repeated contention that experience is always embedded in a constitutive intersubjective context. This contradiction is more apparent than real. A person enters any situation with an established set of ordering principles (the subject's contribution to the intersubjective system), but it is the context that determines which among the array of these principles will be called on to organize the experience.

Experience becomes organized by a particular invariant principle only when there is a situation that lends itself to being so organized. The organization of experience can therefore be seen as codetermined both by preexisting principles and by an ongoing context that favors one or another of them over the others. (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 24)

Samuel Gerson (2004) formulated this same concept differently, with his view of the unconscious as “a holding area whose contents await birth at a receptive moment in the contingencies of evolving experience” (p. 69). Donnel Stern (1989) articulated a more nuanced view on this subject in his description of the nature of what he has termed *unformulated experience*:

Unconscious contents can no longer be conceived of as concrete or literal, but must instead be understood as potential mental activity: thoughts not yet thought, connections not yet made, memories one does not yet have the resources or willingness to construct. (p. 12)

Stern’s reconceptualization of unconscious processes as *unformulated experience* constitutes a radical substitute to Freud’s dynamic unconscious. In Stern’s (1989) perspective, to say that mental content is unconscious is to say that it is unarticulated, potential mental activity having neither shape nor clarity: “unconscious material must...change in form in order to enter consciousness” (p. 12). For Stern, the chief manner through which this change occurs is *language*, whereas the unformulated has not yet been put into words, and the formulated has achieved expression through language.

According to Gerson (2004), the idea of the unconscious as unformulated experience can be seen as related to Christopher Bollas’s (1987) concept of the *unthought known* and Judith Mitrani’s (1995) formulation of *unmentalized experience*—with all referring to “experience that eludes consciousness due to absences of a resonant interpersonal environment” (Gerson, 2004, p. 69). In contrast to these concepts is the IST idea of an *unvalidated unconscious* (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992), which consists of aspects of experience that “could not be articulated because they never evoked the

requisite validating response from the surround” (p. 33). This realm of the unconscious according to the intersubjective formulation is considered to always be in a fluid state, capable of being transformed into consciousness depending on the intersubjective context and the proper environmental fit for its expression or emergence.

Temporality also is implicated as an aspect of working intersubjectively as conscious and unconscious organizing principles are related to the patient’s unique history and to the constitutive impact of how the current context is both forming and being formed through the interplay of subjectivities.

Clinically, we find ourselves, our patients, and our psychoanalytic work always embedded in constitutive process. Process means temporality and history. To work contextually is to work developmentally. To work developmentally is to maintain a continuing sensibility to past, present, and future experience.... [It] affirms the emotional life of persons who have come from somewhere and are going somewhere. (Orange et al., 1997, p. 77)

Intersubjectivity is a broad movement to espouse relationally based conceptions of developmental and clinical processes, with current discourse on the intersubjective perspective appearing as a significant departure from debates that marked its initial emergence (Gerson, 2004). Charles Spezzano (1997) labeled the newly emerging paradigms, the *American middle group*, namely, the schools of relational and intersubjective theory. In a coauthored work, Stephen Mitchell and Lewis Aron (1999) referred to the unfolding of a distinctly new tradition, relational psychoanalysis, with its origins in early object relations theory, the British middle school, and American interpersonal and self-psychology traditions (Mills, 2005).

Criticism of the relational and intersubjective schools is often framed as a dichotomy between the euphemistic one-person (intrapsychic) and two-person (intersubjective) formulations of the analytic interaction (Gerson, 2004); however, more recent contributions have aimed to transcend these initial polarizations by revising psychoanalytic theory in a manner that articulates the ever interconnected and essential contributions of each perspective (Green, 2000). IST includes conscious and prereflective mental processes as it occurs within the intersubjective context incorporating yet-to-be formulated expressions of intrapsychic life, as it evolves “within a nexus of living systems” (Orange et al., 1997, p. 68).

Phenomenology and the Birth of Subjectivity

Phenomenology is both a contemporary school of philosophy and a general movement of thought arising in the 20th century, with its influence evidenced in literature, psychology, psychiatry, social science, and psychoanalysis (Hanly, 1979). In the history of phenomenological research, a transformation occurred in the scientific consciousness after the collapse of the idealistic systems in the last decades of the 19th century, which gave particular sciences their independent rights. As a result of this transformation, a philosophical renewal secured for philosophy its own field with the distinctive features of a scientific philosophy and character of “a theory of science, a logic of the sciences” (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 13). The early stages of this transformation began in the mid-19th century with the development of a scientific philosophy which gained prominence by providing a foundation to various disciplines directed toward consciousness, and emerging as “an original science of consciousness itself, a psychology” (p. 19). By the end of the 19th century, scientific philosophy (i.e.

psychology) was considered the basic science of philosophy, with its most pervasive concern being a theory of *consciousness*, with clear ties to Descartes, who was the first to identify consciousness, *res cogitans*, as the basic theme of philosophy.

Within phenomenological research, the decisive discoveries of phenomenology are (1) intentionality, (2) categorical intuition, and (3) the original sense of the *a priori* (Heidegger, 1985/1992). The concept of intentionality will be given further exposition later in this project, and according to Heidegger, is “a structure of lived experiences” (p. 29), in which *intentio* simply means a directing-itself-toward. Additionally, Heidegger wrote that “every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself toward something. Representing is a representing of something, recalling is a recalling of something, judging is judging about something, presuming, expecting, hoping, loving, hating—of something” (p. 29). Although intentionality has been mistakenly assigned a metaphysical prejudice, Heidegger (1985/1992) disputed this association and asserted that it is an elemental step in the comprehension of phenomenology. He noted that the relations between comportments and lived experiences themselves are of an intentional character and structural coherence definitive of intentionality—an elemental principle for the understanding of phenomenology.

Holism versus atomism.

As noted by Eric Chelstrom (2013), phenomenology is a wholly unique field, in that it is the study of consciousness qua consciousness. It is a tradition and a methodology, central to which is the deliberate achievements of subjectivity. The phenomenological tradition, according to Chelstrom, is one that “has consistently aimed

towards taking a middle position between atomism and collectivism or holism” (p. 2). J.

N. Mohanty (1984) also effectively argued for the rejection of both extremes:

It would be best to begin by recognizing [the truth of] ... the rejection of atomism, be it psychological, semantic or epistemological. Neither a mental act nor its sense nor its referent stands, each by itself, as an autonomous unit. A mental act belongs to the mental life of its owner, just as a sense points to other senses and a referent to other entities in its world. But rejection of atomism need not entail holism. Truth must lie in between these one-sided abstractions.

Phenomena themselves do not speak for either. (pp. 2-3)

By extension, the individual subject does not operate free of relations and dependency on others, but is always part of a social context. According to Mohanty (1984), a satisfactory phenomenological theory must account for *both* the individual of the particular phenomenon *and* the context that makes that individual what it is. An effective psychoanalytic theory of intersubjectivity must also account for both. How we understand and experience consciousness, the mental acts that comprise the thought stream, the meaning we derive from our interactions with others, and our self-relation to internal and external events are relevant factors in how we come to understand the world, ourselves, and our place in it.

According to Chelstrom (2013), atomism offers an insufficient account as it discounts the importance of the thematic whole or social context and treats the individual as being autonomous or independent. Holism is insufficient because it discounts the importance of the individual, viewing one as merely an instance of a kind, and sees an individual's achievements as constituting and maintaining the whole at a primitive level.

Each position is an extreme in that it seeks to understand one pole of the relation in terms of the other. Chelstrom wrote:

Atomistic thought aims to understand social wholes in terms of individuals.

Holistic thought aims to understand individuals in terms of social wholes. A moderate position, on the other hand, treats neither individual nor whole as inherently given in isolation from the other, and aims to explicate the dialectical and dynamic nature of their relation. (p. 4)

Mohanty (1984) argued that the recognition of the primacy of the individual as the basic locus of agency and consciousness, in relation to whom social institutions and practices are built up is not only “historically a basis of Western logic and epistemology but also, phenomenologically, an incontrovertible thesis that any holism can deny only at the risk of its own credibility” (Chelstrom, 2013, p. 3). This modern view of the separate subject thus marks the inception of intersubjectivity (e.g. between subjectivities) as a conceptual possibility within the phenomenological tradition.

The psychological individual: The self.

An understanding of the conceptualization of the self lies at the center of an understanding of intersubjectivity. A view of the self as distinctly separate from one’s surroundings: city, culture, environment or things is a pivotal paradigm shift leading to the ushering in of the modern notion of self (Faulconer & Williams, 1990). Frank Summers (2012), in his thoughtful essay about contemporary psychoanalysis, wrote about the objectification of the self as a scientific object. He noted that this new view of the human subject changed the nature of being human:

Lost to the present age is the fact that the natural science conception of space is a relatively recent creation which homogenizes space and turns things into “objects”, law-governed points of mass. In ancient Greece there was no “object” in the sense of a material thing, therefore objectification was not possible in that world. After science invented the “object”, the human becomes a “subject” in the Cartesian sense, separated from the world. (p. 42)

In Summers’s (2012) view, the next step is to apply the objectification to human being in which event, the nature of being human is lost:

Mediating from the ontological nature of being human, the way to study human being is to immerse oneself in the being one hopes to know. Understanding is engaging the ways people are in the world, their modes of being in the world. And that cannot be studied from afar; it can only be grasped by entering into their ways of being and relating. (p. 42)

Eric Chelstrom (2013) added to this discussion by addressing the notion of a plural subject, the subject of collective experience, of *we* in his research on the nature of social reality, or more specifically, the social domains of reality. Chelstrom argued that the key to understanding the social world lies in the explication of the role of consciousness in the constitution of social objects. He contended that if the social world is dependent on achievements of beings within sufficiently higher-level systems of consciousness, then the intentionality of consciousness is foundational to the social world. His theory proposes that intentionality is essential to any and all socially constituted beings, and that the task for the phenomenologist is how to explicate and describe one’s *intentions of others*, which refers to the consciousness of another as part of one’s own experience, or

the experience of another as other. Chelstrom's work is an excellent contribution to psychoanalytic thought in explicating the phenomenology of intentionality and intersubjective space within social groups, of which the therapeutic dyad is constitutive. Thus, the theory of intentionality that one assumes in theorizing has implications for one's social ontology, and one's theory of the nature of the social world, with phenomenology as an exacting methodology for the analysis of intentionality.

Donnell Stern (2004) suggested that intentionality is often not unified due to conflict between multiple self-states. Stern viewed the achievement of *inner conflict* to be preferable to the alternative of *dissociation*—which later fuels enactments. Stern posited a formulation of the self as *multiple* and noted that vague affective hints, tensions, or chafing can serve to direct focus to these clues about unconscious involvement with a patient. Stern observed that unconscious enactments and patterns, that can be sources of difficulty in the treatment, are often difficult to see and formulate precisely because they *constellate around needed alterations in relatedness* in the analysis—alterations in relatedness that are the preconditions for their own accomplishment. The provocation of therapeutic change and the conditions for learning something new are often dependent upon the atmosphere of the relational dyad and the intersubjective stasis within the relational field.

Brentano's theory and subjectivity.

Franz Brentano (1874/1973) identified intentionality as the essential structure constitutive of the true nature of psychic phenomenon, which became for him the basis for the differentiation of psychic from physical phenomena. The contributions of Brentano figure large in the history of phenomenological thought and in developing a

theoretical vocabulary for the mind. In 1874, Brentano's work on the relation between mental and physical phenomena in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* was inaugural in formulating intentionality as the mark of the mental in modern terms.

Brentano wrote:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by...the intentional inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly ambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing)... This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. (pp. 88-89)

In his account of the mental he incorporated *consciousness* and *intentionality* as two dimensions of the mind. Regarding consciousness he stated, "no mental phenomenon is possible without a correlative consciousness" (p. 121). Brentano was preoccupied with Greek philosophy with a particular reverence for Aristotle, through which he arrived at his unconventional horizons of philosophical inquiry. Brentano was a student in Berlin in the 1860s when he sought to interpret Aristotle against the background of the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (Heidegger, 1985/1992). The path away from the medieval tradition Heidegger explains, was mapped by Descartes and therefore, Brentano's work exhibits a singular blend of *Aristotelian-Scholastic* philosophizing and modern *Cartesian* questioning.

According to Heidegger (1985/1992), Brentano made "the philosophical goal of a science of consciousness his own" (p. 20) by detaching himself from "the tendency to transpose the methods of natural science and physiology into the exploration of psychic

life” (p. 20). In his 1866 dissertation, Brentano concluded that philosophy, like the natural sciences, must derive its concepts from *its own* matters and proceed “with a fundamental regard for the character of the subject matters in question” (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 20). The manner to approach this then is to accept the extant elements of psychic life, as they are directly accessible. The first task in this endeavor is the *classification* of psychic phenomena by *dividing* and *ordering* actual elements of the psychic itself as they are immediately given. Ordering is always done from a discrete *point of view*. Point of view refers to that toward which one looks, in making distinctions regarding a particular subject matter. In this way, Brentano attempted to specify “the foundations for the science of consciousness, of lived experiences, of the psychic in the broadest sense” (p. 20) by comparing the nature of psychic phenomena with physical phenomena. Brentano discovered that the basic structure of the psychic is that something of the objective inheres or indwells in each lived experience, a difference that he referred to as *intentional inexistence* (Heidegger, 1985/1992).

Intentio is a Scholastic expression that means *directing itself toward*. In his *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint* of 1874, Brentano points to the intentional inexistence of the object, in which every lived experience directs itself toward something in a manner that differs according to the unique character of the experience. Using this basic structure of psychic phenomena, Brentano segregated the various ways of self-directedness into three elementary categories of psychic comportment: representation, judgment and interest (Heidegger, 1985/1992). “We speak of a representing wherever something appears” (Brentano, 1973, p. 198), “wherever something is simply given and the simply given is perceived” (Heidegger, 1985/1992, p. 22). Representing in the most

inclusive sense is the simple having of something. Brentano described judging as “an accepting as true or a rejecting as false” (1874/1973, p. 198). In contrast to merely having something, judging is taking a definite position toward the represented. The third category designated by Brentano is interest, which he variously titled as *love*, *emotion*, *interest* or *valuing*.

These three divisions of representing, judging, and interest determine the relationship of all psychic phenomena and constitute his central thesis: that every psychic phenomenon is itself either a representation or is based upon representations. “This representing forms the basis of judging just as it does of desiring and every other psychic act. Nothing can be judged, but also nothing can be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not represented” (Brentano, 1874/1973, p. 80).

Brentano initiated a new movement in psychology and philosophy that impacted American psychology at that time, influencing the American psychologist William James, who attained prominence in Europe and later influencing the French philosopher Henri Bergson, whose theory of the immediate data of consciousness harkens to the concepts of Brentano’s original psychology (Heidegger, 1985/1992). Brentano’s way of questioning and reflection continued to usher in a new wave of thought profoundly impacting both Wilhelm Dilthey and Brentano’s famous pupils, Edmund Husserl, the eventual founder of phenomenological research, and young Sigmund Freud who studied under Brentano for three years when he was a student at the University of Vienna (Pearl, 2011).

This origin of intentionality provided by Brentano defined as *directing itself toward* a particular object is evident in the psychoanalytic phenomenology of George

Atwood and Robert Stolorow (2014), as it relates to the *structure of a person's experiencing* and *structures of experience* as it applies to analysis and investigations of personality composition and character. Stolorow and Atwood have referred to *structures of experience* as those distinctive configurations of self and other (a directed being-toward self or being-toward other) that "shape and organize a person's subjective world" (p. 28). In their psychoanalytic phenomenology, the concept of *character* is homologous to the structure of one's subjective world.

It seems evident that this type of questioning and analysis is essential to psychoanalytic practice and therapeutic change. To question how intentionality is implicated in relation to the phenomenology of lived experience, with its correlates in personal agency and behavioral motivation, and its impact on the therapeutic dyad seems a logical succession in psychoanalytic theory-building. Freud's concept of *tabula rosa*, the blank tablet, germane to the one-person psychology and the commensurate idea of analyst neutrality likely contributed to the paucity of critique in this area, but this appears as an underdeveloped area for psychoanalytic research.

Faalty to the experiencing subject.

Summers (2013) argued persuasively that the hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretation wins out over its deductivist natural science counterpoint because of its fealty to the experiencing subject, which is the exact subject of analysis. For an analysis to be effective, the focus of therapy must be the persistent recognition and illumination of the experiencing patient in his or her ever-expanding multiplicities of experience. This model of engaging the subjective has emerged as a widely employed but little articulated analytic way of thinking. One reason for this lack of notice may be the gradual shift to the

lessened emphasis on theory, and additionally because it does not fit neatly into any existing psychoanalytic viewpoint. According to Summers:

The deceptively simple premise that psychoanalytic therapy is a concentration on the experiencing subject demarcates a field of investigation and transformation that has implications for the model of mind, analytic strategy and conduct, the experience of the other, and the nature of a variety of mental phenomena. (p. 18)

In *The Psychoanalytic Vision* Frank Summers (2013) wrote:

The phenomenological understanding of the relationship between person and world, based on the nature of human experiencing rather than the eighteenth-century natural science standpoint, constitutes the philosophical foundation for psychoanalytic theory because, as we have seen, the uniqueness of psychoanalysis lies precisely in its inquiry into the experiencing subject. (pp. 24-25)

However, if the nature of human being is to relate to the world, then the long-standing psychoanalytic ways of construing the nature of the psyche is called into question, particularly in the distinction made in theoretical writing between internal and external experience. A common psychoanalytic concept such as the intrapsychic reifies these distinctions and metaphors for introspection or *looking inside* (Summers, 2013).

As Heidegger (1954/1977) and Foucault (1980) have shown, the language of inside and outside is a product of the natural science paradigm. Summers (2013) illuminated this point as well:

Once “objects” were created as points in homogenized space, it became possible to refer to them as “outside” as though external to experience, and other psychic events, such as fantasies and dreams, as “inside”. Descartes’ *cogito* is perhaps the

first intrapsychic concept in the Western World. (p. 25)

Thus the subject of analysis is the experiencing subject wherein experience is conceptualized as inclusive of all levels of consciousness, including unconscious processes. Historically, theoretical presuppositions of deductivist analytic theories have been privileged over the patient's reported experiences. Summers (2013) noted that this sort of subtle pressuring for the patient's experience to fit the analyst's presuppositions is one of the inherent dangers of interpreting from a mistaken "theoretical frame" (p. 17). The epistemological problem of using theory deductively rather than as a heuristic is a practice common and widely accepted in analytic theory across theoretical divisions (Fonagy, 2000). Psychoanalytic theory may be considered an inquiry into the experiencing subject, and a depth exploration of experience, which requires its own epistemology and standards for truth and efficacy that have yet to be iterated for psychoanalysis, as a unique science of the subjective.

Intentionality and Intersubjectivity

Phenomenology is a rich tradition that investigates and illuminates structures of experience, the father of whom is considered to be Edmund Husserl. Husserl, in later sections of his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*, wrote about the appearance of intersubjective phenomena and of one's experience of an other as an other (e.g. intersubjectivity). As Dan Zahavi stated (Chelstrom, 2013), "Husserl came up against intersubjectivity in the course of analyzing the constitution of objectivity, reality and transcendence, since these categories simply could not be constituted on a solitary egological basis" (p. 5). The problem he encountered emerged in his contrasts between the experience of an other as a lived body versus a physical body, and the lack of an adequate description of the "forms

of intentionality” (p. 5) manifest in the experience of others; a distinction that appeared out of alignment with his phenomenological theory (Chelstrom, 2013). “The other is given in its bodily presence as a *lived body*, a body that is actively engaged in the world” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 183). As such, the experience of lived bodies is constituted in a different way than the experience of physical bodies. This motivated phenomenological descriptions to rely on the signifier of *empathy* as a reference to the intentionality of the experience of an Other. “Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the other’s lived experience” (p. 183). Empathy appears as a form of intentionality in Heinz Kohut’s self psychology and in the intersubjective theory of Robert Stolorow and George Atwood.

Intentionality has long been the subject of phenomenological philosophy (Klaskow, 2011) and emerges as central to any discussion of intersubjectivity and social phenomenon. An aspect of intersubjectivity is how one experiences an other as other, or the actual experience of embodied others and one’s consciousness of another as part of one’s own experience—this is the task given to phenomenology in an effort to describe higher-order intersubjective wholes. Husserl, in his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* addressed the intentional nature of consciousness and how intentional contents refer to the phenomenon of other in terms of the kind of evidence manifest to experience in relation to the experience of others. The experience of otherness, or of another as other, is appropriated in phenomenological discourse by the term *alterity* (Chelstrom, 2013). A complicating factor in this understanding is the irreducible asymmetry in the experience of other:

It is essential to the phenomenological description of the subject-subject relation that it involves an asymmetry. There is a difference between the experiencing subject and the experienced subject. But this asymmetry is a part of any correct description of intersubjectivity. Without asymmetry there would be no intersubjectivity, but merely an undifferentiated collectivity. (Zahavi, 2003, p. 114)

Thus, it is because the foreign subject eludes one's direct experience "that he or she is experienced as an Other at all" (p. 114).

It is important to explicate the definition of the term intentionality, thus distinguishing *intention* from use of the term *intent* in English-language philosophy. The terms *intention* and *intentionality* as utilized in this study refer either to "a cognitive act, the act of one's consciousness being oriented toward or directed at an object, event or state of affairs; or that which represents or embodies an expression of one's will to action" (Chelstrom, 2013, p. 6). Phenomenology's understanding of intentionality is different from that found in contemporary analytic philosophy and is similar to that proffered by Franz Brentano (Chelstrom, 2013). In the phenomenological view, intentionality "is entirely internal to episodes in consciousness—to *experiences*, broadly conceived—and does not consist in, or merely essentially involve, a relation of reference to anything in the world outside of consciousness" (Meixner, 2006, p. 26). In the phenomenological tradition, the idea that consciousness is always consciousness-of-something is referred to as the intentionality of consciousness: "Intentionality is a ubiquitous character of consciousness, and as the phenomenologists put it, it means that

all consciousness (all perceptions, memories, imaginings, judgments, etc.) is *about* or *of something*” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 7).

Edmund Husserl’s (1931/1999) most famous analysis of intersubjectivity is in his work *Cartesian Meditations*. Husserl’s main focus is on the recognition that the other is other, a conscious subject unto himself, as manifested in experience. This recognition is a basic intentional achievement, which preserves the alterity of the other, and that is achieved through an essential asymmetry in the experience of the other. Because another’s consciousness and intentional states are not accessible to one in an original means, one’s intention of the other is possible only through “an indirect form of adequate evidence” (Chelstrom, 2013, p. 11). Because one cannot have direct experience of the consciousness of another, recognizing another subject as other is available through evidence or indications of the other’s consciousness, not the other’s consciousness itself. Husserl’s analysis speaks to *how* one experiences others, and defines the evidentiary possibilities as necessarily incomplete by virtue of the nature of alterity present in the experience of the other. Husserl’s critique does not endorse a solipsistic view of experience as others in the social world are already meaningfully present in one’s lived experience in a deep and irreducible way (Husserl, 1931/1999); instead it attempts to address the ways that knowing occurs in our experience of otherness.

John Searle (1983) articulated the nature of intentionality in a manner consistent with phenomenological philosophy, defining it thus: “Intentionality is that property of mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world” (p. 1). This definition makes it clear that intentionality is manifest in experience and does not have to be linguistic in nature or strictly volitional in character—

in the sense of comportment—but that it can also apply to states of consciousness, or mental states. Zahavi (2003) enumerated this in detail:

In his analysis of the structure of experience, Husserl pays particular attention to a group of experiences that are all characterized by being conscious of something, that is, which all possess an object-directedness. This attribute is also called intentionality. One does not merely love, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs. Regardless of whether we are talking of a perception, thought, judgment, fantasy, doubt, expectation, or recollection, all of these diverse forms of consciousness are characterized by intending objects and cannot be analyzed properly without a look at their objective correlate, that is, the perceived, doubted, expected object. (p. 14)

Searle (1992) proffers three distinct categorical forms of intentionality: intrinsic, derived, and as-if. Intrinsic intentionality is the intentionality inherent to consciousness. As-if is the metaphorical assignment of subjectivity to something that could not bear those features (e.g. my computer is angry). And derived intentionality is “where something possesses intentionality, but the reason for its having intentionality is a dependence relation on beings that possess intentionality intrinsically” (Chelstrom, 2013, p. 8).

Language is an excellent example of derived intentionality.

Searle (1992) used the examples of a sentence in a language and a stop sign. Sentences have linguistic meaning through derived intentionality, because they are *about* something. As such, a sentence’s intentionality is not intrinsic to itself, but rather it is based upon the speakers and their linguistic communities, and the agreed upon meanings of a set of written marks and or vocalized phonemes. Sentences only possess

intentionality because the speakers and their linguistic communities make them so. Thus, *derived intentionality* is constitutive of the interplay of consciousness (e.g. intrinsic intentionality) of the subjectivities involved. This definition offers an articulation of a basic tenet of intersubjective systems theory, whereby the co-creation of experience and co-transference occur between two subjectivities in the clinical encounter and shared meaning is derived.

Although Heidegger rarely used the word *intentionality* in *Being and Time*, the concept is frequently found in his book *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, written around the same time. At the most basic level, Heidegger's formulation of intentionality is commensurate with Husserl's. For Husserl (1900/2000), intentionality refers to the structural relationality of consciousness, as he stated in his *Logical Investigations*: "Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of directing themselves in varying fashion to presented objects, but they do so in an intentional sense. An object is *referred to* or *aimed at* in them" (p. 558). Heidegger's (1927/1982) definition of intentionality appears quite similar: "Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, or being-directed-toward" (p. 58). Both Husserl and Heidegger begin with human being in its common everyday life, but the difference in their conceptions is that for Heidegger intentionality is a structure of Dasein's being rather than a structure of consciousness, thus, intentionality is constitutive of Dasein. And Dasein, ontologically defined as intentional comportment, can never be understood without the presence of an intentional correlate (Klaskow, 2011).

It is difficult to bring nonsensual intentionality into view as it is difficult to grasp since it does not refer to the senses but instead is a relation or directedness to something

relationally constituted. One way to talk about this is through the concept of categorical intuition. Categorical intuition is a certain way of seeing something we cannot actually see: “Categorical intuition is the intuition of logical or conceptual determinations of intuitional objects, an intuition of something that does not appear sensuously-phenomenally” (Klaskow, 2011). It is a way to analyze and describe ontically given objects—not merely material essences of sensuously intuitive objects like their colors and shapes, but also formal materially emptied essences (without a particular kind of content) that are brought to light via phenomenological *Wesensschau*, or relationality. This relationality is the essence of the clinical encounter and offers a methodological approach and discourse geared toward addressing the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and how therapeutic change occurs in the clinical encounter.

In Heidegger’s phenomenological work *Being and Time*, the essential intersubjective or communal nature of Dasein is emphasized, within the intersubjective embeddedness found in a *community*. *Community*, in this sense, is understood as a way of living that is expressed through the actions of a group of people and how the people understand and live in a world collectively—as opposed to merely the sum total of its members brought together that are existing independently (Stroh, 2015).

Transference

Therapeutic change is the cornerstone of psychoanalytic treatment and the phenomenology of transformation has been written about in psychoanalytic literature with evolving views. Transference has been considered one prospect for generating change in psychoanalysis. Carl Jung replied to Freud’s inquiry on his view of transference describing it as “the alpha and omega of the analytic method” (Freud, 1917,

p. 172). The reciprocal action between a therapist and patient engaged involves the related concepts of (1) mutual process/mutual influence and (2) the interactive field. Within this interactive phenomenological field, the client's unconscious dynamics become manifest in the therapeutic relationship in the here-and-now as they emerge in relation to the analyst. Similarly, the patient also experiences the subjectivity of the analyst through implicit or unconscious dynamics that arise between them.

Initially, Breuer and Freud (1895/1976) identified the idea of transference as a *false connection* made by the patient whereby the patient transferred "on to the figure of the physician the distressing ideas which arise from the content of the analysis" (p. 1). The image of *arising* was consistent with the archeological implication of Freud's model through which one digs through the unconscious, excavating to the deeper layers "tracing back one psychological structure to another which preceded it in time and out of which it developed" (p. 1). Bergmann and Hartman (1976) wrote, "Following Freud's emphasis on archeology as the model for psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts tended to see their work essentially as a reconstruction of what once existed and was buried by repression" (p. 1). In Freud's conceptualization, transference is a manifestation of a biologically rooted compulsion to repeat the past in what is termed the *repetition compulsion*.

Additionally, displacement was used to explain the occurrence of transference whereby the patient "displaces emotions belonging to an unconscious representation of a repressed object to a mental representation of an object of the external world" (Nunberg, 1951). The concept of transference as displacement implies that there is a distortion of reality that occurs and that it emanates entirely from the client, the client's past, and individual psychopathology. Freud later focused on the relationship between transference

and resistance. In his first formulation, transference was regarded as arising from resistance. Freud later came to view resistance as mainly a product of transference. Freud stated, “all resistance manifests itself by way of transference” (p. 6) and that “the analysis of resistance is in effect the analysis of transference” (p. 6).

In Melanie Klein’s formulation the concept of transference in therapy is the process of a patient applying to a therapist the instinctually based phantasies, fears, and feelings associated with some past figure or relational experience (St. Clair, 2004). Her conceptualization of transference is through the mechanism of projection in which the client projects rejecting internal objects upon the analyst, converting internal conflicts into external ones. In her view, a child has object relationships with figures that involve love, hate, and anxieties and that transference begins in these early experiences of object relations. At various points in the analysis, the therapist can represent various different figures from the earliest period of the client’s life and there may be rapidly shifting transferences in the therapy in which the therapist may be perceived as “enemy,” “good mother,” or “bad mother” (p. 47). Klein’s model of object relations is more closely aligned with Freud’s reified concepts of projection and transference than IST.

The Kohutian idea of transference is conceptualized as a developmental transformation in the child’s organizing activity, specifically Kohut’s formulation of the “selfobject transferences” (Stolorow & Lachmann, 1984, p. 7). The selfobjects are objects that we experience as part of our self (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Selfobject transferences are considered key developmental phases of childhood and include a *mirroring transference* and an *idealizing transference* (St. Clair, 2004). The mirror transference is one in which an insufficiently or faultily responded to childhood need for

a source of accepting-confirming *mirroring* is revived in the treatment. This mobilizes the grandiose self from that early developmental stage in which a child tries to hold onto a part of the primary narcissism, assigning all imperfection to the outside (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). In this way, the patient includes the therapist in the self-experience of the patient either via (1) *merger* (most primitive manifestation), (2) *twinsip* (patient assumes therapist is like the patient), or (3) *mirror transference* (patient knows therapist is separate, but therapist is only important within context of patient's needs).

The idealizing transference is one in which a need for merger with a source of *idealized* strength and calmness is similarly revived in the treatment situation (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). This mobilizes the idealized parental image, whereby the patient revives that early phase in which the child tries to hold onto narcissistic perfection by attempting to stay merged with the object of the idealized parental image. The defects in the structure of the self (nuclear self) are due to deficits in the client's childhood, which is understood as the lack of sufficient mirroring by caregivers and absence of a target for idealization. The implication for a Kohutian therapist is that part of the goal of therapy is to repair the defects in the structure of the nuclear self by providing the patient with mirroring and becoming the idealized object in order for them to integrate both the grandiose self and idealized object into the reality-based structure of the ego (St. Clair, 2004). The "selfobject functions pertain fundamentally to the integration of affect" and the need for selfobject ties "pertains most centrally to the need for [attuned] responsiveness to affect states in all stages of the life cycle" (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002, p. 11).

The intersubjectivists view transference as the psychological process of prereflective organizing principles. In essence transference is a meaning-making process of organizing current experience whereby the client's perceptions of the analyst, his actions and the analytic relationship are shaped and assimilated by the client's structures of meaning into the client's personal subjective world (Stolorow & Lachmann, 1984). The patient's experience of the therapeutic relationship is shaped by the inputs from both the analyst and the structures of meaning into which these are assimilated by the client, as well as the events occurring within the analytic situation that evoke transference reactions. The transference reactions may then be analyzed through comprehending the meaning that these events acquire in their assimilation by the patient's subjective frame of reference. The residual analytic transference in the termination phase is thought to gradually recede from its pre-eminent position, to a position where it serves as a bridge to a more richly experienced life. The transference is viewed as co-created by both the analyst and the client, and the result of the interplay of two distinct subjectivities within the intersubjective field.

IST views transference as a meaning-making process of organizing current experience whereby the patient's perceptions of his or her subjective world are assimilated using *prereflective-organizing principles* (Stolorow, 2005), with *prereflective* being used synonymously with *unconscious*. In this conceptualization, transference is a psychological process of structuring present experience in which the patient's perceptions of the analyst, her action and the analytic relationship are shaped by unconscious organizing principles or *structures of meaning*, into the patient's personal subjective world (Stolorow & Lachmann, 1984). In effect, the patient's experience of the

therapeutic relationship is shaped by incorporating inputs from the analyst and the events occurring within the analytic situation that evoke transference reactions into one's existing structures of meaning. The transference reactions may then be analyzed through comprehending the meaning that these events acquire in their assimilation by the patient's subjective frame of reference. IST provides a useful philosophical framework for how transformations occur within consciousness in the analytic process.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, it is apparent to see how patterns of historicity and relationality are molded in infancy and childhood. "These are the early schematics of self-in-relation-to-world which form the unconscious relational grammar of our subjectivity" (Clarke, 1997, p. 26); something Hans-Georg Gadamer would foreground as the "always already there relational matrix" (p. 26). Christopher Bollas (1987) described self-states, or moods, which preserve early, internalized relations predicated on early experience, with an emphasis on *languageless* knowing. As Anthony Elliot (1995) showed, Bollas put early unconscious and affectively organized relational experience at the core of subjectivity: "Subjectivity is theorized by Bollas as a kind of dream work: overdetermined, displaced, condensed, symbolic" (pp. 331-332). Within the clinical setting, interest in an other always arises from a hermeneutic *fusion of the horizons* of our relational history with that of the other, and is predicated on prior understandings that come with the relative continuity of traditions, persons or ideologies (Spence, 1988). According to Brett Clarke (1997):

That our most abstract intellectual interests can be grounded in our earliest prereflective affective experiences, that philosophical rumination and feelings of shame, or hunger, or symbiotic acquiescence can come together in a single

experience or endeavor, is rooted in the fact that our horizons are determined in an ongoing way by the totality of our experience, which is always the experience of confluence and conflict, illumination and concealment, in the interplay of horizons. (p. 27)

Inherent to the therapeutic encounter, “the analyst inevitably participates, inevitably reveals himself, inevitably influences the course of treatment and the evolution of the transference” (Greenberg, 1991, p. 214), something Heinrich Racker (1957) also noted in psychoanalytic terms in his analysis of countertransference and the horizontal nature of the analytic encounter:

It is an interaction between two personalities, in both of which the ego is under pressure from the id, the superego, and the external world; each personality has its internal and external dependencies, anxieties, and pathological defenses; each is also a child with its internal parents; and each of these whole personalities—that of the analysand and that of the analyst—responds to every event in the analytic situation. (pp. 308-309)

Consciousness / The Nature of Mind

History of consciousness.

The nature of consciousness is ordinarily thought to present a deep dilemma for science. Nonetheless, psychology and its sister disciplines have cultivated many different methods for investigating its phenomenology in research on sensation, perception, emotion, thinking, memory and various other subdivisions that address how phenomena are experienced (Velmans, 2007).

“Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues,” as George Miller once pronounced. “Depending upon the figure of speech chosen it is a state of being, a substance, a process, a place, an epiphenomenon, and emergent aspect of matter, or the only true reality” (Miller, 1962, p. 25). According to Güzeldere (1997), given the multiplicity of its conceptual history, it is prudent to regard consciousness as a “cluster concept” (p. 22), due to its numerous aspects. However, there is a coherent discernable thread in the theory of consciousness tracing from early texts in ancient Greek, to early modern, to the scientific psychology of the 19th century to current times. Inhering to this thread are the distinctions of qualitative and nonqualitative aspects of consciousness—with qualitative or phenomenal facets of consciousness being the most difficult to explain. Complicating this theorizing is controversy over whether qualitative and nonqualitative features of mind can be studied or understood independent of one another.

This conceptual split is occupied by prominent philosophers on both sides of the theoretical divide. Qualitative dimensions generally refer to representations and thoughts that we are conscious of and that are subject to reason or articulation. Nonqualitative dimensions inhere in the nonintentional, nonrepresentational dimension of mind, in what Richard Rorty (1979) has termed “raw feels” (p. 23) (e.g. pains and what babies have when they see colored objects). Nonintentional, nonrepresentational phenomenal properties of mind are the most difficult to depict. Rorty has attempted to do so with his diagrammatic model of the two dimensions of mind: (1) intentional/representational and (2) nonintentional/nonrepresentational that attempts to articulate the characteristics of phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as the two hallmarks in the emergence of

the mental. Jerry Fodor (1991) asserted that intentionality exists and can be studied in the absence of qualitative consciousness, and justifies this claim thus:

It used to be universally taken for granted that the problem of consciousness and the problem about intentionality are intrinsically linked: that thought is ipso facto conscious, and that consciousness is ipso facto consciousness of some or other intentional object.... Freud changed all that. He made it seem plausible that explaining behavior might require the postulation of intentional but unconscious states. Over the last century, and most especially in Chomskian linguistics and in cognitive psychology, Freud's idea appears to have been amply vindicated....

Dividing and conquering—concentrating on intentionality and ignoring consciousness—has proved a remarkably successful research strategy so far. (p. 12)

However, the consensus is not in on this position, with the dissenting voice of John Searle, whose thesis argued for what he referred to as the “connection principle” (Güzeldere, 1997, p. 22), purporting that consciousness and intentionality are natively linked. Searle (1992) remarked,

Only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious.... There is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality that has the consequence that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness. (p. 132)

In this way Searle contradicts Freud's idea of *unconscious intentionality* and launches the pointed suggestion of supplanting this formulation with the notion of *preconscious intentionality*, which has the inclusive quality of potentialities.

The investigation of consciousness presents singular epistemological and ontological challenges. The consciousness puzzle is difficult to unravel on one hand because of the epistemic factor of *perspectivity*, or the condition that consciousness is a phenomenon that harbors a distinction between perspectives or *points of view* in its exposition, which lies at the heart of its confounding nature. George Miller (1962) envisions that part of the difficulty in understanding consciousness stems from the reality that consciousness is both the phenomenon we try to investigate and the tool needed in this investigation:

Turning a tool on itself...may be as futile as trying to soar off the ground by a tug at one's bootstraps.... Perhaps we become confused because whenever we are thinking about consciousness, we are surrounded by it, and can only imagine what consciousness is *not*. The fish, someone has said, will be the last to discover water. (p. 25)

Phenomenologist John Searle (1992) noted that another perplexing feature of mind is that we cannot observe the consciousness of another or observe a person's subjectivity, but rather that we can see the causal relationships between the structures of one's consciousness and behavior. Similarly, one's own consciousness cannot be observed because where conscious subjectivity is concerned there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed, or between the perception and the object perceived.

Searle (1992) offered in contradistinction the model of vision, which works on the

concept that a determination can be made between the thing seen and the seeing of it. In conscious introspection, there is no way to make this separation because “any introspection I have of my own conscious state is itself that conscious state” (p. 97). So in essence, any observation of one’s own subjectivity is made with that which is supposed to be observed. Searle asserted that for this reason, *introspection* as a special inner observation or method of investigating consciousness does not work. Thus the notion of there being an observation of reality is essentially the idea of subjective *representations* of reality: “The ontology of observation—as opposed to its epistemology—is precisely the ontology of subjectivity” (p. 99).

An additional difficulty that makes consciousness abstruse is the epistemic asymmetry or duality in the study of phenomenon. This asymmetry refers to the “*mode of access* to facts of one’s own consciousness and the mode of access to facts about others’ conscious states” (Güzeldere, 1997, p. 24). This asymmetry is the delineating feature between systematic studies of consciousness on the basis of the *first-person perspective* versus the *third-person perspective*. The first-person perspective includes the way the world (including oneself) appears to one and is defined by firsthand, immediate, direct experience, to include sights, sounds, tastes, smells and tactile sensations otherwise termed *qualia* (p. 25), or *what it is like to be*—taken from the infamous title of Thomas Nagel’s (1974) well-known article “*The Feeling of What it is Like to be a Bat.*”

Additionally, we have a *privileged* way of knowing about our own thoughts, feelings, and sensations, and common wisdom suggests that to entertain that we lack consciousness while using consciousness to ponder such an inquiry is logically contradictory to direct experience. Descartes was correct in his conclusion, as is mirrored

by the contemporary philosopher Güzeldere (1997) “The mere fact that one is the bearer of (these) thoughts is, in the Cartesian sense, unmistakable evidence, *for oneself*, that one is conscious” (p. 25). This is the hallmark of the first-person perspective; from the inside consciousness seems “all-pervasive, self-evident and undeniable” (p. 25). In contrast, the third-person perspective is exploration of consciousness *from the outside*, where firsthand exploration of others’ experiences seems out of reach and is “neither directly observable nor noninferentially verifiable” (p. 25). This third-person perspective has obvious limitations but has been the dominant scientific practice for the past few centuries in the understanding of consciousness.

The pursuit to develop a systematic approach to the study of consciousness originates with René Descartes (1596-1650), and his ideas persist in exerting a profound influence even in contemporary times. Descartes is most widely known for the pointed distinction he made between the physical and mental, which has been termed Cartesian dualism. In his view, the body is one kind of substance and the mind another due to their uniquely distinct characteristics (Frith & Rees, 2007). Descartes’ account delineated mind and body as thinking versus extended substances, with the nature of their relation being the interplay between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* (Güzeldere, 1997). In Descartes’ formulation, the body (matter) is distinguished by spatial extension and motion, while the mind is distinguished by thought that is considered private—with this portrayal of the mind being an antecedent to the first-person and the third-person perspectives.

John Searle (1992) wrote that dualism in any form today is regarded as unscientific and inconsistent with the scientific worldview. Most contemporary scientists

reject dualism and instead believe that mind in some way emerges from the physical properties of the brain. Searle noted that the implicit assumptions of materialist theories of mind that predominate, represent the only scientifically acceptable alternative to dualism's antisecularism and its historicity based in beliefs of spiritualism, immortality of the soul and other religious conceptions. For this reason, some postulate that Descartes' ideas hindered the scientific study of consciousness, because dualism placed consciousness outside of the purview of science. Ironically, however, Descartes was the first to seriously ponder the possibility of neural correlates of consciousness, and could be considered an interactive dualist (Frith & Rees, 2007).

For Descartes, consciousness was a state of mind, and the role of the brain was strictly confined to nonconscious processes such as sensory input and motor output, although this was not the basis of mind in his view. Nonetheless, the brain had a pivotal role in linking mind and matter (Frith & Rees, 2007). Descartes claimed that consciousness was a necessary aspect of all that is mental and used the term *consciousness* to refer to the awareness of one's inner mental states:

As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-evident. For there is nothing that we can understand to be in the mind, regarded in this way, that is not a thought or dependent on a thought. (Descartes, 1911/1993, p. 171)

Descartes elaborated on how thoughts relate to consciousness: "By the term 'thought' I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it" (p. 174).

The semantics of the word *consciousness* have shifted over time. Derived from

the Latin term *conscius*, in its earliest sense, the term *consciousness* carried a social conception, as in a joint or shared knowledge by a community of people (e.g. class consciousness, or feminist consciousness) (Güzeldere, 1997). Consciousness also has a psychological conception thought to relate more to individuals, than to groups. This sense of consciousness can be divided into two meanings—either “the state or faculty of being conscious, as a condition and concomitant of all thought, feeling and volition” (p. 9) or “the state of being conscious, regarded as the normal condition of healthy waking life” (p. 9). These definitions refer to the distinction between transitive and intransitive senses of consciousness. Transitive consciousness is “creature consciousness” (p. 9) and denotes an overall state or property of an organism, as alert, awake or conscious. Intransitive or “state consciousness” (p. 9) serves as a type-identifier of one’s mental states; as either one that can be made conscious (through Freudian psychoanalytic methods) or among those that cannot become conscious (certain computational states).

The difficulties inherent in the nature of consciousness constitute many of the philosophical problems between the nature and validity of inferences between matters epistemological and matters ontological, and the specific ways in which these problems have been formulated repeatedly in the history of consciousness research. Güzeldere (1997) wrote:

The view that consciousness (or, in general, the mind) and its physical basis (or, in general, the body) seem essentially so different from one another that they must have distinct existences is based on a deep-rooted idea in the history of philosophy. This idea and its variants were constitutive of arguments for the metaphysical independence of mind and body throughout early modern

philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps most notably exemplified in the work of Descartes. The essential and complete nature of mind, generally speaking, seems to consist solely in thinking, and, as such, it must be unextended, simple (with no parts), and essentially different from the body, and therefore immaterial. This was Descartes' argument in a nutshell, ultimately drawing a strong ontological conclusion (regarding the distinctness of mind and body) from a starting point constituted by epistemic considerations (regarding the distinctness of their appearances). (p. 10)

As the study of consciousness advances, these philosophical problems may resolve quite rapidly or remain obstinate. One way to gain insight into this difficulty is by locating the analysis within its broad historical perspective and giving careful attention to constituent fibers of the past viewpoints and their essential problems, and the specific ways in which these problems were formulated. This may yield useful hints that point to which steps *not* to take in approaching consciousness in the present.

Consciousness has two characterizations summarized in the mottos: "consciousness is as consciousness does" and "consciousness is as consciousness seems" (Güzeldere, 1997, p. 11). The former is the *causal characterization* (i.e. the causative thrust of consciousness in mental life is basic), and the latter is the *phenomenal characterization* (i.e. how mental life seems or feels is basic). Historically, these are considered to be mutually exclusive categorizations, but Güzeldere has taken instead an integrationist intuition: "what consciousness does, qua consciousness, cannot be characterized in the absence of how consciousness seems, but more importantly, that how consciousness seems cannot be conceptualized in the absence of what consciousness

does” (p. 11). The phenomenal and the causal characterizations are simply expressions of what seems most important or primary, in the formulation of consciousness, and are not, in themselves, in opposition with each other.

The American psychologist and philosopher William James may be the educator who wrote most extensively about consciousness than anyone in history (Güzeldere, 1997). In James’s major work *Principles of Psychology* (1950), he discussed the neural underpinnings, the phenomenal nature of consciousness and its evolutionary function, and declared consciousness to be the starting point of all psychology. James named *introspective observation* as the most central aspect of human mentality on which we have to rely first and foremost stating: “Every one agrees that we there discover states of consciousness” (p. 185). Although James moved away from his early conception of consciousness as a nonmaterial entity or first principle, he continued to use the term consciousness to represent a function.

The study of consciousness in the history of modern psychology has a varied, fascinating historical course. Consciousness has been exalted as the most vital aspect of human mentality, only to be succeeded by periods of scapegoat treatment for the failures of philosophy and science—and psychology—to give an adequate account of the mind. In either attitude, consciousness has never been ignored, and remained an ongoing concern for study of the human mind (Güzeldere, 1997). In the last 100 years starting with modern philosophy, consciousness research has journeyed through the scientific schools of *introspectionism*, *behaviorism*, and *cognitivism* in psychology.

Introspectionism can be seen as the first outgrowth of the effort to separate psychology from philosophy into an independent, scientific specialty of its own.

Introspectionism's basic postulate was that psychology was the study of the *phenomenology* of the human mind, and the mapping of the mental landscape required a full description of its contents as it appeared to the subject. The methodology included a description of the subject's sensory sensations of data points like color, sounds, smells, modeled after the modern chemistry of the day in order to gather an exhaustive inventory of *atomic units* (Güzeldere, 1997). The underlying belief was that codifying elemental sensory impressions that a subject could identify would eventually lead to the construction of an atomic table of the mind (Külpe, 1901). Introspectionism failed not only because of the magnitude of the task involved in mapping sensory space, but also because the positivist attitude in scientific sectors was growing. Concurrently, psychologists were attempting to dissolve ties with philosophy and anything *mental* in an effort to situate psychology among the natural sciences, with consciousness perceived as metaphysical baggage. With the rise of behaviorism, consciousness became a taboo subject but remained a hidden variable in the minds and research agendas of psychologists (Güzeldere, 1997).

Behaviorism began to gain ascendancy and in the opening sentences of John Watson's landmark manifesto, *Behaviorism*, he equates the introspectionist's concern with consciousness as analogous to witchcraft:

Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviorist, who has been trained always as an experimentalist, holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic. (Watson, 1970, p. 2)

Unlike introspectionism research, the methodology of behaviorism was exceedingly

uncomplicated, with only one element in its research agenda: outwardly observable behavior. This approach requires that any phenomena studied must be available to third-party observation. This methodology would eventually sever, rather than untangle, the knot of consciousness (Güzeldere, 1997). This move from subjective reporting was a methodological alteration, which Edwin Boring (1953) characterized as shifting “the locus of scientific responsibility from an observing subject to the experimenter who becomes the observer *of the subject*” (p. 184). According to Güven Güzeldere (1997), “Watson championed this shift of locus and the change in the subject matter of the new psychology from ‘facts of the internal’ to ‘facts of the external’” (p. 15). Watson (1913) echoed this in his advice to fellow psychologists:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its method nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in term of consciousness. (p. 158)

The emphasis on behavior as the only focus for a truly scientific psychology had far-reaching implications for the field of psychology felt even now in the contemporary era. The term *consciousness* was never incorporated into the lexicon of any natural sciences and likewise, left the lexicon of scientific psychology. Watson (1913) supported this turn away from consciousness studies and viewed behaviorism as the end of an era for consciousness:

The time seems to have come when psychology must discard all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making

mental states the object of observation...This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier from psychology which exists between it and the other sciences. (pp. 163, 177)

However, as early as the 1930s Boring's (1932/1963) statement about consciousness reveals an awareness of the limitations of behaviorism: "Behaviorism owes its *ism* to consciousness. And what would it be without its *ism*? Well, it would be physiology" (p. 275). Years later, Julian Jaynes (1976) remarked retrospectively, "off the printed page, behaviorism was only a refusal to talk about consciousness" (p. 15).

Behaviorism remained a very dominant paradigm for psychology for over 50 years, managing to thoroughly eliminate the terms *consciousness* and *introspection* from the vocabulary and textbooks of psychology. In its zenith, behaviorism turned its fundamentalist line to the position that the *discipline* of psychology could study only observable behavior, but additionally, that nothing more exists of the *phenomenon* of psychology outside of observable behavior. But the fantasy of the absence of anything became the weakness of behaviorism and an opportunity for the emergence of a new paradigm of thought—cognitivism.

Ulric Neisser's (1967) *Cognitive Psychology* ushered in a new era in psychology and marked a shift in the intellectual climate among psychologists. Information theory had an immediate impact on psychology and was used in studies measuring choice reaction time (Hick, 1952), quantitative dimensions of psychological judgments and memory (Miller, 1956) and the use of flow chart systems and *box and arrow* diagrams to graph cognitive processes and information transmission. As Neisser (1967) stated, "the

basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become clear as the reason for studying anything else: because they are there. Our knowledge of the world *must* be somehow developed from the stimulus input” (p. 5). With the inception of cognitive psychology whose primary concepts were based in computational models, consciousness research found a niche as a component or aspect of information-processing models: “Interestingly, it was the success, rather than the failure, of information-processing models in explaining learning, memory, problem solving, and the like—actually almost everything except consciousness—that brought some attention to consciousness itself” (Güzeldere, 1997). The fact that consciousness remained the last obscure phenomenon without explication in an otherwise successful new field of research brought about the resurgence of old questions about consciousness that had been dormant during the behaviorist period.

George Mandler (1975), in his cognitivist manifesto *Consciousness: Respectable, Useful, and Probably Necessary*, pointed to the value of consciousness in cognitive psychology and cognitivist theory. In his bold opening statement he attempts to dislodge the behaviorist prejudice against consciousness:

I welcome this opportunity to act as *amicus curiae* on behalf of one of the central concepts of cognitive theory—consciousness. Another statement, however imperfect, may be useful to undo the harm that consciousness suffered during fifty years (approximately 1910 to 1960) in the oubliettes of behaviorism. It is additionally needed because so many of us have a history of collaboration with the keepers of the jail and to speak freely of the need for a concept of consciousness still ties the tongues of not a few cognitive psychologists. (p. 229)

This statement was an echo of an earlier assertion made by Tim Shallice (1972) namely,

that theoretical developments in cognitive psychology and the increasing use of introspective research necessitate a rationale, which ought involve the consideration of consciousness.

Research on consciousness in cognitive psychology was grounded in the belief that consciousness could be mapped onto the information-processing model using flowcharts and diagrams taken from computational models in computer science. Additionally, the use of engineering terms taken from communication theory (channel capacity), control systems theory (feedback), and computing (central processor, response buffer) (Broadbent, 1958) was applied to the study of consciousness (Frith & Rees, 2007). In this paradigm, consciousness was conceptualized as a *limited capacity processing mechanism* (Posner & Boies, 1971; Treisman, 1969). Other researchers conceptualized consciousness as a property circumscribing various processes (conscious versus unconscious processes) in constructions of memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Norman, 1968). Philip Johnson-Laird (1983) characterized the “contents of consciousness” as the “current values of parameters governing high-level computations of the operating system” (p. 465).

Under the *cognitivist* paradigm, consciousness became a box among other boxes with arrows indicating the directional flow of information demonstrating input and output, which provided a decisive advantage to the study of consciousness and its processes. This diagrammatic approach offered a decisive advantage to the study of consciousness according to Ulric Neisser (1976), “It represents a coup: not only are the facts of attention apparently explained, but psychology’s most elusive target is finally nailed down to a box in a flow chart” (p. 103).

Other influences on the study of consciousness in the history of contemporary psychology include theorizing in philosophy, such as in functional accounts stimulated chiefly by computational ideas. While *functionalism* in philosophy was having great success in deciphering propositional dispositions, consciousness (in terms of subjective experience and qualia) was continuing to evade the grasp of functionalist elucidation. In another direction, the advancing and ongoing ascendance of neuropsychology research served to highlight and bring consciousness and its processes back into focus.

The unquestioned supposition of the modernist philosophy of science discourse was that formal reasoning applied to sense data provided the basis for certain knowledge. Despite the huge impact of the modernist worldview on the human environment, and in controlling natural processes and improving quality of life as evidenced by the industrial and informational revolutions, several thinkers, including Frederick Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, began to deconstruct Enlightenment assumptions (Polkinghorne, 1990). These thinkers raised doubts about the certainty of the tradition's knowledge statements and the accuracy of descriptions of reality, and pointed to the opaque nature of language itself as its own artifact and as a limiting vehicle for carrying ideas within a particular network of meaning (Polkinghorne, 1990). The deconstruction of the Enlightenment discourse created an opening for discussants to consider ways for a *postempirical* or *postpositivist* science to be practiced.

Theories of consciousness.

Chalmers's theory of consciousness.

Philosopher David Chalmers (1995) wrote about the *easy problem of*

consciousness and the *hard problem*. The easy problem, or more straightforward problem, is the explanation of various cognitive functions: discriminatory abilities, reporting mental states, attention, controlling behavior. All are phenomena that can be explained scientifically: “All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms” (p. 201). The hard problem of consciousness is a different sort of problem, as it eludes the standard scientific methods of explanation and poses a threat to reductionist neuroscience (Hameroff, Kaszniak, & Scott, 1998). According to Chalmers (1995), “The really hard problem is the problem of experience” (p. 30) or more precisely, *subjective experience*. The hard problem is bridging the *explanatory gap* between accounts of the causal-functional (physical) type and the occurrence of distinct phenomenal aspects:

Even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: *Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?...* This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on ‘in the dark’, free of any inner feel? (p. 203)

The phenomenal aspect of consciousness pertains to qualitative, subjective experience, termed *qualia*. Attempts to bridge the explanatory gap between how brain processes give rise to conscious experience began a hundred years in the history of psychology and philosophy. The present scientific view of the brain does not account for qualia, therefore phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained within current paradigms of

science (Hameroff et al., 1998). A historical review of this philosophical debate reveals why the dynamical tensions of mind/body and phenomenal/physical are recurrent, persistent leitmotifs in the history of psychoanalytic theorizing, and appear with varying emphases, and under different guises over and over.

Chalmers asserted that consciousness might be an irreducible fundamental property of the universe—in a classification with space, time, mass, and electric charge (Hameroff et al., 1998). The apparent irreducibility of consciousness seems a key reason for the ongoing mind-body problem, and is a point of argument for dualists and materialists alike, who argue from both sides that this irreducibility supports their respective positions. That phenomenal consciousness resists reduction because qualia as intrinsic qualities are not physically irreducible, suggests that one must accept the epiphenomenalism of qualia—however,

although qualia as absolute intrinsic qualities are irreducible, qualia similarities and differences appear functionally characterizable and hence reducible...this opens the door to their functional characterization...what is really important about our perceptual experience—that is, the cognitive role—can be functionally characterizable and hence shown to be causally efficacious. (Kim, 2007, pp. 416-417)

Although the neurosciences have given us much research and information on the neurophysiological correlates to consciousness, we have the benefit of this expanding body of knowledge to study philosophical and psychological questions such as: What exactly is consciousness and how exactly do conscious mental phenomena relate to the unconscious? How do special features of the mental function: subjectivity, intentionality,

and mental causation? Questions that the phenomenologist John Searle takes up in his seminal book *The Rediscovery of the Mind*.

Searle (1992) noted that in the history of philosophical debate reductionism has been a persistent element of a positivist philosophy of science. Although it has been largely discredited, it remains an important part of the history of science. Successful causal reductions tend to lead to ontological reductions, and that “we simply redefine the expression that denotes the reduced phenomena in such a way that the phenomena in question can now be identified with their causes” (p. 115).

One such example is color terms, like the color *red*, which was once defined by subjective experience of the identification of red by *normal* color perceivers under *normal* conditions. Once a causal reduction of color phenomena to light refraction was discovered, color expression was redefined based upon its ontological properties of reduction. In similar causal reductions, heat was reduced to molecular movements and sound reduced to the movement of airwaves. However, when it comes to the emergent nature of consciousness, we do not automatically find a causal reduction leading to an ontological reduction because the constitutive elements are not evident. As such, Searle also considers consciousness as an irreducible property. Searle argues the irreducibility of consciousness as not something especially strange or mysterious (Searle, 1992), but just as a trivial consequence of our current standard patterns of reduction and definitional practices (Searle, 2007). In a similar critique, Galen Strawson (1994) contended that consciousness is the only distinctive characteristic of mind.

Part of the purpose of reductions is to carve off the subjective experiences and exclude them from the definition that names the real phenomena. But when the

phenomena of interest are the subjective experiences themselves, there is no way to carve anything off (Searle, 1992):

Part of the point of the reduction in the case of heat was to distinguish between the subjective appearance on the one hand and the underlying physical reality on the other. Indeed, it is a general feature of such reductions that the phenomenon is defined in terms of the 'reality' and not in terms of the 'appearance'. (p. 121)

With consciousness, however, we cannot make this kind of appearance-reality differentiation, since consciousness consists in the appearances themselves, thus "Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the appearance is the reality" (p. 122). The seeming asymmetry between consciousness and color or consciousness and heat is not an asymmetry in the elemental structure of the universe—to the contrary the cases are symmetrical. As Searle noted:

The physics of colored objects, together with our constitution, causes us to have experiences of color, and the physics of our brain, together with its biological constitution, causes us to have the experiences of consciousness in general. But we are willing to make the reduction in the case of color in a way that we are unwilling to make it in the case of consciousness. (p. 333)

The reason for this unwillingness may be because we would lose the point of having the concept of consciousness in a sense that we do not lose the point of having the concept of color if we exact the reduction.

How we understand the nature of mind provides the philosophical backdrop to the work we do as clinicians and analysts. Philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists throughout history have made contributions in theorizing about human nature and how

the mind works in making choices and in the creation of meaning. The fact that qualia is functionally reducible insinuates that there is no special quality with regard to consciousness as an insoluble feature of the universe any more than the mystery of magnetism or laws of gravity.

Lear's theory of mind.

A practical starting point in considering dimensions of psychological theory-building with its basis in meaning-making, is for one to have a working model or conceptualization of the nature of mind. Jonathan Lear (1998) argued that it is intrinsic to the very idea of mind that mind must be sometimes irrational. He asserted that "Rather than see irrationality as coming from the outside as from an Unconscious Mind which disrupts Conscious Mind, one should see irrational disruptions as themselves an inherent expression of mind" (p. 84). In essence, according to Lear, mind has the tendency to disrupt its own rational functioning. He further outlined several features of mind that express key aspects of what we take mindedness to be: minds are restless, irrational, and minds are embodied.

According to Jonathon Lear (1998), a seminal feature of consciousness is that minds are restless. They are not algorithm-performing machines, but must make leaps and associations, and have the embedded potential for creativity. Freud's discovery of primary process thinking, and mental tropisms like projection and introjection as well as his discovery that human sexuality is not merely a biological instinct but a drive with great plasticity in its aim and object, are all indicators of the restlessness of mind (Lear, 1998). Freud made this discovery in his attempt to interpret dreams, though he was unaware of the logical flow of his argument. Lear wrote, "as soon as one approaches a

dream as something that requires interpretation—that is, as something whose meaning is not immediately transparent, but which nevertheless has a meaning—one needs to account for both the opacity and for the meaning” (p. 85).

Lear (1998) argued that to be making meaning, mind has to be making associations among ideas and engaging in symbolization; yet those associations must be opaque to conscious rational-thinking mind. It is then evident that certain forms of mental activity are taking place as the mind links ideas—as in displacement, and superimposes ideas—as in condensation. According to Lear, these activities both discover and create similarities, and provide forms of restlessness needed for the mind to express creativity and imagination. The associative nature of mind is expressed in language through the extensive use of metaphor and analogy in the linking of ideas or concepts, which share similar meaning or parallel thematic structures. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle (trans. 1954) wrote that metaphor “consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy” (p. 251), and he added that “a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilar” (p. 255). I. A. Richards (1936) also weighed in on the importance of metaphor to language, noting:

That metaphor as the omnipresent principle of language can be shown by mere observation. We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it.... Even in the rigid language of the settled sciences we do not eliminate or prevent it without great difficulty. (p. 92)

He further maintained that metaphor is omnipresent in more than just language: “*Thought*

is metaphoric and the metaphors of language derive therefrom” (p. 94). He thus offered a definition: “In its simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction” (p. 93).

The second feature, according to Lear (1998), is that minds must be embodied. Embodiment is a formal requirement and is part of the idea of mind that “mind is part of a living organism over which the mind has incomplete control and that it helps the organism to live in an environment over which the organism has incomplete control” (p. 85). Essentially, a mind cannot be omnipotent. Freud’s discovery of the elemental forms of mental restlessness suggests that if we are to understand the multiple phenomena of *motivated irrationality*, “we have to understand how the mind effects transformations on the inner contents of propositional attitudes and other meaningful bits” (p. 87). Lear (1998) concluded that psychoanalysis is of philosophical interest not just because it provides a fascinating picture of human motivation, but also because it articulates how one might construct a “predicate calculus of irrationality” (p. 87).

Searle’s theory of mind.

Biological naturalism is the name John Searle (2007) has given to his approach to what has traditionally been called the mind-body problem, which he developed as a theory of consciousness. Biological naturalism posits that there is a simple solution to the mind-body problem, which is basically that consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain, which are features of the brain. Searle denies that this leaves consciousness as an epiphenomenon, as he does not assume a purely physical causation. Searle argued that the view that consciousness

and mental states are physical features of the brain and play a causal role in behavior does not commit one to some form of Cartesian dualism (1992): “The fact that a feature is mental does not imply that it is not physical; the fact that a feature is physical does not imply that it is not mental” (p. 15). Searle locates the source of so much difficulty in establishing a new thought system for consciousness in the inadequacy and apparent opposition of the traditional vocabulary and obsolete terminology—dualism, monism, materialism—that have become dichotomous categories in our thinking.

Consciousness, in short, is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains. It is caused by neurobiological processes and is as much a part of the natural order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. (p. 90)

Searle situated his theory of biological naturalism as grounded in the epistemology of two contemporary scientific worldviews: the atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary theory of biology. Searle (1992) argued that with these theories in mind, consciousness “falls into place naturally as an evolved phenotypical trait of certain types of organisms with highly developed nervous systems” (p. 90) and can be viewed as a part of the natural world. However, for Searle, two main problems persist: (1) the sheer complexity of studying consciousness, and (2) the lack of a neurobiological explanatory basis of consciousness in terms of the causal powers of the brain.

Searle (1992) identified two topics central to consciousness: (1) temporality, or time, and (2) society, or other people. He noted that since the time of Kant, we have been aware of an asymmetry in the way that consciousness relates to space and time, and that although we experience objects and events as both spatially extended and of temporal

duration, “our consciousness itself is not experienced as spatial, though it is experienced as temporally extended” (p. 127). He further contended that the subject of society, or other people, plays a special role in the *structure* of our conscious experiences, very dissimilar to that of objects and states of affairs. Additionally, Searle suggested that the capacity for assigning a special status to the loci of consciousness is both biologically based and is a “background supposition for all forms of collective intentionality” (Searle, 1990, p. 128). Searle makes these assertions against the backdrop of his admission that he does not yet know how to demonstrate these claims.

Searle (1992) outlined twelve structural features of everyday consciousness: (1) Finite modalities—human consciousness is manifested in a limited number of modalities (sight, smell, taste, hearing, sense of balance, proprioception and the thought stream), (2) Unity—the consequence that states of consciousness come to us as part of a unified sequence, (3) Intentionality—most but not all consciousness is intentional, (4) Subjective feeling—the perspectival character of conscious experience leads to the what-it-feels-like aspect of conscious states, (5) Connection between consciousness and intentionality—“only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious” (p. 132), (6) The Gestalt, figure-ground structure of conscious experience—perceptual experiences come to us as a figure against a background structure of experience, (7) Aspect of familiarity—aspectual features of conscious experience and the occurring events and structures of consciousness will be experienced as familiar or recognizable, (8) Overflow—conscious states refer beyond their immediate content, and connect with other thoughts in an indefinite extendibility, (9) The center and the periphery of attention—

within the field of consciousness, some things require one's full attention while some things are at the periphery of consciousness, (10) Boundary conditions—being conscious of one's own person situated within a certain spatio-temporal-socio-biological location, (11) Mood—a mood provides the tone or color that characterizes part of a conscious state or a sequence of states, and (12) The pleasure/unpleasure dimension—there is always a dimension of pleasure and unpleasure in a slice of the stream of consciousness.

Searle (1992) addressed in detail the relation of unconscious to conscious processes and challenged the Freudian notion of the unconscious as naïve and incoherent. Searle asserted that although cognitive science has researched the unconscious, computational processes of mind, that we still do not have a clear notion of unconscious mental states. In explicating the relation between the unconscious and consciousness, he stated, "The notion of an unconscious mental state implies accessibility to consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that which is potentially conscious" (p. 152). In contrast, Searle noted that Freud's pre-theoretical concept of an unconscious mental state is "the idea of a conscious mental state minus the consciousness" (p. 152). Or stated another way, this conception of an unconscious state is the notion of an unconscious state that just happens in the moment to be unconscious—but which is understood on the model of a conscious state.

Searle (1992) analogized Freud's model of unconscious mental states in the mind as fish deep in the sea that we cannot see underneath the surface, but have the exact same shape when they surface. They do not lose their shapes below the water. Complicating this Freudian conception is the connection between consciousness and intentionality, with the key point that any theory of the unconscious must be able to differentiate between

mental phenomena that are genuinely intentional, and those that act as if they were but in fact are not. Whether conscious or unconscious “every intentional state has a certain *aspectual shape*, and this aspectual shape is part of its identity, part of what makes it the state that it is” (p. 155), including every belief and every desire, and every intentional phenomenon.

This begs the question of how unconscious mental phenomena, if truly intentional, can preserve an aspectual shape even when unconscious. This leads to the conclusion that the ontology of an unconscious intentional state is essentially its possible *causal capacity*, given the right circumstances, to produce consciousness or possible contents of consciousness—unless impeded by barriers such as repression or brain damage which restrict access to consciousness or if “for one reason or another, the agent simply *could not* bring it to consciousness “ (p. 160). Prior to conscious states, there exist only sequences of neurophysiological events occurring in neuronal architectures that are “dispositional states of the brain” (p. 161) to produce conscious thoughts and conscious behavior. The concept of unconscious intentionality is therefore a dispositional causal capacity—“that of a *latency* relative to its *manifestation* in consciousness” (p. 161). In classical psychoanalysis, it is believed that unconscious mental states “exist both as unconscious and as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious” (p. 168), and have all the exact features of conscious mental states, including intentionality and subjectivity. Freudian theory does not render intelligible what other mental events may be happening in the brain to create unconscious subjectivity and intentionality. This more complex formulation of how unconscious states are related to conscious states has important implications for the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, and requires a new

conceptual framework for how dispositional states, or neurophysiological facts—as unconscious organizing structures of experience—impact the transference and countertransference process in the clinical setting. An additional consideration is the long-standing psychoanalytic therapeutic goal of bringing unconscious states to consciousness, and in terms of praxis this new paradigm stimulates questions about how or whether an analyst should endeavor to make a causal capacity conscious.

Mental causation and nonconscious processes.

Inna Semetsky (2004) considered the bearings of intuition on thinking and the cognitive, inferential, learning process on the apprehension of reality. Semetsky used Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic philosophy, which unites logic and psychology and includes the presensory and preconscious—not limited to sense-data—apprehension of reality upon which one is prepared to act, derived from a shared layer of experience. Pierce took signs, symbols, metaphors, and cultural sign systems as the objects of study, and viewed logic as “a science of the necessary laws of thought, or better still (thought taking place by means of signs), it is a general semeiotics, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs being signs” (p. 434). In his view, all thought is sign process. Logic, then, in Peirce's description is the science of the laws of signs.

Using his logic, Peirce classified the relation among signs in terms of categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness:

First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation.... In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General

conception Third, or mediation.... Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. (Peirce, 2009. pp. 109-110)

Firstness, is quality or potentiality and does not refer to anything else; Secondness, is of physical reality, action and reaction; and Thirdness relates seconds to thirds—it is synthesis, mediation, memory, communication. There is a causal influence embedded in the Firstness of abduction or intuition, Secondness of feeling and Thirdness of cognition. Thirdness governs Secondness, creating a “synthetic consciousness... sense of learning” (p. 377).

Intuition, then, would be classified as precognitive, qualitative immediacy of experience—the immediate Firstness. The very etymology of the word validates this: to *in-tuit* indicates to learn from within (Semetsky, 2004). The intuitive mode involves: (1) an immediate contact with the object, (2) receptivity to let the object act upon or seize the subject, (3) a quest, or desire for meaning that is “realized in seeing, creating a picture in out minds, understanding” (Noddings & Shore, 1984, p. 81), and (4) a tension created by perplexity or dissonance between certainty and uncertainty at both subjective and objective levels. This aforestated tension is “created by perplexity, a curious fact, a problematic situation, a dissonance” (Semetsky, 2004, p. 435); the interference which Giles Deleuze (1968/1994) termed *difference*, which enables the original distance to be bridged by intuition, the process by which the strange becomes the familiar.

These four factors subserve to distinguish the intuitive mode from an analytic, or conceptual, activity; although the relation between the two remains complementary as they operate recursively and reciprocally in the operation of the thinking process.

Certainly, an intuitive mode involves using concepts, yet subjects return “again and again to the object...[allowing] contact with the object to direct their thought, whereas analytic thinkers are directed by concepts they have attached to the object” (Noddings & Shore, 1984, p. 70). Intuition therefore is not of something but is something—it is a pragmatic method or process of knowing, albeit preconscious.

Peirce’s notion of abductive inference (Semetsky, 2004) is a way of apprehending encounters with otherness, considered the dissonant experience. The inference is unconscious and not actually thought, though it is in the mind habitually and within the *laws of thought*, belongs to the objective logic of discovery, whose conclusion is accepted without our knowing how. Semetsky connected the Firstness of Peirce’s notion of abductive inference with the Firstness of intuition. Semetsky noted that Firstness of intuition is “always already present within the Thirdness of cognition” (p. 433) and as such, it is intrinsic to semiotic thinking and thus a precondition for the production of meaning in the process of learning.

Gilles Deleuze’s (1968/1994) method of transcendental empiricism aimed “to bring into being that which does not yet exist” (p. 147). For Deleuze (1968/1994), signs that act in the world engender thought:

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but a fundamental ‘encounter’. ... It may be grasped in a range of affective tones.... In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. (p. 139)

Deleuze’s method remains empirical because the object of inquiry is regarded as real experience, yet transcendental because the very foundation for the empirical

principles are left outside the common faculties of perception; as the object of experience is considered to be given only in its tendency to subsist in a virtual, as yet subrepresentative, state. Although tendencies escape spatial representation, they are real, not merely possible, and are inherent and continuous in the world of the mind. Tendencies are regarded as intensive multiplicities or systems of multiple differential relations with the efficiency of becoming actualized in a process Deleuze called differentiation. Because virtualities exist as tendencies, prior to the appearance of any effect, they define the immanence of the transcendental field. The plane of immanence becomes literally constructed, “immanence is constructivism, any given multiplicity is like one area on the plane” (Deleuze, 1992/1995, p. 48). Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) defined the plane of immanence thus:

Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effects with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind. (p. 41)

In Deleuze’s philosophy, difference and repetition/recurrence are seen as fundamental in the production of meaning, as thinking takes place in the disjunction—or a cut—at a structural level, whose breakthrough establishes a line of flight which *upsets being*, but a line along which “things come to pass and becomings evolve” (Semetsky, 2004, p. 442). In a functional sense, the breakthrough or differential performs a constructive,

conjunctive role of a positive synthesis, as becoming-other expresses diversity and multiplicity; thus, the field of immanence is constructivism. This notion is equivalent to the possibility that logic is constructed “from the basic intuitive act” (p. 442).

Deleuze’s theory of tendencies and of difference and repetition/recurrence is relevant to psychoanalysis as they provide a more thorough, phenomenological explication of consciousness (conscious and unconscious processes), and describe encounters with otherness in the interpretation and production of meaning. The tendencies of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and Charles Sanders Peirce’s views on intuition offer a phenomenological account that seems compatible with IST’s concepts of the intersubjective field and invariant, prereflective organizing principles. These concepts share key aspects as they exist as systems of multiple differential relations prior to the experience of any effect, and define the plane of immanence that becomes constructed in the coherence of occurring events.

Science and the Study of Consciousness

So when did psychology first become a science and why? It is a widely held opinion that psychology became a new science when Wilhelm Wundt established the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879 (Sturm, 2006). Before this decisive new step, psychology existed only as part of philosophy and was not considered an experimental science. Thomas Sturm explored the question of whether psychology can be a mathematical or quantitative discipline and asked; “If scientific knowledge of material nature can be couched in mathematical language, cannot the same be achieved for knowledge of the mind?” (p. 357). Originally, it was Immanuel Kant who connected

this question with an inquiry into whether psychology can be a proper science. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* of 1786, Kant (2004) wrote:

Even further than chemistry, the empirical doctrine of the soul must always remain outside the rank of a natural science...because mathematics cannot be applied to the phenomena of the internal sense and their laws, unless one could count a law of continuity in the flow of inner changes: but this would be an enlargement of knowledge that would compare to the one achieved by the application of mathematics to the doctrine of body as the doctrine of the properties of lines compares to geometry as a whole. (IV 471)

Indeed, Kant was the first in the 18th century to link the question of the possibility of a mathematical psychology with the question of whether psychology can ever garner the standing of a natural science (Sturm, 2006). Sturm considered Kant's *impossibility claim* (Nayak & Sotnak, 1995) that psychology cannot be considered a science—properly so-called—through the frame of the historical and contextual backdrop in which it appeared. Kant did not believe that mental states could be measured without a constructively defined, quantitative notion of the type of mental state that need be linked with a quantitative property of physical states—like measurable intensities. In addition, Kant felt that no mental state could be measured without an external standard—like a physical stimulus or experimental design—to manipulate and control intensities for the purpose of measurement and comparison. Kant did not consider introspection or internal self-observation true scientific observation as it contains methodological problems—in terms of analyzability and control—needed for scientific measurement; therefore inner observations were not considered real experiments because they were only performed in

thought (Sturm, 2006). Kant's beliefs were firmly rooted in the notion that quantifiable measurement is the traditional criterion for the status of science.

The philosophical status of psychoanalytic knowledge is often discussed in terms of the hybrid nature of psychoanalysis with its different models in terms of the relation between its hermeneutic-interpretive and its scientific-objectivist versions, which has often created division within the field of psychology. Whereas some clinicians such as G. S. Klein (1976), Roy Schafer (1976; 1983) and Robert Steele (1979) claim that psychoanalysis is an exclusively hermeneutic discipline, several hermeneutic philosophers interested in the epistemological status of psychoanalysis, like Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur have argued that "psychoanalysis is only partially hermeneutics" (Phillips, 1991, p. 392). Phillips asserted the idea that psychoanalysis is a hybrid discourse combining both hermeneutic interpretation and objectivist investigation and explication as articulated by Habermas and Ricoeur:

In finding a way to integrate the natural-science aspect of psychoanalysis into a larger hermeneutic framework these hermeneutic theoreticians have accomplished two tasks: they have superseded the rigid hermeneutics/natural science opposition in psychoanalysis ... and they have shed new light on exactly those aspects of human behavior which led Freud (presumably mistakenly) to consider psychoanalysis as a natural science in the first place. Thus, although these men have provided the philosophical underpinnings for the hermeneutic discussion of psychoanalysis, their positions will be of a mixed-model of psychoanalysis—part hermeneutics, part natural science. (p. 293)

Brett Clarke (1997) argued that objective understanding of causal mechanisms and the meaning-making activities of hermeneutic interpretation in developing an encompassing epistemology of a psychoanalytic model, are helped tremendously by philosophy, which addresses how people come to know one another and the world, and how we come to talk about this relationship.

Classical phenomenological approaches to consciousness as explicated by Husserl (1859-1938) do not focus on naturalistic concerns about how the brain causally relates to consciousness, but rather *brackets* our scientific opinions and suspends judgment on whether or how the brain generates consciousness or on what kind of ontology is correct. This is the first part of the phenomenological approach, referred to as the *epoché*, and is the first step of the *phenomenological reduction* (Gallagher, 2007). The study of the phenomenology of consciousness is essentially interested in what conscious experience is like, and in this sense, is relevant to a naturalistic investigation into subjective experience and its pursuant correlations to direct experience. This approach however, decontextualizes consciousness and delimits its applicability by this kind of bracketing. The method of phenomenological reduction includes turning toward experience itself and providing what Gallagher calls “systematic and precise descriptions” (p. 687) of that experience in order to codify various things such as differing states of consciousness, variable or invariable structures of experience, and discreet abilities within consciousness (memory, perception, and imagination). The realization that consciousness is *intentional* implies that we are always turning toward the world and are always conscious *of* something, which is the (intentional) object of our conscious experience: “This intentional experience is the inevitable and the exclusive way in which we come to

understand the world, perceptually, conceptually, esthetically, emotively, mathematically, scientifically, and so forth” (p. 687). Gallagher posited four key aspects inherent to consciousness: (1) The intentionality of consciousness, (2) The temporal structure of consciousness, (3) Self-awareness, or *consciousness of itself* as belonging to me, and (4) Embodied consciousness.

In Max Velmans’s (2007) epistemological study of mind, he asserted that there is no *phenomenal* difference between the physical phenomena that we see/observe and the physical phenomena that we experience consciously. This idea contradicts the dualistic notions in which *experiences* are considered private and subjective, and *physical phenomena* are considered public and objective. Velmans’s distinction refers to a reflexive way of viewing the relation of observations to experiences, in which, in terms of phenomenology, there is not a separate experience of an object or event as perceived in the world from the experience of an object in the mind. Thus, experienced phenomena *represent* things or events themselves, but are not identical to them. However, the phenomenology of an observed phenomenon remains uniquely private and subjective.

Velmans (2007) reasoned that to the extent that observed entities and events are subject to similar perceptual and cognitive processing in different individuals, it is plausible to assume a degree of *commonality* in the manner in which they are experienced: “Thus while *experienced* entities and events (phenomena) remain private to each observer, if their perceptual, cognitive and other observing apparatus is similar, we assume that their experiences (of a given stimulus) are similar” (p. 717). His conceptualization is summarized thus: (1) There is only *private* access to individual observed or experienced phenomena; (2) There can be *public* access to entities and events

that serve as the stimuli for such phenomena (the entities and events which the phenomena represent); and (3) Experienced phenomena may be *public* in this special sense, insofar as they are *similar or shared private experiences*.

Velmans's (2007) reanalysis of public versus private phenomena offers a progressive way to appraise the relation between *subjectivity* and *inter-subjectivity*. Every private observation or experience is accordingly *subjective*, viewed or described from one's individual perspective—although, once that experience is shared with another observer it becomes *inter-subjective*, “Through the sharing of a similar experience, subjective views and descriptions of that experience potentially converge, enabling inter-subjective agreement about what has been experienced” (p. 717). How different observers establish inter-subjectivity by negotiating accepted descriptions of shared experience is a “complex process” (p. 717) involving considerably more than shared experience: “One also needs a shared language, shared cognitive structures, a shared world-view or scientific paradigm, shared training and expertise, and so on” (p. 717). This has implications for the parallel formulations of Stolorow and Atwood with their conceptualizations of *transference* and organizing *structures of subjectivity* in the complex process of the interplay of subjectivities.

The new post-Enlightenment approach to research emphasizes that *reason* can be used to discern an understanding of human existence within the human sciences.

According to Polkinghorne (1990):

One of the assumptions of the Enlightenment discourse was that rationality was limited to the kind of thought that adhered to the principles of formal logic, and that this is the only legitimate way to reach valid conclusions. By setting aside the

term *reason* to refer only to the type of thinking process that uses calculative, hierarchical ordering operations, the implication was made that other approaches are unreasonable or irrational. (p. 105)

The loss of belief in the epistemological foundations of the Enlightenment and the use of formal logic to discern objective truth, allows for different approaches to understand both the natural and human realms. These new efforts at a nonformal order of understanding are based in the belief that human existence can be made comprehensible, and these assumptions provide an occasion for the renewal of psychology as an investigation of the multiple modes of human experience and subjectivity.

Other Psychoanalytic Views

Juan Tubert-Oklander (2014) wrote that relational approaches to psychoanalysis have included the study of the impact of social reality on the person, but have not addressed the study of groups, institutions and society “as mental processes to be analytically enquired” (p. 59). Tubert-Oklander argued that a new metapsychology is needed for theorizing how social collectives, political groups, and communities influence and affect individual mental processes and consciousness. According to Tubert-Oklander, “Even if we no longer have a use for classical metapsychology, we *do* need some kind of general theory of mind that makes an explicit formulation of our implicit and often unconscious assumptions that underlie our clinical thinking” (p. 59).

Jon Mills (2005) wrote that “psychoanalysis today is largely a psychology of consciousness... [M]any contemporary approaches have displaced the primacy of the unconscious” (p. 156). Mills (2005) contended in his vitriolic paper that relational trends are “gaining ascendancy” (p. 155) and noted that these trends are not seen elsewhere in

the world, observing that Freud has a strong presence in Europe and abroad, with “Klein in England and South America, Lacan in France and Argentina, Jung in Switzerland, the independents in Britain, Kohut in the Midwestern United States, and the interpersonalists in the East, among others” (p. 155).

Although Mills’s (2005) critique is clearly intended as an incendiary polemic, he has garnered a great deal of attention and raised concerns that the unconscious may somehow be lost in the current intersubjective wave. Mills asserted that theoretical statements by Stolorow and his collaborators lend themselves to “decentering intrapsychic activity over relational interaction” (p. 159) and suggested that theoretical statements that emphasize the role of intersubjective relatedness in the making of all experience

irrefutably replace psychoanalysis as a science of the unconscious with an intersubjective ontology that gives priority to conscious experience. To privilege consciousness over unconsciousness to me appears to subordinate the value of psychoanalysis as an original contribution to understanding human experience (p. 59).

In his critique, Mills (2005) championed several relational analysts naming those whom he views as continuing to place primacy on unconscious processes, specifically, Donnel Stern, Phillip Bromberg, Thomas Ogden, and Jodie Messler Davies. Whereas critics of relational and intersubjective approaches exist, more highly represented in the literature are the recent attempts at conceptual linkages among contemporary approaches.

Samuel Gerson is one such example. In a 2006 research article he wrote that although there is general agreement within psychoanalytic camps that human beings are

not self-contained entities and indeed develop within the “continuous and reverberating influence of current and past relational realities” (p. 217), our conceptual clashes are stirred when discussions turn to “the origins, content and dynamics of the unconscious” (p. 217). Gerson (2006) reviewed the research of Juan Tubert-Oklander’s (2006) relationally informed view of the unconscious and his delineation of intersubjective theory as a grounding for clinical interpretation. Gerson outlined Tubert-Oklander’s consideration of the unconscious subjectivities of both analyst and analysand in his descriptions of the unconscious, which include aspects of what several authors have termed a *relational unconscious* (Lyons-Ruth, 1999; Zeddies, 2000; Gerson, 2004).

Gerson (2004) wrote that the goal of his research is a reconsideration of some of the basic concepts that originated from within a more exclusively intrapsychic orientation and extending same concepts from within an intersubjective perspective.

The relational unconscious is the fundamental structuring property of each interpersonal relation; it permits, as well as constrains, modes of engagement specific to that dyad and influences individual subjective experience within the dyad...Enactments and intersubjective resistances are viewed as clinical manifestations of the relational unconscious, and the therapeutic action of analysis results, in part, from altering the structure of the relational unconscious that binds analysand and analyst. (p. 63)

According to Gerson (2004), the idea of a *relational unconscious* best captures the theoretical and clinical implications of intersubjectivity. Its emerging use offers a new language for discussing the role of unconscious processes from within the intersubjective school, and emanates from the original concept of *prereflective organizing principles* first

formulated by Stolorow and Atwood. The idea of a relational unconscious appears as an important bridge concept between classical and contemporary psychoanalytic theoretical models.

Gerson (2004) additionally contrasted the concept of a relational unconscious with three notions of *thirdness*—the *developmental third*, the *cultural third* and the *relational third*. This relates to how each person strives to transform private sensation into symbolic communication as the route by which all individual minds become both “the creator and the expression of culture... thus transforming inchoate impression into a communicable form... preserving the idiosyncratic truth of experience” (p. 64). This shares similarities with Christopher Bollas (1992), who noted how we are continually involved in attempts to utilize elements of the environment as opportunities for “thinking ourselves out” (p. 3). “Without giving it much thought at all, we consecrate the world with our own subjectivity, investing people, places, things, and events with a kind of idiomatic significance” (Bollas, 1992, p. 3).

Chapter 3

Methods

Research Approach

Philosophical hermeneutics, considered the art of reflection on interpretation, is a theory of what happens when we reflect on something (Crusius, 1991), and offers a meaningful way to study this topic. The traditional focus of hermeneutics is the event of understanding and interpretation as it occurs in the encounter between reader and text, with the purpose of the creation of a deeper or new understanding. Because published writing preserves discourse over time and permits the distribution of ideas over space, the inevitable consequence is some degree of alienation between author and reader, “hermeneutics has its origins in breaches in intersubjectivity” (Linge, 1926/1976, vii).

Philosophical hermeneutics is a general philosophy of human existence, “which holds that interpreting is not so much what human beings or some other class of human beings do, but rather what all human beings are, namely, interpreters” (Crusius, 1991, p. 5). Derived from the German phase of phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics was begun by Edmund Husserl, who is often considered the founder of the phenomenological movement and transcendental phenomenology. Husserl, in response to his disillusionment with the scientific world, articulated a way of thinking and a method of inquiry to study experience in the life-world (Crist & Tanner, 2003; McConnell-Henry, Chapman, & Francis, 2009). Husserl emphasized the importance of discovering the truth as derived by understanding the lived human experience and by studying it systematically through rigorous inquiry using bracketing, or reduction, whereby researchers put their preconceptions and beliefs aside for the purpose of exposing the true essence of the lived

experience of a person (Cohen, Kahn, & Steeves, 2000; McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). Bracketing appears as a preservation of an aspect of the Cartesian approach, whereby the dualism of empirical analytic science was retained in his method.

A key premise of philosophical hermeneutics is that *being* is an event—not a static, separated existence, but the intrinsic motion of existence, the ebb and flow of beingness and, like consciousness, is a moving manifestation. In the tradition of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the context of text and meaning is enlarged to include the underlying Being, or *Dasein*, the largest context of one's human beingness in the world. In his seminal work, *Being and Time*, Heidegger asserted that understanding is not simply a cognitive task, but names one of the basic ways (*existentialia*) as one of the fundamental ways of being-in-the-world. Philosophical hermeneutics attempts to place interpretation in the total context of existence (Crusius, 1991): “Philosophical hermeneutics begins explicitly with the primacy of Being with our dependency on the given, on nature, language, culture, tradition and social practices” (p. 20).

The term *hermeneutics* has been used in ancient and modern times to mean interpretation. In Greek mythology, Hermes, the son of Zeus, was a messenger of the gods who interpreted hidden meanings for the mortals (Vandermause & Fleming, 2011). The Greek verb *hermeneuein* (i.e. to interpret) reflects this mythological association. In the Middle Ages, hermeneutics referred to the translation and interpretation of biblical texts in order to make them understandable to the public, an aspect of which became part of the phenomenological movement when Continental philosophers began writing about the essence of experience as it shows itself. Phenomenological approaches to thinking (from the Greek *phainomenon*, what shows itself) introduced a way of translating everyday

experience that has been used in the interpretation of texts in contemporary writings (Vandermause & Fleming, 2011).

Following Husserl, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) took an alternative turn in his writings, whereby experience was viewed ontologically, and not as a subjective activity. Heidegger rejected bracketing, a remnant of the mind-body split in Husserl's epistemology and wrote alternatively about being-in-the world as a temporal, dynamical activity that encompasses what it means to be. Heidegger emphasized the role of foresight, or ability to make interpretations based on background events. Fore-conception is an interpretation that permits anticipation of what might be (possibility), and pre-understanding that already exists in the interpretation of events and engagement in always-already meaning-making. This circular process, of humans as self-interpretive beings, can be described as the hermeneutic circle, and is inclusive of a past, present and future oriented understanding (Diekelmann & Ironside, 2006). Heidegger's ideas about the nature of being introduced a conversation that countered and challenged conventional thinking.

Hans-Georg Gadamer was a student of Martin Heidegger and expanded on Heidegger's ontological views of what it means to be, focusing on an ontological understanding of a person's being in the world that is achieved through language and openness to the perspectives of other beings (McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). Gadamer, whose name is closely associated with the notion of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, developed the notion of hermeneutics as a philosophical standpoint in his magnum opus, *Truth and Method* (1975), and questioned the idea of the notion of truth and whether a method can ever yield it. Gadamer identified hermeneutics with the

awareness that the concept of method is ill suited for the task of understanding within the domain of the human sciences. Gadamer insisted that we are inextricably embedded in our history, tradition, prejudices, and personal horizons of experience that form the basic conditions of all understanding.

As such, Gadamer, like Heidegger, contended that people cannot abstain from preconceived notions and that attempts to eliminate these preconceptions are futile and foolish (Annells, 1999; Gadamer, 1975). Using this stance, the researcher becomes an involved agent of the interpretive process and cannot bracket understandings as data is analyzed in the interpretive tradition. This is a distinguishing turn from Husserl's phenomenological approach (Vandermause & Fleming, 2011).

The technical method for the current paper consists of a literature review of the philosophical and theoretical antecedents that make a contribution to understanding contemporary psychoanalytic theory. This method required that I gather data from both primary and secondary texts in both psychology and philosophy. Additionally, text-data for this research is drawn from various textual sources including scientific, scholarly, literary, or theoretical references. As part of the hermeneutic process, an interpretive analysis of select textual excerpts was conducted. In addition, relevant but underrepresented philosophical themes in contemporary psychoanalytic theories were identified based on the collected sources as part of the hermeneutic process. Following the comparative analysis, I critically analyzed convergent theoretical assumptions and applied the theoretical data in order to arrive at an interpretation of the research rendering a synthesis as it appropriates to the current inquiry and the field of clinical psychology.

Statement of Reflexivity

Whereas the hermeneutic method is the method of engagement and process of understanding between a given text and myself and between texts, the process of understanding begins with the previous knowledge or presuppositions that I bring to the texts being considered. It is through this receptivity to the research process and an awareness and self-reflective stance of my personal interest in the subject, that I have analyzed and developed conclusions based upon my findings.

My engagement with this topic initially germinated from a personal interest in exploring and developing a more articulated conceptual framework for my own clinical work with patients. I was first introduced to some of the chief philosophical works selected by professors over the period of my graduate coursework, which served to deepen a growing interest in the theoretical and philosophical dimensions of psychoanalysis. My interest is organized around contributing to the growing body of psychoanalytic literature that examines the philosophical presuppositions of psychoanalytic metapsychology that frame the development of Freudian and contemporary analytic theories, and the inclusion of the study of consciousness and its phenomenological aspects as a relevant domain of inquiry for psychologists.

My belief is that the clinical utility of psychoanalytic theory is strengthened by illuminating basic philosophical presuppositions and epistemological tenets, which can be articulated and readily communicated. I approach these concerns with an effort to enter into dialogue on several levels: between philosophy and psychoanalysis, between the texts, and myself and between theory and practice. As Schopenhauer previously noted: “In the first place, we find philosophy to be a monster with many heads, each of which

speaks a different language” (p. 95). Though challenges to fruitful dialogue between the two disciplines exist due language differences, a sense of vocation and devotion akin to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s *rigorous practice* (Schleiermacher, 1998) make the endeavor worthwhile, nevertheless.

This has been a unique writing project in that it has been an organic process from its inception that developed synergistically, with my natural interest in the subject matter serving as both talisman and guidepost. It has very much been a *blind following* down a road that in every step along the way, appeared as a path emerging out of nothingness leading to an unknown, unmapped destination—an unfolding in consonance with John Burroughs’ axiom: *leap and the net will appear*. The essential consequence of this endeavor has been a sense of hurdling toward some exigency within the grip of a gravitational pull, and the sense of being called to the topic by an anonymous invocation. The birthing of this paper has been a parallel birthing of my interest in the realm of philosophical inquiry as it relates to psychoanalytic theorizing, and as an extenuation and a broadening of my intellectual investment in psychology as a philosophy of mind. Though I had been a practicing psychotherapist for 13 years prior to my doctoral studies, this project of a philosophical psychology has jettisoned my professional interest in a new direction with vastly different horizons. That I took on this topic as my final writing assignment as a doctoral student at all is suggestive of a mixture of naïveté, hubris, and idealism—a cocktail commonly encountered in teens and graduate students alike. My choice to use a hermeneutic approach to the selected writings called for continual self-evaluation of how my values, beliefs, and wider interests were shaping and affecting the research, as well as myself throughout this process. I considered how the design of the

study might have affected what was found. In addition, I considered other ways of investigating the topic, and remained open to alternative ways of interpreting the findings throughout the research process.

Implications for Future Research

An examination of the importance and use of language in psychology, as a human phenomenon, taking its point of departure from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others in this tradition could be a focus of additional research. The importance of the phenomenon and use of language has been argued by Gadamer (1975) as well, “all that is known, or can be known, is known in discourse about it” (Williams, 1990, p. 140). And additionally, that we are what (who) we are only in and through our participation in the discourse, and similarly that through our participation we both alter and contribute to the conversation. Other ideas for the extenuation of this project would be an investigation into the implications of human ethical tendencies—or human nature—for psychoanalytic theory development and clinical practice. This investigation would ask questions such as the following: What does ethics offer in constructing a world-picture of a good life or healthy patient? What relevance do ethics have in the cultivation of a horizon of meaning or life-world for our patients and ourselves? The notion of unconscious strivings within psychoanalytic theory could be explored in terms of how Freud’s theory of human motivation impacts the idea of ethics and personal accountability. These concerns relate to the notion of whether psychology is a value-neutral profession, and how psychoanalysts may most effectively help patients make meaning of their life-worlds.

Chapter 4

Discussion

Overview

The totality of the efforts of this paper could be referred to as a post-positivist study of human experience and its culmination in the phenomenology of consciousness—the lived experience of subjectivity. The deconstructive philosophers of science and many contemporary European philosophers have responded to the loss of belief in the epistemological foundations of the Enlightenment—the use of formal logic and rationality to locate objective truth and create a universal picture of reality—by reaching for new and different approaches to understand the natural and human realms. Such a strategy calls into being alternate logics, rationalities, and research methods in the attempt to understand human existence—including the use of nonformal logic and hermeneutic rationality in studying the multiplicities of human existence. It is at this unique juncture that we currently find ourselves, which offers the opportunity to study the subjective experience of phenomenal consciousness as part of a renewal of psychology as a human-centered science. Essentially, the evidentiary use of reason can be employed in the explication of a science of human understanding with its basis in hermeneutic-interpretive and phenomenological methodologies.

How philosophy in general and studies of consciousness (phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience) in particular came to be severed from psychology can be explained in terms of historical events and thought paradigms, but on a commonsense level this history seems incompatible with psychology's interest in what constitutes uniquely human behavior and out of line with a rigorous professionalism.

Particular aspects of subjective and emergent experience seem a logical focus for applied and clinical psychologists, and the effect of intersubjectivity on mental states and therapeutic transformation appear as coextensive with experience-near theory and praxis.

It is my view that a working theory of consciousness is essential to rendering epistemological knowledge of conscious and unconscious processes, and should be the chief domain of psychology as a science going forward, with recorded social discourse being the means of study and method for collecting clinical data for data analysis. In addition, Searle's definitional explanation of consciousness as *biological naturalism* appears as a natural starting point for a scientific theory of consciousness with its basis in the irreducibility of consciousness, and with unconscious processes considered as an epiphenomenon of consciousness.

Limitations of Current Study

This research study focused almost exclusively on intersubjective systems theory—the most current psychoanalytic model within the contemporary relational school—and classical Freudian analysis. Additionally, it should be noted that there are many divergent views and unique psychoanalytic models including models that oppose basic tenets of the intersubjective, relational perspective. Numerous dominant schools exist worldwide, including the independent school, interpersonal school, British Middle Group, Kleinian, Lacanian, Bionian, and Kohutian schools, which have theories with distinct concepts and differing clinical perspectives. Additionally, because the focus of the current study is heavily philosophical in nature, it has inherent limitations for addressing the unique clinical contributions of intersubjective versus non-intersubjective schools.

Implications

The historical point at which psychology severed its ties with philosophy and its investigations into consciousness (mental life) marked a major turning point and an epistemological setback in the evolution of a human science of subjective experience. The intersubjective systems theory of Robert Stolorow and George Atwood attempts to reconnect and mend these severed ties with mental life through its emphasis on phenomenological contextualism and experience-near theorizing and practice. Their focus is on the interplay of unique subjectivities in the co-creation of subjective experience, which is constellated in the clinical encounter through conscious and unconscious processes.

If we accept the premise (Heidegger's) that psychology is the science of human lived experience, which culminates in consciousness, then the study of psychology should be related to the study of the mind and the study of subjective experience as an always-happening phenomenal consciousness in the apprehension of new insights, expanded awareness, more flexible defenses, and greater psychological resilience in the face of trauma, loss, stress, and the daily challenges of everyday life. Subjective experience is shaped by intentionality, expressed in the subject-object relationship in the form of empathy, as the feeling through which otherness is apprehended. Intersubjectivity refers to the theory of intentionality—the mark of the psychological—as it moves consciousness and structures or inheres in all encounters between subjectivities.

By far the most confusing aspect of intersubjective theory canon is Atwood and Stolorow's (2014) description of prereflective organizing principles as *invariant*. This appears as a perplexing paradox to their notion of phenomenological contextualism.

Although Stolorow and Atwood (1992) attempted to address this seeming contradiction, a thorough conceptual proposition to address these issues is still needed. For example, if organizing principles are invariant, how does IST account for the aggregation of new organizing principles within the context of affective attunement and selfobject experience in the clinical encounter? What happens to the original principles when new organizing principles are added? What is the formal proposition for the development of organizing principles—other than that they are developmentally constituted based upon patterns of interaction within relational matrices? An explication is needed of fundamental aspects of a *universal structuring of experiencing* and how such structures evolve and constellate within developmental relational matrices and are modified throughout the life cycle.

Organizing principles refer to the structure of one's unique emotional life in the ordering of subjective experience, and can be said to essentially distinguish my subjectivity from yours. Thus, organizing principles implicitly refer to intrapsychic processes that persist in an enduring way—not in the strict Cartesian sense, but in the sense that these principles exist, phenomenologically, as yours or mine. Kant, who was probably the first phenomenologist, referred to this as the transcendental illusion of subjective unity—I experience one and all of my representations as mine. However, if it were not so, at least to a greater or lesser extent, then my thoughts would become your thoughts (or vice versa) either immediately once we come in contact, or gradually over the course of repeated exposure, or as a function of the duration of time spent together, etc. This appears as a paradoxical element within the phenomenological contextualist philosophy of IST. This paradox suggests that phenomenological contextualism has abiding limitations or laws to which it conforms, is constricted, or constrained. These

unarticulated laws (patterns) form the basis for the characteristics of consciousness that refer to its constitution, and its evolution; an important and germane area for psychoanalytic investigation.

In phenomenological theory and research, the primary concern is the illumination of *structures of experience*, and there are numerous possible structures that could be the focus of investigation. In psychoanalytic phenomenology the subject of investigation is the illumination of *structures of subjectivity* or subjective experience. This differs from the philosophical phenomenologist who is concerned with structures of experience in universal terms such as the essence of man's being, and tends to rely on solitary reflection, steering the focus away from the individual. In contrast, the psychoanalytic phenomenologist is concerned with the unique intersubjective history or idiosyncratic life experiences of the individual in treatment and their subjective lifeworld. This distinction is important so as not to conflate our subject matter for study and investigation. Husserl was interested in *structures of consciousness* and descriptions of what conscious experience is like; whereas Heidegger was interested in *structures of intelligibility* that order our experiences and make us intelligible to ourselves. However, structures of consciousness are integrally linked to potentials for prereflective organizing principles and self-intelligibility generally.

The theoretical irony of IST lies in the argument against the idea of the Cartesian isolated mind from within the very paradigm that made the argument possible. The concept of subjectivity itself, from which the term *intersubjective systems theory* derives its meaning, is founded upon the subject/object reference delineated by Descartes. Other traces of Cartesian dualism pervade the theory as well including the reifying implications

of *introspection* and the concept of an intersubjective *field*, which Stolorow has noted may prove to be a remnant of metapsychological constructs.

The IST emphasis on affectivity, systems of organizing principles, empathy, and cognitive-affective schemata is contextually dependent and emerges from within a dyadic system or field, dependent upon the temporality of being (i.e. foundational to one's experience of beingness and meaning-making). However, when Stolorow and Atwood select out biological drives from this equation, they fall back into dualistic mind/body, inside/outside thinking. Since drives are phenomenologically coextensive with context in ways comparable with affectivity, it seems an unnecessary distinction to sever the head from the body, when conceptualizing the relevance or clinical utility of either within the therapeutic setting. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body experience serves as an important counterpoint to this split in terms of bringing together these experiential modes of interaction with reality, and the social world.

Familiarity with Heinz Kohut's self psychological theory, the school out of which Stolorow and Atwood germinated their earliest psychoanalytic formulations, renders conclusions about the importance of empathy and introspection, to the exclusion of biological drives, understandable. Kohut argued that a scientific theory should be consistent with a science's method of investigation, and thus reasoned that since the psychoanalytic method always includes introspection and empathy as its central constituents, only that which is accessible to introspection and empathy belongs within the domain of psychoanalytic theory. Essentially, in Kohut's view psychoanalytic theory should be a depth psychology of personal experience, because it is only personal experience that is accessible to the psychoanalytic method of investigation, thus

excluding instinctual drives. The field that is observed in Kohut's two-person psychology includes both the observed and the observer, but only as a head that sees and hears and is capable of introspection and empathy.

As occurs in the therapeutic encounter, it is the interplay of subjectivities and the resultant co-creation of meaning that implies at its basis a grounding in some ethical horizon or conceptual foundation. This is logically commensurate with the activity of meaning-making and the requisite philosophical underpinnings of any narrative, synthesis, or reframing that is constitutive of interpretive functions—in any attempt at the assimilation of events, happenings, emotions, patterns and thematic tendencies within subjectivity. In a similar way, one may compare the hermeneutic-deconstructive approach, whether applied to theory or practice, which calls for open-minded questioning and resumes the conversation, allowing it to continue with the incorporation of newly emergent truths.

Historically speaking, the terror associated with the antisocialism of dualism appears to have been a powerful reinforcer of materialism, which was associated with the scientific approach. Thus, consciousness was shunned as the unexplainable monolith standing outside the scientific approach. This accounts for the near elimination of consciousness discourse from the discipline of psychology, but concurrently renders this exclusion inexplicable, since the central domain of psychology is the mental life of the patient, with conscious and unconscious processes its primary focus and mode of exploration. The exclusion and neglect of consciousness as a constitutional province for psychology and psychoanalytic theory extends from the scientific movement with its genesis in positivism and Cartesian dualism. Although psychoanalysis is currently taught

as the pinnacle of clinical training, without the inclusion and benefit of the rich history of consciousness research in cognitive science and phenomenological philosophy, it falls short of offering the comprehensive training and expertise for a well-defined theory of mind. At its most basic level, a psychoanalytic philosophy of mind should address intentionality (pliability of drives), causality, the associative nature of mind, agency, social cognition/how we know others, the tendency to concretize experience, a well-conceived epistemology of nonconscious/nonsensual/apprehension of reality, primary and secondary process thinking, a sense of unity and temporal continuity to our subjective experiences, and a working hypothesis for how nonconscious processes affect consciousness. These topical referents clearly are rich spheres for future research.

The emphasis on affectivity in relational psychoanalysis, and its motivational primacy, particularly with regard to nonconscious affect, is greatly aided by the theorizing of Gilles Deleuze and his concept of transcendental empiricism. Deleuze (1994) described a fundamental encounter with an object or sign through a phenomenological lens, as an encounter that can only be *sensed*. This subtlety of experience is conveyed as *affective tones* and offers a descriptive account of the apprehension of reality and the immediacy of subjective emotional experience. Similarly, Inna Semetsky (2004) employed Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic philosophy to compare the intuitive mode with a Firstness of experience that is characterized as precognitive, qualitative, and inclusive of presensory and preconscious data. The intuitive mode is taken to operate recursively and reciprocally with the analytic mode in the operation of the thinking process. These ideas buttress and augment psychoanalytic conceptions of unconscious mental processes and terms such as

Christopher Bollas's (1987) *unthought known*, and Donnel Stern's (1989) *unformulated experience*.

As stated previously, a key goal for this paper is the stimulation of discussion on how values, worldviews, therapeutic frames, theories and beliefs are an inseparable part of all psychotherapeutic interactions. It is deeply concerning that the philosophical basis and tenets embedded in each intervention employed in the treatment of patients is systematically unacknowledged. It is an important advance both for psychoanalysis and psychology proper to consider that at the core of *interpretation* is the kernel of suggestion, that psychoanalytic neutrality is not a reasonable possibility, and that the notion of psychology as a value-neutral profession, is in itself, nonetheless a value. It is my belief that through discourse we can begin to share our individual and collective discoveries and that through this ongoing dialogue we can more readily recognize the emerging inception of more inclusive worldviews and theoretical paradigms—thus creating a newly emergent conceptual language to articulate the phenomenology of subjective perspectival shifts. How we learn and how we expand our horizons of meaning through the ongoing happenings of organizing principles via the process of expansion, contraction or extinction of ideas, thoughts and emotions within consciousness is clearly the fundamental province of psychology generally and psychoanalysis in particular.

Conclusion

It appears clear in the examination of psychoanalytic theory with its basis in the therapeutic transformations that make psychic change possible, that the paucity of theoretical grist in relation to consciousness studies and a clear language for explicating how conscious and unconscious processes effect therapeutic change is a lacuna of

gigantic proportions in the history of psychoanalytic theory. While modifications in psychoanalytic thought are evident in the declining use of long-established metaphysical concepts like *psychical apparatus* and *psychic energy*, the psychological knowledge of post-modern thought must also be transposed into more hermeneutic or phenomenological terms. Additionally, there remains an insufficient account of the process whereby psychological flexibility is fostered and new worldviews are acquired via the interplay of subjectivities and interactions within the clinical encounter and through psychoanalytic discourse.

This paper's title appears as a reflection of the moniker that seems most accurate for psychoanalysis in its current incarnation—a philosophy of mind. Psychoanalysis continues to be a dynamic, self-correcting endeavor and it has the potential for much growth as a human science of lived experience. I fully agree with Heidegger's assumption that an authentic *science of human experience* implies a phenomenological approach to lived experience, which culminates in consciousness. Thusly, psychology should in its purest form be a human science with its basis in the phenomenology of consciousness. In speaking to the issue of the unconscious in its classical conceptualization as an infinite unknown, in my view this logic holds consistent sway, not as a reified entity or objective psyche, but in lieu of its temporal existence and because consciousness in its dual aspects (conscious and unconscious processes) is always changing and never static.

The important contribution of Heideggerian concepts such as *categorical intuition* and *nonsensual intentionality* offers a useful language for discourse about meanings that are relationally constituted and illuminated via phenomenological relationality within the

psychoanalytic encounter. In my view, these terms and concepts should be given careful consideration for incorporation into the contemporary psychoanalytic lexicon. Because language is the means by which we disclose and create reality in the always happening phenomenal appearance of truth, it is essential for language to reflect our current and best approximations for our current discoveries of self and other. To mirror the sentiment of the 13th-century Sufi poet Rumi: Speak a new language so that the world will be a new world.

Although this paper emphasized primarily intersubjective systems theory and classical psychoanalytic approaches reflective of their respective philosophies of mind, numerous other psychoanalytic schools exist including Bionian, Kleinian, Lacanian, Kohutian, and others. That there are so many divergent views and theoretical divides within psychoanalysis proper is supportive of my central thesis that a theory of consciousness is relevant to the field of clinical psychology, and could aid in shifting its epistemological basis from its current incarnation as a philosophy of mind or more precisely, numerous philosophies of mind, to a scientific theory of mind. I agree with D. K. Silverman's (2000) contention that psychoanalysis must turn to a systematic scientific approach to constructing a theory of mind, building on the work of Freud. A working model for a scientific theory of consciousness could serve as the starting point for a unifying tenet for the many distinct psychoanalytic schools.

In this survey of the relevant literature, the ontology of the mental is evidentially a first-person ontology in that knowledge of our world contains an irreducibly subjective aspect. When attempting to discern the real from appearances, we are confounded by the contradiction that what appears in consciousness—although it may be a representation of

objective reality—is no less real than the original objects represented. This is the new thought system that seeks expression and the paradox revealed as a hidden aspect of reality.

It is my belief that we need to begin to merge these expanded viewpoints and insights from the rich philosophical heritage of our trailblazing predecessors, and make the concerted effort necessary to speak a new language and develop a unique lexicon to articulate and address the meanings we are discovering regarding how transformations in consciousness occur. In so doing, we can fundamentally refine and redefine the theory and practice of psychoanalysis by integrating research from related disciplines such as cognitive science, philosophy of mind and consciousness studies. The scientific study of consciousness using a mixed-model approach to include both hermeneutic and natural science variables, would contribute most significantly to psychoanalytic theory development.

Because the incorporation of previously distinct thought systems increases intellectual hybridization, reductionistic tendencies and isolationism can be delimited within thought systems without the loss of conceptual, contextual, and historical relevance and meaning of concepts in the process, as seen with psychologism. This ongoing hermeneutic endeavor serves to further progress and extend the epistemological foundations upon which psychoanalysis is based, and to consider the possibilities for systematic research, as an orientation to, or a *turning toward*, the future of the field and subsequent generations of scholar-practitioners of the human science and phenomenology of consciousness.

As we endeavor to cultivate meaning through the clinical encounter, the central

challenge and impediment to hermeneutic understanding within psychoanalytic treatment remains the initial absence of shared or commensurate worldviews, language, experiences, or cognitive structures between discrete consciousnesses. In the psychoanalytic project, the research and scientific efforts for refinement all attempt to redress the limitations inherent to these and all human interactions, which culminate in the gap between subjectivities and the discrete consciousnesses that define us.

As these relational models continue to mature and gain momentum, it is likely that a more precise conceptual language will emerge for communicating the intersubjective viewpoint. As is already seen with the usage of new terms such as *Freudian intersubjectivity* and the *relational unconscious*, it stands to reason that these concepts would begin to be referenced and recognized for their shared conceptual basis, instead of for their differences. As hybridization continues between theories and across disciplines, my hope for the future of psychoanalysis is that a convivial, nondefensive discourse across psychoanalytic divides may be cultivated and practiced.

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